The Musical Uncanny In Early Nineteenth-Century German Culture by Lalonde, Amanda
  
 
 
 
THE MUSICAL UNCANNY IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
GERMAN CULTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Amanda Lee Lalonde 
May 2014  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 Amanda Lee Lalonde  
  
 
THE MUSICAL UNCANNY 
IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMAN CULTURE 
Amanda Lee Lalonde, PhD 
Cornell University 2014 
 
 
In this dissertation, I define the concept and foundations of the musical uncanny i n 
early nineteenth-century German culture. My dissertation differs from previous studies of 
the musical uncanny in that, in addition to the customary investigation of how music can 
act uncanny or evoke uncanniness, it also investigates why music is uncanny, taking an 
interdisciplinary and historical approach. By specifying a focus on the musical uncanny, I 
mean an uncanny that is specifically oriented towards music, encompassing conceptions of 
music in aesthetics; the representation or reception of musical activities and works in 
literature, criticism, and visual art; and musical works that engage with notions of music’s 
uncanniness. In short, I am interested in the uncanniness of music in the early nineteenth 
century, rather than the coincidence of music and uncanniness. 
 In the first chapter, I retrace and critique Freud’s etymological survey to gain a 
clear understanding of the meanings of unheimlich in the nineteenth century. I then 
suggest that Idealist music aesthetics in the early nineteenth century support an 
understanding of music as uncanny. The second and third chapters take the relevance of 
the uncanny to nineteenth-century music criticism as their focus. In the second chapter, I 
flesh out intimations of the uncanny in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony, suggesting that the essay constitutes a point of transition between the aesthetics 
of the musical sublime and the musical uncanny. In the third chapter, I address the 
reception of ombra music as uncanny in early nineteenth-century instrumental music. The 
fourth and fifth chapters address thematisations of music as uncanny in German literature 
  
and musical works. In the fourth chapter, I examine the twin thematisation of the forest and 
music as manifesting the absolute and the primary symbol of this fusion, the Waldhorn. In 
the fifth chapter, I consider the thematisations of the musical instrument as a living-dead 
thing. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Musical works associated with death and German Romantic operas featuring 
supernatural figures are often labelled uncanny. However, for the purposes of this 
study, they do not necessarily constitute the musical uncanny. Those expecting a 
discussion of automatons and severed heads may be disappointed. Although many 
uncanny themes surface in early nineteenth-century musical works, by specifying a 
focus on the musical uncanny, I mean an uncanny that is specifically oriented towards 
music, encompassing conceptions of music in aesthetics; the representation or reception 
of musical activities and works in literature, criticism, and visual art; and musical 
works that engage with notions of music’s uncanniness. In short, I am interested in the 
uncanniness of music in the early nineteenth century, rather than the coincidence of 
music and uncanniness. 
 In a broad sense, the musical uncanny in Western art music has been the subject 
of a number of short studies since the 1990s, although it has not received extended 
consideration.
1
 Where my project differs most substantially from many of these 
                                                 
1 
I will not consider here recent work on the musical uncanny that is outside of this area, such as 
Brianna Wells’ performance and media theory-driven consideration of the Met’s Live in HD 
productions as the familiar made strange, or Isabella Van Elferen’s monograph on the sounds and music 
of the gothic, from the soundscapes of gothic novels to the subgenre of gothic rock music and the 
soundtracks of such contemporay gothic television, video game, and film dramas as Twin Peaks and 
Silent Hill. Brianna Wells, “‘Secret Mechanism: Les Contes d’Hoffmann and the Intermedial Uncanny 
in the Metropolitan Opera’s Live in HD Series,” 19th-Century Music 36, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 191-203. 
Isabella Van Elferen, Gothic Music: The Sounds of the Uncanny  (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
2012). 
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previous studies is that, in addition to the customary investigation of how music can act 
uncanny or evoke uncanniness, I ask why music is uncanny, and what that means for 
music. My research is also distinctive in that I treat the musical uncanny – in the sense 
that I specified a ove    as a historical phenomenon.2 My argument is historical, first of 
all, in that I argue for a conceptualisation of music as uncanny that is specific to a 
particular time and culture, stemming from the re-evaluation of music in German 
Idealist aesthetics after Kant. This approach contrasts with the sweeping survey of 
Richard Cohn (which embraces Gesualdo, Monteverdi, Schubert, and Wagner, among 
others)
 
or the work-specific, but not historically centred, readings of
 
Carlo Caballero 
and Joseph Kerman, which focus on the uncanniness of Dukas’ The Sorcerer’s 
Apprentice and Beethoven’s Op. 131, respectively.3 An exception to this approach is 
Michael Cherlin’s convincing argument that evocations of tonality in the atonal mus ic 
of Schoenberg can be understood as uncanny, since they are the repressed products of a 
culturally surmounted system of composition.
4
 
                                                 
2 
In doing so, I follow scholars of the uncanny in other fields, such as Terry Castle, who argues that the 
age of Enlightenment “produced, like a kind of toxic side effect, a new human experience of 
strangeness, anxiety,  afflement, and impasse” – that is, the uncanny. Terry Castle, The Female 
Thermometer: Eighteenth Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 8. Castle is interested in extending the historical relevance of the uncanny back into the 
eighteenth century in reaction to scholarship that depicts the uncanny as a post -1800 phenomenon. I do 
not argue for the unique right of the nineteenth century to claim the musical uncanny, a mission that 
would  e in direct opposition to Castle’s work, but rather seek to establish an understanding of the 
musical uncanny that is particular to the nineteenth century.  
3 
Richard Cohn, “Uncanny Resem lances: Tonal Signification in the Freudian Age,” Journal of the American 
Musicological Society 57 (2004): 285-324; Richard Cohn, “Hexatonic Poles and the Uncanny in Parsifal,” 
The Opera Quarterly 22 (2006): 230-48; Carlo Ca allero, “Silence, Echo: A Response to ‘What the 
Sorcerer Said’,” 19th-Century Music 28, no. 2 (2004): 160-182; Joseph Kerman, “Beethoven’s Opus 
131 and the Uncanny,” Nineteenth Century Music  25 (2001): 155-64. 
4 Michael Cherlin, “Schoen erg and Das Unheimliche: Spectres of Tonality,” Journal of Musicology 11 
(1993): 357-73. In addition to grounding his argument in culturally-specific ideas about music, Cherlin 
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 Furthermore, my argument is historical in that it claims to establish and to 
operate under a distinctively early nineteenth-century German sense of the term 
unheimlich. This requires a careful negotiation of the most celebrated and unavoidable 
theorist of the uncanny, Freud, whose de t in “Das Unheimliche” to his early 
nineteenth-century sources is as significant as his departure from nineteenth-century 
thought.
5
 Freud’s theory of the uncanny has informed my own thinking about this 
aesthetic and has led me to many valuable nineteenth-century sources. However, as the 
first chapter will make evident, my own conception of the uncanny departs significantly 
from Freud’s definition. By working primarily with nineteenth-century sources to 
formulate my theory of the uncanny, I claim a historical specificity that would be 
forfeited if Freud were my sole point of reference.  
 In addition to identifying a nineteenth-century uncanny, I seek to delineate a 
musical uncanny. In my belief, it is no coincidence that Hoffmann, whom Freud called 
the “unrivalled master of the uncanny in literature,” 6 was obsessed with music. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
makes a historical argument in the sense that the music under consideration is contemporaneous with 
Freud’s essay.  
 
5 
Michael Cherlin comments that it is interesting that Freud does not address why Hoffmann and 
Schelling, both early nineteenth-century figures, offer particularly compelling insights into the 
uncanny. Cherlin proposes the explanation (akin to Castle’s ideas, but with more of a chronological 
delay) that in early nineteenth-century thought the legacy of the eighteenth-century  ecomes “displaced 
and estranged.”  Cherlin, “Schoen erg and Das Unheimliche,” 361-62. Similarly, Lawrence Kramer 
suggests that Freud’s work “is in part a codification of nineteenth -century expressive and discursive 
practices.” Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice: 1800-1900 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 184. Marc Falkenberg re-examines some of Freud’s source material and 
generates an expanded definition of the uncanny that suits his purposes of examining German Romantic 
literature. While my focus on music leads my conclusions down a different path than those of 
Falkenberg, my work is indebted to his methodology.  Marc Falkenberg, Rethinking the Uncanny in 
Hoffmann and Tieck (Oxford: Lang, 2005). 
 
6
 “E. T. A. Hoffmann ist der unerreichte Meister des Unheimlichen in der Dichtung.” Sigmund Freud, 
“Das Unheimliche,” in Sigmund Freud Studienausgabe, Band IV: Psychologische Schriften  (Frankfurt 
am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1970),  257. 
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Hoffmann’s tales, music participates in and sometimes single-handedly creates the 
uncanniness of the story. Throughout this dissertation, Hoffmann serves as one of the 
touchstones of the early nineteenth-century musical uncanny, and his literature, music 
criticism, and visual art play an important part in the invention and representation of 
this aesthetic.
7
  While Hoffmann’s musical writings have received significant 
musicological attention, they remain more closely associated with the musical sublime 
than the uncanny. And indeed, this pair of aesthetic concepts is often so intertwined in 
the very beginning of the nineteenth century, that a substantial portion of this study is 
devoted to differentiating them.   
   What is the musical uncanny? As I noted previously, the manner in which I 
employ “musical” in this project exceeds the common usage, which denotes uncanny 
effects attributed to musical moments or the musical response to uncanny extra -musical 
themes. While I have thus far emphasised the ways in which this dissertation advances 
scholarship on the musical uncanny, these pre-existing concerns are also mine. What, 
after all, is the point of music being perceived as uncanny if musical works cannot 
demonstrate it? In this dissertation, I build on previous scholarship on the musical 
uncanny, while departing from it in terms of methodology and scope .  
 The larger part of the existing scholarship treats texted or programmatic music 
that deals with uncanny subject matter. Christopher H. Gi  s‘ “Komm, geh’ mit mir: 
Schu ert’s Uncanny ‘Erlkönig’,” examines the reception history of Goethe’s poem and 
Schu ert’s song, locating the appeal of the latter in its effective evocation of the text’s 
                                                 
7
 Some of Hoffmann’s compositions could also be invoked in discussions of the musical uncanny, in the 
sense that they combine uncanniness and music; however, the works do not take musical  uncanniness as 
their subject. 
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uncanniness on several levels. Regarding the song as a whole, Gibbs follows Shoshana 
Felman’s concept of the “uncanny reading effect,” where a reader performs the text  y 
repeating it. Pointing out the accepted belief that Schubert employs musical depictions 
of phenomena as indicators of mental states, Gibbs argues that the storm/hoofbeat motif 
in “Der Erlkönig” “ ecomes a relentless invocation of unease and anxiety,”  which 
causes the listener to enter the scene and states of mind of the song ’s characters, thus 
creating an “uncanny listening effect.”8 More specifically, Gibbs locates uncanniness in 
the voice of the Erlkönig, which undoes the binary oppositions of attraction/repulsion, 
female/male, and sweetness/terror.
9
 
 A chapter from David Schwarz’s Listening Subjects: Music, Psychoanalysis, 
Culture is also concerned with musical-textual relationships, but trades a reception 
history approach for psychoanalytic criticism.
10
 Schwarz examines two Schubert songs 
(“Ihr Bild” and “Der Doppelgänger”) that deal with su jective dou ling, relating the 
situations of each song to the theory of the gaze, which “o ften bears an uncanny sense 
of looking and being looked at; su ject/o ject relations are confused.”11 In “Der 
Doppelgänger,” Schwarz locates psychic experiences in very specific musical 
phenomena, based on text-music relations and supported by Schenkerian analysis: 
                                                 
8
 Christopher H. Gi  s, “Komm, geh’ mit mir: Schu ert’s Uncanny ‘Erlkönig’,” Nineteenth Century 
Music 19 (1995): 123 and 128-29. Shoshana Felman, “Henry James: Madness and the Risks of Practice 
(Turning the Screw of Interpretation),” in Writing and Madness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 141-247. 
9
 Gi  s, “Komm, geh’ mit mir,” 123  and 131-32. 
10
 David Schwarz, “Music and the Gaze: Schu ert’s ‘Der Doppelgänger’ and ‘Ihr Bild’,” in Listening 
Subjects: Music, Psychoanalysis, Culture (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1997), 64-
86. 
11
 Schwarz, “Music and the Gaze,” 64.  
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musical repetition is understood as obsession, F# is labelled as the pitch -class 
representative of the gaze, and G as the pitch of recognition.
12
 In “Ihr Bild,” the setting 
emphasises that the image of the beloved is none other than the reflection of the 
protagonist. Once again, we encounter a text-specific reading where music performs the 
work of highlighting the uncanniness of a text. 
 Carlo Ca allero’s article, “Silence, Echo: A Response to ‘What the Sorcerer 
Said’,” which addresses Dukas’ The Sorcerer’s Apprentice and Carolyn A  ate’s essay 
on the same piece, similarly relies on an extra-musical narrative to establish the basis of 
musical uncanniness, although his interpretation departs from dependence on the text at 
a crucial juncture. Caballero’s mission is to highlight the uncanniness of the work, 
which was intimated in,  ut not the central focus of, A  ate’s essay.13 While Caballero 
esta lishes the  asis of uncanniness in the  room’s transformation from heimlich 
domestic object to unheimlich animate and infinitely regenerating monstrosity, he also 
reads the end of the piece as surpassing the narrative stated in Goethe’s poem. 14 
Caballero suggests that the final notes imply the possible reanimation of the broom, 
even after the supposed undoing of the spell, and that, more significantly, they do so in 
the “voice” of the  room.15 His ideas about the uncanniness of interjections and 
                                                 
12
 Schwarz, “Music and the Gaze,” 65-66. 
13
 Carlo Ca allero, “Silence, Echo: A Response to ‘What the Sorcerer Said’,” 19th-Century Music 28 
(2004): 161. Carolyn Abbate, “What the Sorcerer Said ,” 19th-Century Music 12, no. 3 (1989): 221-230. 
14
 Ca allero, “Silence, Echo,” 163. 
15
 Caballero, “Silence, Echo,” 163-177. 
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interruptions, where another voice (and particularly the voice of an inanimate object) 
seems to usurp the music, have informed my theories. 
 More recently, an interest in a musical uncanny less related to textual references 
has led to a search for specific musical techniques or principles that create an uncanny 
effect. Richard Cohn’s work on the sensation caused  y the pair of chords related to 
each other as “hexatonic poles” makes a clear distinction  etween the “weak sense” of 
the uncanny in texted musical works, where a standard-issue catalogue of uncanny 
phenomena drawn from Freud and Jentsch, including “dead  odies, necroanimism, 
reincarnation, magic, and spirits,” is implicated in the narrative, and a stong use – a 
specifically musical device which operates in the “Freudian sense of effacing 
 oundaries.”16 Cohn translates Freud’s assertion that “an uncanny effect is often  and 
easily produced when the distinction  etween imagination and reality is effaced” into 
musical terms, reasoning that for Lorenz, Kurth, and Schenker musical reality is 
consonance, while dissonance is mere appearance. Arguing that consonance/dissonance 
and reality/imagination are interchangeable, Cohn arrives at a new formulation for the 
musically uncanny: “an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the 
distinction between dissonance and consonance is effaced, as when something that we 
have hitherto regarded as dissonant appears  efore us as a consonance.” 17 Cohn figures 
                                                 
16 Richard Cohn, “Hexatonic Poles and the Uncanny in Parsifal,” The Opera Quarterly 22 (2006): 244. 
Richard Cohn, “Uncanny Resem lances: Tonal Signification in the Freudian Age,” Journal of the 
American Musicological Society  57 (2004):287. 
17
 Cohn, “Uncanny Resem lances,” 317-18. 
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the pair of hexatonic poles as a musical device wherein the consonant triad’s latent 
potential to be reinterpreted as dissonant creates an uncanny effect.
18
  
 As is evident from the title, Nicholas Cook similarly figures musical 
juxtaposition and reinterpretation as creating an uncanny impression in “Uncanny 
Moments: Juxtaposition and the Collage Principle in Music.” 19 Working with 
established ideas about collage in surrealist art and montage in film, Cook proposes that 
the principle of juxtaposition functions to retain the commonplace identity of each 
element, in one sense, while also creating new, unfamiliar significances through 
incongruous combinations.
20
 Although Cook insists that his theory is applicable to 
earlier Western art music (he repeatedly mentions Beethoven), his musical illustrations 
are more convincing and worked-through when he deals with Queen’s “Bohemian 
Rhapsody,”21 raising the question of whether the principle of collage can be applied to a 
piece that is so not overtly sectional. Furthermore, Cook declines to define what, 
precisely, is uncanny about this situation, an omission that he acknowledges and that he 
ascribes to the ineffability of the musical uncanny.
22
 Finally, Cook’s theory would also 
benefit from additional consideration of what constitutes a musical analogue to 
juxtaposition and collage, particularly whether the musical components need to  e “pre-
                                                 
18
 Cohn, “Uncanny Resemblances,” 320. 
 
19
 Nicholas Cook, “Uncanny Moments: Juxtaposition and the Collage Principle in Music ,” in 
Approaches to Meaning in Music , ed. Byron Almén and Edward Pearsall (Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), 107-134. 
 
20
 Cook, “Uncanny Moments,” 119-124. 
 
21
 Cook, “Uncanny Moments,” 125-28. 
 
22
 Cook, “Uncanny Moments,” 129. 
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existing” in some sense in addition to contrasting, as is the case with materials in a 
visual art collage. While I engage with the idea of “pre-existing” music, to some extent, 
in my explorations of the repurposing or adaptation of musical topics in chapters three 
and four, I am not convinced that this is a significantly strong parallel with collage. 
 In connexion with musical topics, but in contrast to the other approaches 
surveyed here, Michael L. Klein’s “Bloom, Freud, and Riffaterre: Influence and 
Intertext as Signs of the Uncanny” relies largely on topic theory to identify the musical 
signifiers of the uncanny.
23
 Klein’s uncanny is rather loosely defined with references to 
various uncanny phenomena, and seems to centre on fear, as this is the aspect of the 
death and ombra topics that he links to the uncanny.
24
 Despite my objections to the 
framing of his argument, I find myself engaging with some of the same musical features 
and topics as Klein, particularly ombra music. Klein ties ombra to the uncanny through 
their mutual association with awe and terror, although he does not explain what makes 
the uncanny use of ombra signifiers more than simply terrifying. His identification of 
ombra-as-uncanny music is also very loose: Klein sometimes calls a single augmented 
sixth or diminished seventh chord a suggestion of this  topic.
25
 As a result, his musical 
uncanny is too plentiful, a problem that he acknowledges.
26
 
 I have already mentioned Michael Cherlin’s article “Schoen erg and Das 
Unheimliche: Spectres of Tonality” in the context of historically-based uncanniness. In 
                                                 
23 
Michael L. Klein, “Bloom, Freud, and Riffaterre: Influence and In tertext as Signs of the Uncanny,” in 
Intertextuality in Western Art Music  (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004),  77-107. 
 
24 
Klein, “Bloom, Freud, and Riffaterre,” 80-85, 95. 
 
25 Klein, “Bloom, Freud, and Riffaterre,” 80 and 87.  
 
26 Klein, “Bloom, Freud, and Riffaterre,” 106.  
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one sense – the wider historical context – Cherlin’s argument operates on the principle 
of juxtaposition, in this case between the systems of tonality and atonality. In the sense 
of individual musical works, however, it belongs more to notions of musical 
uncanniness that are linked to rendering familiar harmonic sonorities unfamil iar. 
Whereas this results in an interpretation of tonal traces as “estranged, evanescent 
spectres,” 27 other scholarship considers the Heimlichkeit of the tonic. Nicholas 
Marston’s “Schu ert's Homecoming,” for example, explores the common metaphor of 
the tonic as “home,” particularly in the recapitulation of a sonata. 28 Focusing on the 
first movement of Schu ert’s Sonata in B flat, D.960, Marston argues that Schu ert 
makes the tonic “unhomely,” and thus uncanny, in the recapitulation. While the concept 
of this article is intriguing, Marston’s contextualisation of the ideas is less compelling. 
For instance, Marston aligns the uncanny with anagnorisis, or a discovery scene, which 
is not necessarily uncanny as it need not involve repression or a sense that the 
recognition should not occur.
29
 
 Other scholarship strikes out in individual directions. Whi le Joseph Kerman’s 
“Beethoven’s Opus 131 and the Uncanny” leads one to expect a meditation on 
uncanniness, Kerman’s most extended application of the uncanny is his deli erately 
clumsy cautionary interpretation, where a “repressed” musical idea is revealed to  e just 
                                                 
27 Cherlin, “Schoen erg and Das Unheimliche,” 362. 
 
28 
Nicholas Marston, “Schu ert's Homecoming,” Journal of the Royal Musical Association 125, No. 2 
(2000): 248-270. 
 
29 
Nicholas Marston, “Schu ert's Homecoming,” 266-67. Regarding anagnorisis and the uncanny, in a 
prototypical scene of anagnorisis, it is not uncanny when Odysseus, upon his return home, is 
recognised for his scar while being bathed by his old nurse. Jessica Waldoff briefly notes a possible 
relation between anagnorisis and uncanniness, but does not suggest that the former necessarily evokes 
the latter. Jessica Waldoff, Recognition in Mozart’s Operas  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6. 
 
  
11 
 
 
as likely something that is momentarily set aside.
30
 Uncanny, here, is an adjective, not 
an aesthetic category with all of its accompanying baggage: Kerman writes of the 
thematic manipulation in the final movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet in  C# 
minor, Op. 131: “The adjective that works for me is uncanny. This music has something 
of the ogre a out it.”31 Although Kerman’s analysis is perceptive, it is disappointing 
that he backs away from the seemingly central question of what musical uncanniness 
means to him. Kerman concludes with the justification that “E. T. A. Hoffmann didn’t 
ask why the double-bass fugato was uncanny in the Fifth Symphony.” However, as I 
will argue in the second chapter, Hoffmann’s use of that word points to a broad 
conception of music, one that is indeed further developed in that iconic review.
32
 
 Heather Hadlock’s “Return of the Repressed” is more centrally concerned with 
gender issues than it is with theorising the musical uncanny.
33
 In Offen ach’s Les 
Contes d’Hoffmann, according to Hadlock, the repressed that returns is the personage 
and voice of the operatic diva. Although, aside from the title, Hadlock does not 
explicitly theorise her work in terms of the uncanny, her idea of the female singer as 
instrument in Hoffmann’s stories is of particular interest for this dissertation: in a way, 
it is the mirror image of the ideas developed in the fifth chapter.
34
 
                                                 
30 Joseph Kerman, “Beethoven’s Opus 131 and the Uncanny,” Nineteenth Century Music  25 (2001): 158. 
 
31 Kerman, “Beethoven’s Opus 131,” 158 . 
 
32 Kerman, “Beethoven’s Opus 131,” 164 . 
 
33 Heather Hadlock, “Return of the Repressed,” Cambridge Opera Journal 6 (1994): 221-243. 
 
34
 Hadlock, “Return of the Repressed,” 223. 
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 In “Scherzo and the unheimlich: The Construct of Genre and Feeling in the Long 
19th Century,” Lóránt Péteri argues that the scherzo genre tends to create the conditions 
for musical uncanniness, a quality that Péteri attributes to the sprightly, dance-like 
nature of the genre.
35
 Péteri suggests that nineteenth-century scherzi possess an 
automated quality, which he associates with clockwork, musical automata, and the 
danse macabre.
36
 A significant problem with this study is that Péteri does not fully 
distinguish uncanniness from a more mundane feeling of creepiness, an issue that might 
result from his interest in the imagery of Freud’s and Jentsch’s essays over their  (long 
grappled with) definitions.  
 In summary, the  ody of scholarship attests to elusiveness of the musical 
uncanny    often  uite candidly. As noted throughout my survey of the literature and as 
will become more apparent throughout the dissertation, I concur with many of these 
scholars as to the musical devices, effects, and topical references that can create 
uncanny impressions. However, I believe that music engages with the uncanny in a 
deeper manner than through fleeting sensation. I seek to go beyond the musical uncanny 
in the weak sense, where textual uncanniness is provided slight musical enhancement, 
or in the one-dimensional sense, where uncanny is synonymous with eerie and is evoked 
by every chill sonority. To accomplish this, the question of why this music is uncanny  
must be confronted, a question that E.T.A. Hoffmann did not ask in his review of 
                                                 
35
 Lóránt Péteri, “Scherzo and the Unheimlich: The Construct of Genre and Feeling in the Long 19th 
Century.” Studia musicologica 48 (2007): 322. 
36
 Péteri, “Scherzo and the Unheimlich,” 323-24. 
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Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, although it is a subject of exploration throughout nearly 
all of his fictional musical writings.  
 
In this dissertation, I define the concept and foundations of the early nineteenth-century 
musical uncanny in German culture and investigate the ways in which this conceptual 
musical uncanny unfolds in music criticism, literature, and musical works. In the first 
chapter, I begin  y considering Freud’s essay as aesthetics, then retrace and critique his 
etymological survey to gain a clear understanding of the meanings of heimlich, 
unheimlich, and das Unheimliche in the nineteenth century. I then suggest that Idealist 
music aesthetics in the early nineteenth century support an understanding of music as 
uncanny. 
 The second and third chapters take as their focus the relevance of the uncanny to 
nineteenth-century music criticism. In the second chapter, I flesh out intimations of the 
uncanny in Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, suggesting that the 
essay constitutes a point of transition between the aesthetics of the musical sublime and 
the musical uncanny. In the third chapter, I address the reception of ombra music as 
uncanny in early nineteenth-century instrumental music. I propose that, in this context, 
the previous associations of ombra music become abstacted, and rather than signifying 
supernatural figures and the terror that they inspire, or the progression from chaos to 
order, ombra aligns with the philosophical significance of music in nineteenth-century 
German Idealism. 
 The fourth and fifth chapters address thematisations of music as uncanny in 
German literature, philosophy, and musical works. In the fourth chapter, I examine the 
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twin thematisation of the forest and music as manifesting the absolute and the primary 
symbol of this fusion, the Waldhorn.  I suggest that the horn carries not only the 
established connotations of distance and a personal reaction to that distance (spatial or 
temporal), but also the closing of metaphysical distance and the immanent merging of 
the physical and infinite realms. In the fifth chapter, I consider the thematisations of the 
musical instrument as a latently animate object. In the writings of Hegel, Herder, 
Hoffmann, Körner, and Wackenroder, the foreign body of the instrument is the chamber 
in which the resting resonances of the human heart are amplified and externalized, both 
revealing the music of the heart and imparting the instrument with an echo of human 
interiority. The second half of this chapter examines how composers of Lieder respond 
to this theme in their music.  
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1 
 
Defining a Nineteenth-Century Musical Uncanny 
 
 
 
The Aesthetic of the Uncanny 
Almost every investigation of the uncanny begins with an obligatory nod to Sigmund 
Freud, whose la yrinthine essay “Das Unheimliche” theorises uncanniness from a vague 
feeling into an aesthetic, and substantivises the fleeting adjective unheimlich into a 
formal territory of its own: the uncanny. I, too, begin with Freud, but rather than 
treating the essay as a brilliant piece of twentieth-century aesthetics by way of 
psychoanalytic theory, I plan to engage with it as a rich reworking of nineteenth-
century thought. From the philological project of Jaco  and Wilhelm Grimm’s 
Deutsches Wörterbuch, to E.T.A. Hoffmann’s tales, Karl Ferdinand Gutzkow’s novels, 
and F.W.J. Schelling’s lectures, “Das Unheimliche” is steeped in the intellectual 
products of the nineteenth century. Before diving into these sources, however, we might 
inquire as to the meaning of an aesthetic of the uncanny for Freud and how it fits with 
the intentions of this project.   
 When Freud sets out to define the uncanny as an aesthetic category, he 
understands aesthetics as “not restricted to the theory of  eauty,  ut rather as the theory 
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of our sense of feeling.”37 That he privileges inner life over the philosophy of art, 
therefore, should come as no surprise. In doing so, he adheres more closely to the 
Kantian conception of aesthetics (in which aesthetic judgments are determined in 
relation to feelings of pleasure or displeasure)
38
 than to the Hegelian definition, which, 
though it is not strictly faithful to its etymology, is equally in line with our current 
endeavour. As Hegel explains in the Introduction to his Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik:  
These lectures are devoted to Aesthetics. Their topic is the 
spacious realm of the beautiful; more precisely, their 
province is art, or, rather, fine art. 
For this topic, it is true, the word Aesthetics, taken 
literally, is not wholly satisfactory, since ‘Aesthetics’ 
means, more precisely, the science of sensation, of feeling.
39
 
 
                                                 
37
 “nicht auf die Lehre vom Schönen einengt, sondern sie als Lehre von den Qualitäten unseres 
Fühlens.” Sigmund Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 243. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted . 
38
 “On these considerations is  ased the division of the Critique of Judgement into that of the aesthetic 
and the teleological judgement. By the first is meant the faculty of estimating formal finality (otherwise 
called subjective) by the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, by the second the faculty of es timating the 
real finality (o jective) of nature  y understanding and reason.” Immanuel Kant, The Critique of 
Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), VIII, 34. “Hierauf gründet 
sich die Einteilung der Kritik der Urteilskraft in die der ästhetischen und teleologischen; indem unter 
der ersteren das Vermögen, die formale Zweckmäβigkeit (sonst auch su jektive genannt) durch das 
Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust, unter der zweiten das Vermögen, die reale Zweckmäβigkeit (o jektiv e) 
der Natur durch Verstand und Vernunft zu  eurteilen, verstanden wird.” Immanuel Kant, Kritik der 
Urteilskraft (Ham urg:Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006), VIII, 38. Andrew Smith points out that “[Freud’s] 
account of aesthetics [...] places Freud’s essay in the same terrain as Kant’s reading of the aesthetic and 
its relationship to the sublime. Freud struggles with the significance of aesthetics, revealing a concern 
a out whether the aesthetic is related to ‘feeling’ or ‘ eauty’ or  oth.” Andrew Smith, Gothic 
Radicalism: Literature, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis in the Nineteenth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2000), 148-49.  
39
 Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford : 
Clarendon Press, 1975), 1 . “Diese Vorlesungen sind der Ästhetik gewidmet; ihr Gegenstand ist das 
weite Reich des Schönen, und näher ist die Kunst, und zwar die schöne Kunst ihr Gebiet. 
 Für diesen Gegenstand freilich ist der Name Ästhetik eigentlich nicht ganz passend, denn 
»Ästhetik« bezeichnet genauer die Wissenschaft des Sinnes, des Empfindens [...]” Georg Wilhelm 
Freidrich Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik  I (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 13. 
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My reading of Freud’s aesthetics of the uncanny bridges the gap between his primary 
focus (aesthetics as the study of feeling) and an area that he only tentatively addresses: 
aesthetics as the study of fine art.  
What sort of feeling, then, is caused by the uncanny? Freud is convinced that 
there is “no dou t that it  elongs to the fearful, to that which stirs angst and horror,” 
and that his task is to uncover what differentiates the uncanny as a distinct subset of the 
fearful.
40
 He contrasts his subject matter with that of other aesthetic treatises, which 
“prefer to occupy themselves with the  eautiful, great [groβartigen], attractive, thus 
with positive classes of feelings.”41 Yet, it does not follow that uncanny must be 
characterised as inducing a wholly negative feeling. And although uncanniness in real 
life may be predominantly unpleasant, this does not mean that the uncanny in aesthetic 
experience must have precisely the same effect. For instance, the Deutsches Wörterbuch 
labels as unheimlich those stories that foreshadow dangerous or precarious things, but 
also notes that they have the “charm of the mysterious” (“reiz des geheimnisses”) about 
them, implying that the anxious state they might induce is strangely delightful.
42
 
                                                 
40
 “Kein Zweifel, daß es zum Schreckhaften, Angst - und Grauenerregenden gehört […] Man möchte 
wissen, was dieser gemeinsame Kern ist, der etwa gestattet, innerhalb des Ängstlichen ein 
»Unheimliches« zu unterscheiden.” Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 243. 
41
 “Darü er findet man nun so viel wie nichts in den ausführlichen Darstellungen der Ästhetik, die  sich 
überhaupt lieber mit den schönen, großartigen, anziehenden, also mit den positiven Gefühlsarten, ihren 
Bedingungen und den Gegenständen, die sie hervorrufen, als mit den gegensätzlichen, abstoßenden, 
peinlichen  eschäftigen.”  Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 243. Freud’s “groβartigen” is usually translated 
as “su lime,” even though “erha en” is the standard term for su lime (“groβ” is also fre uently 
employed as an adjective for sublime phenomena). 
42
 “geschichten u.ä., etwa solche, die nichts gutes, sondern gefahr, verderben, unglück, fürchterliches, 
bedenkliches u.s.w. ahnen lassen, mysteriös, rätselhaft, die den reiz des ge heimnisses an sich haben 
u.s.w.” Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 16 vols. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854-
1960), s.v. “unheimlich.” The Grimm dictionary does not employ upper case letters for nouns. Spellings 
have not been standardized. 
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Similarly, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “The Sandman,” can  e “unsettling” and yet “produce a 
sort of pleasurable dizziness, like a roller-coaster ride.”43 Hoffmann’s writing evinces 
that the uncanny needn’t remain wholly pure and unmixed. One need only look to his 
comical, sharp Lebensansichten des Katers Murr  – a novel that thrives on juxtapositions 
– or his ironic, sentimental Kreisleriana to witness the capricious blending of the 
uncanny with complementary literary modes. Like the grotes ue, the uncanny’s 
multifaceted nature seeks various configurations through alliances with harmonising 
modes, on one occasion tilting towards the comic, and on others  towards the sinister.
44
 
 With the examples of Hoffmann’s writings in mind we might revisit the  uestion 
of how Freud’s uncanny might operate aesthetically (that is, both in a system of art and 
in individual art works), although Freud only mentions this application marginally, and 
only in the case of literature. For Freud, the uncanny arises in literature and in psychic 
life out of similar factors, but the altered status of reality in the literary arts means that 
“in literature much is not uncanny, which wou ld be so if it occurred in real life; and that 
in literature many possibilities, that would fall by the wayside in real life, exist to 
                                                 
43
 Neil Hertz, “Freud and the Sandman,” in The End of the Line: Essays on Psychoanalysis and the 
Sublime (New York: Columbia University Press: 1985), 114. 
44
 Elizabeth Wright comments that the “complex inversion of our ha itual distinctions  etween animal 
and human needs [in Kater Murr] is indeed uncanny, but as a result of the parodistic structure it is the 
comic side of the uncanny which predominates. As in the case of the grotesque, there are clearly two 
sides to this am iguous form.” Eliza eth Wright, E.T.A. Hoffmann and the Rhetoric of Terror: Aspects 
of Language Used for the Evocation of Fear  (London: Institute of German Studies, University of 
London, 1978), 236. Similarly, Wolfgang Kayser’s notion of the grotes ue emphasizes the duality of 
this aesthetic category and even hints at an overlap with the uncanny in its blurring of the categories of 
animate and inanimate: “By the word grottesco the Renaissance [...] understood not only something 
playfully gay and carelessly fantastic, but also something ominous and sinister in the face of a world 
totally different from the familiar one – a world in which the realm of inanimate things is no longer  
separated from those of plants, animals, and human  eings.” Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and 
Literature, trans. Ulrich Weisstein (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), 21. 
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achieve uncanny effects.”45 While Freud is concerned with the events and situations 
enabled by fantastical narratives, he devotes little attention to the literary techniques 
that foster an atmosphere in which uncanny effects can unfold.
46
 The crucial point here 
is that literature, as an art form or a collection of techniques, is not uncanny for Freud. 
Instead, only the events recounted through this medium can produce an effect of 
uncanniness. Several literature scholars have sought to fill this gap in Freud’s theory  y 
theorising an uncanny mode of narrative, assigning the property of uncanniness to the 
literary work in question.
47
 
 In contrast to Freud’s application of his theory of the uncanny to literature, my 
argument seeks to establish nineteenth-century musical uncanniness on three levels: 1) 
the uncanniness of music as an art form; 2) the techniques through which musical w orks 
engage with music’s perceived uncanniness; and 3) as in Freud’s practice, events or 
situations in texted music or literature that thematise music, musicians, and instruments 
as uncanny. The first of these concerns is the primary focus of this chapter, in which I 
                                                 
45
 “Das paradox klingende Erge nis ist, daβ in der Dichtung vieles nicht unheimlich ist, was unheimlich 
wäre, wenn es sich im Leben ereignete, und daβ in der Dichtung viele Möglichkeiten bestehen, 
unheimliche Wirkungen zu erzielen, die fürs Leben wegfallen .” Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 271-272. 
46
 For Marc Falkenberg, conversely, the prevailing aesthetic of uncanny fiction is a “pervasive 
paradoxical am iguity” – a  uality that is reflected not only in the story’s events,  ut also in the 
author’s stylistic decisions: creating prose that is laden with such literary techni ues as irony and 
metaphor, the author saturates his or her work with a poetic ambiguity, waylaying the reader with an 
unravelable reality. Falkenberg, Rethinking the Uncanny , 28-29 and 35. 
47
 For more on this subject, see Adam Bresnick, “Prosopoetic Compulsion:  Reading the Uncanny in 
Freud and Hoffmann,” Germanic Review 71 (1996): 114-32; Marc Falkenberg, Rethinking the Uncanny; 
Shelley Frisch, “Poetics of the Uncanny,” in The Scope of the Fantastic – Theory, Technique, Major Authors: 
Selected Essays from the First International Conference on the Fantastic in Literature and Film, ed. Robert A. 
Collins and Howard D. Pearce (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), 49-55; Tzvetan Todorov, The 
Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1975); and Elizabeth Wright, E.T.A. Hoffmann and the Rhetoric of Terror. 
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develop a theoretical basis for a nineteenth-century musical uncanny. This is pursued 
through a re-examination of the significance of the term “das Unheimliche,” performed 
by critiquing Freud’s essay in the context of its nineteenth-century sources (and, in 
particular, by reading beyond the brief excerpts that Freud quotes)  and through the 
development of a functional model of the nineteenth-century aesthetic uncanny that 
bears striking affinities to the Romantic symbol concept.  
 
The Uncanny Constellation: heimlich, unheimlich, and das Unheimliche 
In a rare decisive statement Freud claims, seemingly self-evidently, that the “German 
word ‘unheimlich’ [‘uncanny’] is clearly the opposite of heimlich, heimisch [native, 
homelike], vertraut [familiar, intimate].”48 Yet Freud quickly abandons this deceptive 
opposition, for in the next moment he tells us to resist supposing that the uncanny 
summons horror “ ecause it is not known and familiar.”49 That is, uncanniness does not 
straightforwardly arise from the not-known, the not-familiar: unheimlich is not the plain 
opposite of heimlich. With this statement, Freud gives a nod to the wiliness of the word 
unheimlich and indicates that a dictionary survey will not be a straightforward affair.  
My understanding of the uncanny reads Freud against his linguistic sources in an 
attempt to uncover the relationship  etween Freud’s uncanny and the words heimlich 
and unheimlich. 
                                                 
48
 “Das deutsche Wort »unheimlich« ist offen ar der Gegensatz zu heimlich, heimisch, vertraut.” Freud, 
“Das Unheimliche,” 244. 
49
 “der Schluß liegt nahe, es sei etwas eben darum schreckhaft, weil es nicht  ekannt und vertraut ist.”  
Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 244. 
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The volatility of the word unheimlich arises from the precarious amalgamation of 
its two components, neither of which lends the word sta ility: the German prefix “un-” 
and the word “heimlich.” Freud, of course, is aware of heimlich’s spectral property 
(both as a word in its own right and as a component of unheimlich) as he avers that 
“heimlich is a word whose meaning develops towards an ambivalence, until it finally 
converges with its opposite, unheimlich.”50 Heimlich carries environmental and 
psychological connotations, and each of these carries a range of meaning from the 
intimate to the mysteriously withdrawn. One end of the spectrum in the environmental 
sense of the word, it signifies comfortable, routine domesticity: the heimlich is that 
which belongs to the home, is familiar and trusted.  It is the opposite of foreign.
51
 
However, as heimlich draws nearer to its murky intersection with unheimlich, its 
intimacy takes on more sinister implications.  The heimlich domestic sphere is no longer 
simply a warm, comforting place, but also a guarded arena where things are concealed 
from the outside world, implying threat from without.
52
 It is secretive, an enclosure 
where things are “withdrawn from the eyes of strangers.” 53 This heimlich is similarly 
                                                 
50
 “heimlich ist ein Wort, das seine Bedeutung nach einer Am ivalenz hin entwickelt,  is es endlich mit 
seinem Gegensatz unheimlich zusammenfällt.” Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 250. 
51
 “aus der  edeutung des heimatlichen und häuslichen flieszt [sic] die vorstellung des traulichen und 
vertrauten.” “zunächst von personen einheimisch, an einem bestimmten orte zu hause, gegensatz zu 
fremd” Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 16 vols. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854-
1960), s.v. “heimlich.” Marc Falken erg writes that “The meaning ‘cozy, familiar’ was already o solete 
in 1919 [...] and is only contained in the opposite ‘unheimlich.’” Mar c Falkenberg, Rethinking the 
Uncanny, 46. While it is true that the “ungemütlich” appearing in the definition of unheimlich has no 
“gemütlich” counterpart in the definition of heimlich, the first entry under heimlich emphasises 
familiarity.  
52 
Falkenberg, Rethinking the Uncanny , 46-47. 
53
 “aus dem heimatlichen, häuslichen entwickelt sich weiter der  egriff des fremden augen entzogenen, 
verborgenen, geheimen, eben auch in mehrfacher beziehung ausgebildet .” Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm 
Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 16 vols. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854-1960), s.v. “heimlich.” 
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free from, but aware of, otherworldly disruption: it is an unhaunted place.
54
 Then again, 
perhaps the potential for the foreign and menacing brews inside the home, or rather, in 
the mind: for those who believe in ghosts, every place becomes heimlich and shudder-
inducing.
55
  
In a psychological sense, heimlich (or Heimlichkeit) bears some relation to its 
spatial counterpart. The psychological heimlich, as with the domestic, implies 
something that is guarded within.
56
 In its connotations regarding perception, that which 
is heimlich is mystical, occult, or divine.
57
 Furthermore, in all of these senses, it is 
something that ought not to be revealed.
58
 Heimlich strays into the territory of the 
submerged, the barely sensed, the concealed and forgotten. Its meaning wavers, as a 
moment of dialogue from Karl Ferdinand Gutzkow’s novel Der Ritter vom Geiste, 
quoted by Freud, illustrates: “‘The Zecks are all heimlich.’ ‘Heimlich .. What do you 
understand  y heimlich ..   ’ ‘Well,…it seems to me that they are like a  uried spring or 
a dried-up pond. One cannot walk over it without it always seeming as though water 
                                                 
54
 “heimlich ist auch der von gespensterhaftem freie ort .” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 
s.v. “heimlich.” 
55
 “die bedeutung des versteckten, gefährlichen, die in der vorigen no. hervortritt,  entwickelt sich noch 
weiter, so dasz heimlich den sinn empfängt, den sonst unheimlich [...] hat: mir ist zu zeiten wie dem 
menschen, der in nacht wandelt, und an gespenster glaubt, jeder winkel ist ihm heimlich und 
schauerhaft.” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. “heimlich.” 
56
 Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 16 vols. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854-1960), 
s.v. “heimlichkeit.” 
57
 “heimlich für die erkenntnis, mystisch, allegorisch: heimliche bedeutung, mysticus, divinus, 
occultus,” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. “heimlich.” 
 
58
 “das etwann durch trunkenheit die heimlichkeiten, so  illich verschwiegen, offen art werden.” “sei 
unverworren mit dem der heimligkeit offenbart. [...] offenbar nicht ein  anderns heimligkeit.” “in 
erhabenem sinne, von den geheimnissen gottes, des gewissens, der  natur.” Grimm and Grimm, 
Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. “heimlichkeit.” 
  
23 
 
 
might once again come up there’.”59 At this point, the heimlich drifts into an area so 
o scure that the character Dankmar could rejoin: “We call that unheimlich, you call it 
heimlich.”60  
The multivalent prefix “un-” only further complicates the definition of 
unheimlich in relation to the shifting meaning of heimlich. “Un-” not only negates the 
word it modifies, but can also cast a pejorative connotation on it.  More rarely, it can 
intensify the meaning of the word.
61
 In an entry that was added after Freud had 
completed his essay, the Grimms’ Deutsches Wörterbuch examines the functions of this 
prefix and states that “there is hardly a particle , which has more strongly proven its 
productive power and even today remains more vital than un-.”62 In the most basic 
sense of un-, that of opposition, unheimlich is (obviously) the opposite of heimlich. 
That unheimlich counters heimlich is evident in some of its elucidations: uncozy, not 
homey or homelike, not familiar or intimate, foreign, uncomfortable.
63
 But, as Freud 
                                                 
59
 In the excerpt, “The Zecks” refers to the Zeck family. “‘Die Zecks sing alle h.’ ‘H.?.. Was verstehen 
sie unter h.?..  ’ – ‘Nun…es kommt mir mit ihnen vor, wie mit einem zugegra enen Brunnen oder einem 
ausgetrockneten Teich. Man kann nicht darü er gehen, ohne daβ es Einem  immer ist, als könnte da 
wieder einmal Wasser zum Vorschein kommen.’”  In Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 247; Freud quotes from 
Gutzkow’s novel Der Ritter vom Geiste via the Daniel Sanders Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. 
60 “Aus diesem langen Zitat ist für uns am interessantesten, daß das Wörtchen heimlich unter den 
mehrfachen Nuancen seiner Bedeutung auch eine zeigt, in der es mit seinem Gegensatz unheimlich 
zusammenfällt. Das Heimliche wird dann zum Unheimlichen; vgl. das Beispiel von Gutzkow: »Wir 
nennen das unheimlich, Sie nennen's heimlich.«”  Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 248. 
61
 Marc Falkenberg calls attention to the significance of the multiple functions of the German un-. 
Falkenberg, Rethinking the Uncanny , 46-50. It is worth noting that, while Freud used the Grimms’ 
Deutsches Wörterbuch for his investigation of “heimlich,” the volume containing “un-” and 
“unheimlich” did not yet exist at the time of his essay.  
62
 “es gibt kaum eine partikel, die ihre productive kraft stärker bethätigt hat und noch heute lebendiger 
bewahrt als un-.” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 16 vols. (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1854-1960), 
s.v. “un-.” 
63
 “ungemütlich, nicht anheimelnd .” “nicht vertraut, fremd… un e uem .” Grimm and Grimm, 
Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. “unheimlich.” 
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makes clear, these do not contain the essence of his understanding of  the uncanny. Nor 
is the intensification of heimlich through un- precisely the key site of the Unheimliche 
for Freud, though the word can function in this way.  Through opposition and 
intensification, un- imparts to the word a double meaning, according to the Deutsches 
Wörterbuch. For instance, “un-deep [untiefe] is  oth ‘a shallow place’ and ‘a great 
depth’.”64 In the case of heimlich and unheimlich, un- can be said to function in this 
way where the two words nearly collide.  We will recall of heimlich that it can be used 
to describe a place that is perceived as ghostly.  Intensified, an unheimlich place is one 
that is actively disturbed by spirits: the un- converts potential into being. It distorts the 
sense of something ghostly into a confrontation with the otherworldly.
65
 
The improbative (expressing disapproval) function of un- steps away from the 
comparative straightforwardness of opposition and intensification; so much so, that it 
was compared by Jacob Grimm to the phenomenon of twilight between day and nigh t.
66
 
In this sense, the prefix “negates the idea, not of the o ject as it is,  ut rather as it 
should  e.”67 The words Unwetter and Unmensch (repectively, very bad weather and a 
brute or monster) exemplify this usage: in both cases the meanings, modified by un-, 
                                                 
64
 “so ergi t sich für ein und dassel e wort  isweilen doppelte  edeutung: untiefe ist 'seichte stelle' und 
'grosze tiefe', unmasz 'mangel an masz' und 'überreiches masz', unmühe 'mangel an mühe' und 
'ü ergrosze mühe' u. s. w. danach wechselt auch die  etonung.”  Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches 
Wörterbuch, s.v. “un-.” 
65
 “ein sehr unheimliches haus, von gespenstern verunruhiget.” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches 
Wörterbuch, s.v. “unheimlich.” 
 
66
 “mit den dämmerungserscheinungen zwischen tag und nacht vergleicht” Grimm and Grimm, 
Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. “un-.” 
67
 The improbative un- “stellte das einfach verneinende un- den empirischen begriff in frage, so 
verneint das un- impro ativum die idee, nicht den gegenstand, wie er ist, sondern wie er sein soll.” 
Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. “un-.” 
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breach the ideal state of the root word.
68
 The Deutsches Wörterbuch further elaborates 
this idea, imparting un- with an almost unnatural potency: 
The particle points to deviation from the correct manner and 
state, from the right path, from the serviceable, the useful, the 
good, the usual, the conventional, the regular, to express 
hindrance, error, disfigurement, and so forth. […I]t also 
yields the denotation of the unnecessary, the unpleasant, the 
uncanny [unheimlichen], the misshapen, the overcome, and so 
on.
69
 
 
In the dictionary survey, the definition of unheimlich with which Freud is most 
enamoured operates on this understanding of un-. Schelling’s definition, slightly 
abridged by Freud but presented more fully in the Deutsches Wörterbuch, offers the 
following explanation: “One la els as unheimlich everything that should remain in 
secrecy, in concealment, in latency, and has emerged into the open.” 70 In this 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
68
 As the Deutsches Wörterbuch  indicates, “An Unmensch [un-man, un-person] is clearly a man, but 
such a one that lacks what makes a man a man, no le manliness, humanity.” “ein unmensch ist freilich 
ein mensch, aber ein solcher, dem alles abgeht, was den menschen zum menschen macht, edleres 
menschenthum, humanität
 .” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. “un-.” 
69
 “so gelangt die partikel dazu, das a weichen von der rechten art und  eschaffenheit, vom rechten 
wege, vom brauchbaren, nützlichen, guten, gewöhnlichen, herkömmlichen, regelmäszigen, hemmung, 
irrung, entstellung u. s. f. auszudrücken. durch anlehnung an stilistische verbindungen und 
volksetymologische umschreibungen ergibt sich auch bezeichnung des unnöthigen, unangenehmen, 
unheimlichen, unförmlichen, überwältigenden u.s.w.” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. 
“un-.” Regarding this explanation, Falkenberg comments that “Apparently, the prefix ‘un-’ possesses an 
uncanny  uality all  y itself, even when it does not modify the word ‘heimlich.’ The word ‘unheimlich’ 
evokes the notion of a dark region beyond the boundaries o f what is accepta le or known.” Falkenberg, 
Rethinking the Uncanny, 50. 
70
 “Schellings individuelle definition: u. nennt man alles, was im geheimnisz, im verborgnen, in der 
latenz bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten ist.” Grimm and Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, s.v. 
“unheimlich.” The a  reviated form employed  y Freud reads: “Un -h. nennt man Alles, was in 
Geheimnis, im Ver orgnen… lei en sollte und hervorgetreten ist.”  Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 248. 
Freud highlights this definition without making the editing clear: “Hingegen werden wir auf eine 
Bemerkung von Schelling aufmerksam, die vom Inhalt des Begriffes Unheimlich etwas ganz Neues 
aussagt, auf das unsere Erwartung gewiβ nicht eingestellt war. Unheimlich sei alles, was ein 
Geheimnis, im Verborgnen bleiben so llte und hervorgetreten ist.”  Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 248-49. 
The Daniel Sanders Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache provides two basic definition groups for 
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formulation, the very core of the heimlich – that it is secret, protected, concealed from 
the eyes of strangers – is violated. The heimlich is that which remains in obscurity; the 
unheimlich, that which should have, but does not. 
 If Schelling’s definition is the key to understanding Freud’s uncanny, then we 
might better conceive of it as the (Un)Heimliche, that is, the clashing of heimlich and 
unheimlich. For Freud, manifestations of the uncanny only occur in situations where the 
heimlich and unheimlich are brought into conflict, that is, situations based on the 
improbative un-. Schelling’s explanation of the uncanny is important for Freud because 
it captures the moment in which the heimlich is betrayed, and thus rendered unheimlich. 
It is this moment of revelation of that which should not be revealed in which Freud’s 
uncanny unfolds. Freud’s own explanation of the psychological uncanny is encapsulated 
in the oft-invoked idea of the return of the repressed,
71
 a formula which summarises 
Freud’s statement that “the uncanny is that type of the fearful, which traces  ack to the 
long-known and once-familiar.”72 This definition, too, revels in the clash of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
heimlich. The first is “zum Haus gehörig, nicht fremd, vertraut, zahm, traut und traulich, anheimel nd,” 
and the second “versteckt, ver orgen gehalten, so daβ man Andre nicht davon oder darum wissen 
lassen, es ihnen ver ergen will, vgl. Geheim.”  Furthermore, it claims that unheimlich is not often used 
in opposition to the second meaning. This is supported by the list, above, of the senses in which 
unheimlich is in plain opposition to heimlich. However, no mention is made in Daniel Sanders’ 
Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache of the improbative or intensifying functions of the prefix un-, 
despite the fact that Schelling’s definition, in the a ridged form cited  y F reud, is offered by the 
dictionary. Daniel Sanders, Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (Leipzig: Wigand, 1876-1885), s.v. 
“heimlich” and “unheimlich.”  
71
 “[...] denn dies Unheimliche ist wirklich nichts Neues oder Fremdes, sondern etwas dem Seelenleben 
von alters her Vertrautes, das ihm nur durch den Prozeβ der Verdrängung entfremdet worden ist.” 
Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 264. 
72
 “das Unheimliche sei jene Art des Schreckhaften, welche auf das Alt ekannte, Längstvertraute 
zurückgeht.” Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 244. This also relates to Freud’s lesser -known idea of the 
uncanny as the culturally surmounted, in which old, “primitive”  eliefs in animism, omnipotence of 
thoughts, and so forth linger in us and resurface despite the fact that we have surmounted these no tions 
as a culture. Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 264-65. 
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withheld and the exposed, the familiar and the foreign.  The first elements (withheld and 
exposed), are based on the relationship of heimlich and unheimlich enabled by the 
improbative un-; the second elements (familiar and foreign) are based on the 
relationship of heimlich and unheimlich generated by the oppositional un-. Here, Freud 
covertly informs us that, while manifestations of the uncanny require inhabiting the 
point of ambivalence where the heimlich withheld and unheimlich exposed collide, the 
potential for uncanniness subsumes the entire range of meaning of heimlich and 
unheimlich, encompassing even the elements of the definition (familiar and foreign) 
that never develop into an ambivalence, but instead remain polarised. Another way of 
approaching this might be to make the distinction that the entire heimlich-unheimlich 
constellation can  e perceived as uncanny, since this property exists in latency,  ut “das 
Unheimliche,” the noun Freud creates to represent his aesthetic category, only pertains 
to the manifestation of the uncanny found at its centre.  
 Freud’s uncanny, then, em races the entire heimlich-unheimlich constellation, 
and not only the territory covered by the naïve definition of unheimlich (see Figure 1).
73
 
The diagram of the uncanny constellation can be read as a spectrum from heimlich to 
unheimlich (left to right), engaging all three functions of un-. However, only the 
improbative un-, individually, functions as a spectrum. We will note, addi tionally, that 
“das Unheimliche” does not occupy a position towards the unheimlich end of the 
spectrum, since it, crucially, co-exists with the heimlich. The other connotations of 
heimlich and unheimlich are connected to the idea of das Unheimliche, but they are not  
                                                 
73
 I say constellation and not continuum, because the diverse meanings of heimlich combined with the 
various functions of un- do not allow meaning to flow in a single line between two poles.  
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Figure 1: The Uncanny Constellation 
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its essence. As mentioned above, manifestations of the uncanny occur in the devastating 
point of transition from heimlich to unheimlich through the improbative un-. The 
incidences of unheimlich that do not arise from the improbative un- are less potent. As 
we were informed at the outset, the uncanny does not inspire horror “ ecause it is not 
known and familiar”: the unfamiliar, alone, does not constitute an emergence of the 
uncanny, even if it does share the word unheimlich.
74
 And even though the heimlich is a 
necessary component of the uncanny’s manifestation, it, too, is less compelling on its 
own. The cozy, the protected, the secretive, the foreign, the unknown – none of these, 
alone, summons a surfacing of the uncanny. Yet, if these elements, these other 
meanings of heimlich and unheimlich that radiate around the core of the uncanny, are 
not manifestations of the uncanny, they are imbued with potential uncanniness. Freud 
casts Schelling’s latency  ack onto these other elements, contaminating the heimlich 
and unheimlich alike with uncanny potentiality. When Freud explains that the 
“Unheimliche is really nothing new or foreign, but something long ago familiar in the 
inner life that only through the process of repression has  een estranged from it,”75 he 
implies that the uncanny seems unfamiliar, but in reality is not. Everything that presents 
itself as unfamiliar and strange thus has the potential to blossom into the uncanny, and 
everything that is familiar and trusted may yet harbour something utterly foreign.  
                                                 
74
 As mentioned previously, Freud points this out as a false assumption: “der Schluß liegt nahe, es sei 
etwas eben darum schreckhaft, weil es nicht  ekannt und vertraut ist”  Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 244. 
75
 “[das] Unheimliche ist wirklich nichts Neues oder Fremdes, sondern etwas dem Seelenleben von 
alters her Vertrautes, das ihm nur durch den Prozeβ der Verdrängung entfremdet worden ist.”  Freud, 
“Das Unheimliche,” 264. 
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Furthermore, the unfamiliar has uncanny potential even without relating to something 
that is long-known.
76
 
 
Freud’s Uncanny Symbol and the Romantic Symbol Concept 
Although, as mentioned earlier, Freud’s discussion of literature focuses on events 
within narratives rather than narrative style, there is one instance in which he 
potentially focuses on a literary device, but his means of presentation leaves us unsure 
as to whether he intends this to be a literary argument or something one might 
encounter (or delusionally believe to have encountered) in reality. This is his discussion 
of the symbol, which is without context or illustration.  Situating the sym ol’s uncanny 
function as equivalent to the effacement of the boundaries between imagination and 
reality, Freud argues  
[...] that it often and easily makes an uncanny impression 
when the boundaries between fantasy and reality become 
blurred; when something actually stands before us, which we 
had previously held as fantastic; when a symbol takes on the 
full realisation and significance of the symbolised.
77
 
  
In the second part of this formulation the symbol, a familiar object, is defamiliarised by 
the intrusion of the functions and significance of a concept with which it is associated. 
Reading this statement in the context of Freud’s theory of the uncanny it would seem 
                                                 
76
 Freud, for instance, mentions madness and epilepsy in this connexion. Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 
266. 
77
 “ […] dass es nämlich oft und leicht unheimlich wirkt, wenn die Grenze zwischen Phantasie und 
Wirklichkeit verwischt wird, wenn etwas real vor uns hintritt, was wir bisher für phantastisch gehalten 
ha en, wenn ein Sym ol die volle Leistung und Bedeutung des Sym olisierten ü ernimmt.” Freud, 
“Das Unheimliche,” 267. 
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that, because a symbol is generally a material thing and that which it symbolises is 
more abstract or metaphysical, the functions and significance taken on by the symbol 
when the symbolised is absorbed into it are entirely inappropriate and disjunctive to the 
sym ol’s limited scale. Furthermore, although the symbol can function as a means of 
accessing a more abstract and distant concept, on the other hand the symbol acts as a 
form of repression, for it conceals the immense and ungraspable behind the small and 
comprehensible: by standing for the symbolised, the symbol also obstructs direct access 
to its referent. When the symbolised leaks into our perception of the symbol, what 
should have remained concealed is revealed, the repressed returns.  From the 
metaphysical hidden in the ordinary, the uncanny emerges.  Like the uncanny 
constellation we charted earlier, the symbol-symbolised relationship bears the elements 
of familiar and foreign, obscured and exposed. And just as we are always alert to the 
potential of each aspect of the definition of heimlich and unheimlich to make the 
uncanny manifest, so too are we aware that the symbol and symbolised exist in a kind 
of latency, caught in the tension between remaining in a discrete referential relationshi p 
and intermingling themselves. 
 However, when Freud suggests that an uncanny impression is created by the 
intermingling of the symbol and the symbolised, his idea is not far removed from 
describing the Romantic concept of the symbol. Until the final decade of the eighteenth 
century, the sym ol was either “simply synonymous with a series of other, more 
commonly used terms such as allegory, hieroglyph, figure (in the sense of number), 
emblem, and so on, or else it designated primarily the purely arbitrary and abstr act sign 
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(mathematical symbols),”78 and it seems likely that Freud refers to the symbol in a 
similarly loose sense of the term, where it encapsulates a variety of rhetorical figures. It 
is only with Kant’s addressing of the symbol concept in the Critique of Judgement that 
it enters aesthetic discourse.
79
 Even so, Kant “disallowed the possi ility of an inherent 
relation between symbolizing object and symbolized idea,” according to Nicholas 
Halmi.
80
 For Kant, the symbolic is “where the concept is one which only reason can 
think, and to which no sensible intuition can be adequate.”81 The symbol, therefore, 
stands in as a sensible intuition, providing a concrete link to the remote concept. 
However, Kant continues “what agrees with the concept [i.e. the symbol] is merely the 
rule of this procedure, and not the intuition itself. Hence the agreement is merely in the 
form of reflection, and not in the content.”82 There is thus no unfabricated connection 
between the symbol and the concept, and the two never come together.  
                                                 
78
 Tzvetan Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 199. 
Though he does not say so, it would seem that Todorov’s assertion is related to Kant’s Reflection No. 
3398a “nicht jedes Zeichen ist sym ol, sondern dieses ist ein Zeichen vom Zeichen. Analogische 
Anschauung : sym ol.” Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Band 16: Logik, Reflexionen zur Logik  
(Akademie-Ausgabe, Electronic edition <http://www.korpora.org/kant/verzeichnisse -gesamt.html>), 
§440, 814. 
79
 Oliver R. Scholz, “Sym ol, 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie , 
ed. J. Ritter, K. Gründer, and G. Gabriel (Basel: Schwabe, 1998), 723. 
80
 Nicholas Halmi, The Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 63. 
81
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §59, 221. The sym olic is where “[...] einem 
Begriffe, den nur die Vernunft denken, und dem keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann 
[...].”Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §59, 253. 
82
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. Meredith, §59, 222. However, “mit ihm [dem Begriffe]  loβ 
der Regel dieses Verfahrens, nicht der Anschauung sel st, mithim  loβ der Form der Reflexion, nicht 
dem Inhalte nach ü ereinkommt.” Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §59, 253. 
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 In contrast, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, who is credited with transforming the 
Romantic notion of the symbol,
83
 muses in his Maxims and Reflections no. 314 (1826) 
that “true symbolism is where the particular represents the more universal, not as dream 
and shadow, but rather as living momentary revelation of the unknowable.”84 For 
Goethe, then, the symbol functions to bring the symbolised to revelation, rather th an to 
provide an accessible relation to some distant and hazy notion. Furthermore, the turn of 
phrase “living momentary revelation” suggests a disclosure of the universal that occurs 
through the particular. His axiom, indeed, acts as a companion piece to Schelling’s 
statement that “[o]ne la els as unheimlich everything that should remain in secrecy, in 
concealment, in latency, and has emerged into the open,”85 where the romantic symbol 
becomes the means through which the unknowable is revealed. While the Romantic 
symbol is not an entirely unified or stable concept, in The Genealogy of the Romantic 
Symbol Nicholas Halmi generalises the shift in the symbol concept in Romantic thought 
as a move away from the “analogical sym ol”  (as in Kant’s model) and towards the 
                                                 
83
 Halmi notes that Goethe was the first to di stinguish between symbol and allegory and that, for him, 
“the symbol was distinguished by its inherence in nature, its ontological identity with its meaning, its 
intuitability, and its non-discursiveness,” an understanding that he shared with Schelling. Ha lmi, The 
Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol,  93. Goethe is also identified as the central figure in this 
transformation by Scholz and Gadamer. Scholz, “Sym ol, 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,”  724-29. Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: 
Continuum Press, 1989), 72. 
 
84
 “Das ist die Wahre Sym olik, wo das Besondere das Allgemeinere repräsentiert, nicht als Traum und 
Schatten, sondern als lebendig-augen lickliche Offen arung des Unerforschlichen.” Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe, Maximen und Reflexionen  (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1963), 34. Translation 
mine. 
85
 “Schellings individuelle definition: u. nennt man alles, was im geheimnisz, im verborgnen, in der 
latenz bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten ist.” Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 
s.v. “unheimlich.” 
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“synecdochal sym ol” (as in Goethe’s).86 While Halmi contrasts the Kantian and the 
Romantic models of the sym ol through  ualifications of the term “sym ol ,” some 
nineteenth-century figures make the same distinction by opposing the terms allegory 
and symbol.
87
  
Schelling, who corresponded with Goethe about theories of the symbol, further 
develops the symbol concept in relation to schema and allegory, systematically 
clarifying the manner in which it functions: 
The representation in which the universal means the 
particular or in which the particular is intuited through the 
universal is schematism. 
 
The representation, however, in which the particular means 
the universal or in which the universal is intuited through the 
particular is allegory. 
 
The synthesis of these two, where neither the universal 
means the particular nor the particular the universal, but 
rather where both are absolutely one, is the symbolic.
88
 
 
In Schelling’s theory of the symbol, the distance between the particular and the general 
(which are usually understood as according with the symbol and the symbolised, 
respectively) is utterly eradicated. According to Schelling, allegory and schema 
                                                 
86
 Halmi, The Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol , 64. 
87
 Paul de Man confirms that this opposition is commonly acknowledged: “German writers in the age of 
Goethe [...] consider symbol and allegory as antithetical.” Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in 
Interpretation: Theory and Practice, ed. Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 173. 
88
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, ed. and trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989), §39, 46. “Diejenige Darstellung, in welcher das Allgemeine das Besondere bedeutet, oder 
in welcher das Besondere durch das Allgemeine angeschaut wird, ist Schematismus.  
 Diejenige Darstellung aber, in welcher das Besondere das Allgemeine bedeutet, oder in welcher 
das Allgemeine durch das Besondere angeschaut wird, ist allegorisch.  
 Die Synthesis dieser beiden, wo weder das Allgemeine das Besondere, noch das Besondere das 
Allgemeine bedeutet, sondern wo beide absolut eins sind, ist das Symbolische .” Schelling, Philosophie 
der Kunst (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980), §39, 51. 
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constitute representative figures, while the symbol is not a referent, strictly speaking, 
since it is one with the symbolised, and rejects the unidirectional relationship of one 
thing meaning something else.
89
 In a discussion of mythological figures as the epitome 
of the sym olic, Schelling explains that “[m]eaning here [in the sym olic] is 
simultaneously being itself, passed over into the object itself and one with it. As soon 
as we allow [symbols] to mean or signify something, they themselves are no longer 
anything.”90 
 The Romantic sym ol, then, “is founded on an intimate unity between the image 
that rises up before the senses and the supersensory totality that the image suggests,” 
according to Paul de Man.
91
 For Freud, this very unity, its disjunctive coalescing of 
symbol and symbolised, is uncanny. The sym olic relationship takes Freud’s theory of 
the aesthetics of the uncanny beyond feelings and events and into the realm of the 
philosophy of art. The symbol-symbolised bond not only instils uncanny potentiality on 
the small scale (as a catalyst for an isolated event or feeling), but also functions on a 
much larger scale when it aligns with an abstract system of understanding.  And indeed, 
Schelling explicitly brings the symbol concept into play in his theory of artistic 
representation, stating that the “Representation of the absolute with absolute 
indifference of the universal and the particular within the particular is possible only 
                                                 
89
 Helmut Hühn and James Vigus, “Introduction,” Symbol and Intuition: Comparative Studies in 
Kantian and Romantic-Period Aesthetics. (London: Legenda, 2013), 4. 
90
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §39, 49. “Die Bedeutung ist hier zugleich das Seyn 
selbst, übergegangen in den Gegenstand, mit ihm eins. Sobald wir diese Wesen etwas bedeuten lassen, 
sind sie selbst nichts mehr.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §39, 55. 
91
 de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” 174.  
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symbolically.”92 With this in mind, we turn our attention to an examination of how early 
nineteenth-century conceptions of the absolute, art, and particularly music relate to the 
constructions of uncanniness discussed thus far.
 
 
 
Flowers over the Abyss: Schelling’s Uncanny and the Nineteenth-Century Absolute 
 
By now we are well-ac uainted with Schelling’s definition of the uncanny as relayed  y 
Freud. It is possible that Freud was only familiar with this passage in the form 
presented  y Daniel Sanders’ Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, and never 
encountered Schelling’s lecture “Qualitativer Unterschied zwischen dem Charakter der 
griechischen Religion und dem der früheren Religionen,” in which the definition is 
found. With the inclusion of its context, however, the definition takes on additional 
significance: 
The Homeric world of the gods silently contains a mystery 
and is built over a mystery, over an abyss as it were, which 
it covers up as though with flowers. The Homeric 
multiplicity of gods is itself a unity transformed into a 
multiplicity. Precisely for this reason does Greece have a 
Homer - because it has mysteries; that is, because he 
succeeded in fully overcoming that principle of the past, 
which was still reigning in the Oriental systems, and to 
contain it in the inside, that is, in secrecy, in mystery (from 
which indeed it originally had emerged). The pure sky that 
floats over the Homeric poems could first spread out over 
Greece after the dark and darkening power of that uncanny 
principle (one labels as uncanny everything that should 
remain in secrecy, in concealment, in latency, and has 
                                                 
92
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §39, 45. “Darstellung des Absoluten mit absoluter 
Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen im Besonderen ist nur sym olisch möglich.”  Schelling, 
Philosophie der Kunst, §39, 50. As we will see, elsewhere, Schelling avoids referring to symbolic 
relationships as representations.  
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emerged into the open) – this aether, which arches over 
Homer’s world, could first spread out after the power of that 
uncanny principle, which reigned in the earlier religions, 
was subdued into mystery [...]
93
  
 
Reading this passage with the aid of the terms previously established, one concludes 
that the indistinct pre-Homeric forces are banished back into the “sphere of mystery” 
(the heimlich), where they have uncanny potential (they are in latency), but are not 
manifestly uncanny. The term unheimlich is reserved for describing their past state as a 
“dark and darkening power,” an unleashed wildness that clouded over the “pure sky” of 
pre-Homeric Greece. 
A strikingly similar passage appearing in Schelling’s Vorlesungen über die 
Philosophie der Kunst (1802-03) provides yet more depth to his conception of the 
uncanny: 
As a consequence of the principles we have presented one 
can see further that the complete assembly of the gods 
[pantheon] can first appear only after the purely formless, 
dark, frightening element is driven out. This region of 
darkness and formlessness includes everything that directly 
recalls eternity, the initial ground of existence. It has often 
been said that it is the ideas that first disclose the absolute; 
                                                 
93
 “Die homerische Götterwelt schlieβt schweigend ein Mysterium in sich, und ist über einem 
Mysterium, über einem Abgrund gleichsam errichtet, den sie wie mit Blume zudeckt. Die homerische 
Göttervielheit ist selbst ein in Vielheit verwandeltes Eines.  Gerade darum hat Griechenland einen 
Homer, weil es Mysterien hat, d.h. weil es ihm gelungen ist, jenes Princip der Vergangenheit, das in 
den orientalischen Systemen noch herrschend und äuβerlich war, völlig zu besiegen und ins Innere, d.h. 
ins Gemheimniβ, ins Mysterium (aus dem es ja ursprünglich hervorgetreten war) zurückzusetzen. Der 
reine Himmel, der über den homerischen Gedichten schwebt, konnte sich erst über Griechenland 
ausspannen, nachdem die dunkle und verdunkelnde Gewalt jenes unheimlichen Princips (unheimlichen 
nennt man alles, was im Geheimnis, im Verborgnen, in der Latenz bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten ist) 
– jener Aether, der über Homeros Welt sich wölbt, konnte erst sich ausspannen, nachdem die Gewalt 
jenes unheimlichen Princips, das in den früheren Religionen herrschte, in dem My sterium 
niedergeschlagen war [...]”  Schelling, “Achtundzwanzigste Vorlesung: Qualitativer Unterschied 
zwischen dem Charakter der griechischen Religion und dem der früheren Religionen,” Philosophie der 
Mythologie. Erstes Buch: Der Monotheismus, in Sämtliche Werke, volume II (Stuttgart and Augsburg: 
J. G Cotta’scher Verlag, 1857), 649.  
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only within them do we find a positive, simultaneously 
limited and unlimited intuition of the absolute.
94
 
 
While the passage quoted above included little rationalization as to why the pre-
Homeric forces “should have remained secret,” in the excerpt a ove, Schelling explains 
that they must remain hidden because, in their formlessness and limitlessness, they 
summon up eternity. By replacing this vast indistinctness with the Homeric gods (who 
possess distinct personas with specialised powers), divinity becomes graspable. 
Manifestations of the uncanny do not occur in the Homeric world, because there is no 
confusion between the new gods and the old anarchic forces. 
Although early nineteenth-century notions of the Absolute are not identical with 
the “purely formless, dark, frightening element” of the pre-Homeric gods (these 
entities, according to Schelling, “recall eternity” – though they are chaotic, they are not 
the absolute),
95
 they nevertheless have in common with it an ungraspable boundlessness 
that is tied to the notion that they “should remain secret and hidden.”  Schelling’s 
absolute, recalling his description of the pre-Homeric gods, is even depicted as an 
a yss: “[t]he a solute in and for itself offers no multiplicity or variety whatever, and to 
                                                 
94
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §30, 37. “Als eine Folge aus dem aufgestellten Princip 
kann ferner angesehen werden, daβ die vollkommenen Götter ildungen erst erscheinen können, 
nachdem das rein Formlose, Dunkle, Ungeheure verdrungen ist. In diese Region des Dunkeln und 
Formlosen gehört noch alles, was unmittelbar an die Ewigkeit, den ersten Grund des Daseyns erinnert. 
Es ist schon öfters  emerkt worden, daβ erst die Ideen das A solute ausschlieβen; nur in ihnen ist eine 
positive, zugleich  egrenzte und un egrenzte Anschauung des A soluten.”Schell ing, Philosophie der 
Kunst, §30, 38. 
95
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §30, 37. Emphasis mine. “Als eine Folge aus dem 
aufgestelten Princip kann ferner angesehen werden, daβ die vollkommenen Götter ildung erst 
erscheinen können, nachdem das rein Formlose, Dunkle, Ungeheure verdrungen ist. In diese Region des 
Dunkeln und Formlosen gehört noch alles, was unmittelbar an die Ewigkeit, den ersten Grund des 
Daseyns erinnert.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §30, 38. 
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that extent it is for the understanding an a solute,  ottomless emptiness.” 96 Although 
Schelling’s characterisations of the pre-Homeric forces and the absolute are laden with 
catch-words for the sublime, he locates their uncanniness, not in these qualities, but 
rather in the tension between concealment and revelation.
97
 
In the thought of the German early Romantics, particularly, the very essence of 
the Absolute was the impossibility of knowing it.
98
 As Novalis writes in his first 
Blüthenstaub-fragment, “[e]verywhere we seek the unconditioned (das Unbedingte), but 
find only things (Dinge).”99 German idealist philosophers including Schelling, Hegel, 
and Schopenhauer, writing both concurrent with and subsequent to the early Romantics, 
are also concerned with the relationship between the absolute and the finite.  However, 
these philosophers diverge from the early Romantics in that, although they recognise 
the problem of the traversability between finite and infinite, they nonetheless admit 
circumstances in which one can reach the absolute. As Schelling explains in his 
Philosophy of Art, mythological deities are not the only means of accessing the 
universal. Through philosophy, one represents the a solute “with absolute indifference 
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 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, §30, 36. “Das A solute an und für sich  ietet keine 
Mannichfaltigkeit dar, es ist insofern für den Verstand eine a solute,  odenlose Leere.” Schelling, 
Philosophie der Kunst, §30, 37.  
97
 The relationship between the sublime and the uncanny is develo ped in the following chapter.  
98
 “For the Romantics, the unconditioned is replaced  y the search for the unconditioned.” Manfred 
Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert (Albany, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 50. 
99
 Novalis, in Frank, The Philosophical Foundations, 24. “1. Wir suchen ü erall das Un edingte, und 
finden immer nur Dinge.” Novalis, Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe Freidrich von Hardenbergs. Band 2: 
Das philosophisch-theoretisch Werk, ed. Hans-Joachim Mähl (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1978), 226. 
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of the universal and the particular within the universal.”100 That is to say, philosophy 
mirrors the absolute, representing the universal as universal.  Schelling, Hegel, and 
Schopenhauer differ as to the means by which one can access the unconditioned.
101
 
While philosophical means of knowing the Absolute are possible for these 
German Idealists (whether this knowledge is considered barely finite or universal), the 
sensuous world is a more contested point of access to the infinite.  For Schopenhauer, 
the pro lem of reaching the Will through the finite arises  ecause it is, “not one as an 
individual or a concept is, but as something to which the condition of the possibility of 
plurality, that is, the principium individuationis, is foreign.”102 Illustrating the 
relationship between Will and Representation, he invokes the imagery of a magic 
lantern: 
Just as a magic lantern shows many different pictures , but it 
is only one and the same flame that makes them all visible; 
so in all the many different phenomena which together  fill 
the world or supplant one another as successive events, it is 
only the one will that appears, and everything is its 
visibility, its objectivity; it remains unmoved in the midst of 
this change.
103
 
                                                 
100
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §39, 46. “Indifference” here means non-difference, 
synthesis. It signifies limitlessness and an absence of division.  “Darstellung des A soluten mit 
a soluter Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen im Allgemeinen   Philosophie – Idee   .” 
Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §39, 50.  
101
 Schelling  elieves that “philosophy is the immediate or direct representation of the divine.” 
Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §15, 29. “die Philosophie ist die unmittel are Darstellung 
des Göttlichen.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §15, 25. 
102
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I, trans. Payne, §25, 128. “nicht wie ein 
Individuum, noch wie ein Begriff eins ist; sondern wie etwas, dem die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der 
Vielheit, das principium Individuationis, fremd ist.”  Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellungen I, §25, 193. 
103
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I, trans. Payne, §28, 153. “Wie eine 
Zauberlaterne viele und mannigfaltige Bilder zeigt, es aber nur eine und dieselbe Flamme ist, welche 
ihnen allen die Sichtbarkeit erteilt; so ist in allen mannigfaltigen Erscheinungen, welche nebeneina nder 
  
41 
 
 
 
Here, the manifold projected images, the Representations, are distortions and individual 
expressions of the flame. Though they depend on the flame for their existence, one 
cannot deduce the pure, single fire from the images flickering on the wall. Schelling, 
too, believes that the natural world does not offer a revelation of the Absolute,
104
 
although he makes an exception for the “general world structure,” which, when grasped 
by reason, displays the unity of difference and indifference .
105
 And though, for Hegel, 
the relationship between finite and infinite is one that shifts along with the development 
of the Spirit, the philosopher perceives in the early nineteenth century a profound 
division between the sensuous and eternal spheres, such tha t they are “two worlds 
which contradict one another.”106 
In the finite, artworks defy the mandate that the particular cannot reveal the 
universal: Schelling avers that, in art, one represents the a solute “with a solute 
                                                                                                                                                             
die Welt füllen oder nacheinander als Begebenheiten sich verdrängen, doch nur der eine Wille das 
Erschinende, dessen Sichtbarkeit, Objektivität das alles ist und der unbewegt bleibt mitten in jenem 
Wechsel [...]” Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen I, §28, 226. 
104
 “Phenomenal nature as such is not a complete revelation of God , for even the organism itself is only 
a particular potence.” Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §10, 27. “Die Natur als solche 
erschinend ist keine vollkommene Offenbarung Gottes. Denn selbst der Organismus ist nur besondere 
Potenz.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §10, 22. 
105
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §83, 118. Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst §83, 148.  
106
 “Spiritual culture, the modern intellect, produces this opposition in man which makes him an 
amphibious animal, because he now has to live in two worlds which contradict one another.  The result 
is that now consciousness wanders about in this contradiction, and, driven from one sid e to the other, 
cannot find satisfaction for itself in either the one or the other .” Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 
54. “Die geistige Bildung, der moderne Verstand  ringt im Menschen diesen Gegensatz hervor, der ihn 
zur Amphibie macht, indem er nun in zwei Welten zu leben hat, die sich widersprechen, so daβ in 
diesem Widerspruch nun auch das Bewuβtsein sich umhertreibt und, von der einen Seite 
herübergeworfen zu der anderen, unfähig ist, such für sich in der einen wie in der anderen zu 
befriedigen.” Hegel, Ästhetik I, 80. 
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indifference of the universal and the particular in the particular”107 and Hegel maintains 
that “art’s vocation is to unveil the truth in the form of sensuous artistic configuration, 
to set forth the reconciled opposition just mentioned [between the sensuous and the 
eternal], and so to have its end and aim in itself, in this very setting forth and 
unveiling.”108 Art accomplishes what nature cannot, revealing the absolute in the finite.  
Art lifts the veil of the absolute, drawing forth into perception that which should not be 
sensed. It grasps the ungraspable. And music, granted an exceptional position among 
the arts, exists at the very limits of possibility, where finite nearly dissolves into the 
infinite. 
 
The Secret Made Audible 
 
In his aesthetics, Schelling remarks upon how his treatment of music  is at odds with the 
approach of his predecessors. Drawing attention to Kant’s concept of music in the 
Critique of Judgment, Schelling’s comments illustrate a shift in the Idealist discourse of 
music at the beginning of the nineteenth century:  
As a historical note I will mention only that until now music 
has generally been separated from the formative arts.  Kant 
suggests three kinds: verbal art, formative art, and that of the 
play of feelings. Very vague. Here the plastic arts and 
painting, there rhetoric and the poetic arts. Under the rubric 
of the third: music, which I find to be an extremely 
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 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans Stott, §39, 46. “Darstellung des A soluten mit a soluter 
Indifferenz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen im Besonderen   Kunst.” Schelling, Philosophie der 
Kunst, §39, 50. 
 
108
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 55. “Hiergegen steht zu  ehaupten, daβ die Kunst die Wahrheit 
in Form der sinnlichen Kunstgestaltung zu enthüllen, jenen versöhnten Gegensatz darzustellen berufen 
sei und somit ihren Endzweck in sich, in dieser Darstellung und Enthüllung sel er ha e.”  Hegel, 
Ästhetik I, 82. 
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subjective explanation of the latter, almost like that of 
Sulzer, who says that the purpose of music is to awaken the 
emotions – something that could just as easily be applied to 
many other things, such as concerts of fragrances or 
tastes.
109
 
 
This historical note, along with the aesthetic systems to which it corresponds, is the 
starting point from which we begin to approach music and how it can be understood as 
an uncanny art at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the years around 1800, the 
status of music in Idealist aesthetics shifted drastically.
110
 In Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment, as Schelling notes, music is the poor cousin of the fine arts, barely qualifying 
as anything more than a pleasing sensation.  Kant claims that he classes it among the 
fine arts, rather than the agreea le arts,  ecause he interprets it as a “ eautiful play of 
sensations.”111 However, it is not held in high esteem in this position.  According to 
                                                 
109
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §75, 103. “Nur historisch erwähne ich, daβ  is jetzt 
allgemein Musik von  ildender Kunst getrennt worden.   Kant hat dreierlei Arten: redende,  ildende 
und die Kunst des Spiels der Empfindungen. Sehr vag. Hierher Plastik, Malerei: dorthin Beredtsamkeit 
und Dichtkunst. Unter die dritte die Musik, was eine ganz subjektive Erklärung derselben ist, fast wie 
die Sulzers, der sagt, der Zweck der Musik sey, Empfindung zu erwecken, was noch auf viel andere 
Dinge paβt, wie auf Concerte von Gerüchen oder Geschmäcken.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, 
§75, 131. 
110
 In determining the foundations of the uncanniness of music in the early nineteenth century, I am 
primarily interested in the shift in aesthetics that belong to a larger ontol ogical system. I am not 
suggesting that a pronounced shift occurs in all music aesthetics around the year 1800. Indeed, there are 
many points of continuity in music aesthetics and criticism between the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. For more on the relation between late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century music 
criticism, see Mary Sue Morrow, German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century: Aesthetic 
Issues in Instrumental Music  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 151-57. 
111
 “[…] either it [music] is to be interpreted, as we have done, as the beautiful play of sensations 
(through hearing), or else as one of the agreeable sensations. According to the former interpretation, 
alone, would music be represented out and out as a fine art, whereas according to the latter it would be 
represented as (in part at least) an agreeable art.” Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, 
§51, 190. “[…] man sie entweder, wie wir gethan ha en, für das schöne Spiel der Empfindungen (durch 
das Gehör) oder angenehmer Empfindungen erklärte.  Nur nach der ersten Erklärungsart wird Musik 
gänzlich als schöne, nach der zweiten aber als angenehme Kunst (wenigstens zum Theil) vorgestellt 
werden.” Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §51, 325. 
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Kant, when judged by how much it expands the faculties necessary for cognition, 
“music […] since it plays merely with sensations, has the lowest place among the fine 
arts – just as it has perhaps the highest among those valued at the same time for the ir 
agreea leness.”112 Indeed, Kant’s am ivalence a out music reveals itself tellingly in his 
comparisons of the role and experience of that art with composing seating arrangements 
for a banquet or the odours that might assault us from an overly-perfumed 
handkerchief.
113
 
 By the early nineteenth century, however, spurred by the turn -of-the-century 
literary aesthetics of Wackenroder, philosophers granted music a position central to the 
matter of the A solute’s revelation in the finite.  In Phantasien über die Kunst fur 
Freunde der Kunst (1799),
114
 Wackenroder’s ecstatic fantasies maintain the idea that 
                                                 
112
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. Meredith, §53, 195. “[…] so hat Musik unter den schönen 
Künsten sofern den untersten (so wie unter denen, die zugleich nach ihrer Annehmlichkeit geschätzt 
werden, vielleicht den obersten) Platz, weil sie bloβ mit Empfindungen spielt.”Kant, Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, §53, 329. 
 
113
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §44, 166 and §53, 196. Kritik der Urteilskraft, 
§44, 305 and §53, 330. Schelling does not explicitly connect his objection, quoted on t he previous 
page, (that Kant and Sulzer’s evaluation of music in terms of it awakening the emotions could similarly 
be applied to “concerts of fragrances or tastes”) to this remark of Kant’s; however, the similarities 
suggest that he had this passage in mind. 
114
 The primary sources for Wackenroder’s musical aesthetics are the “fantasies” on music pu lished 
after the author’s death. While some of the contributions to Phantasien über die Kunst  were made by 
Tieck, those dealt with in this essay are all attributed to Wackenroder. The extent to which Tieck edited 
Wackenroder’s contri utions is not known. Richard Littlejohns,  “Ini uitous Innocence: The Am iguity 
of Music in the Phantasien über die Kunst (1799),” in Music and Literature in German Romanticism , 
ed. Siobhan Donovan and Robin Eliott (Rochester, New York: Camden House, 2004), 3. These essays 
are commonly considered the formative basis of German Romantic musical philosophy. Linda Siegel, 
“Wackenroder's Musical Essays in ‘Phantasien ü er die Kunst’,”  The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 30, No. 3 (1972): 351-2; Mark Evan Bonds, “Idealism and the Aesthetics of Instrumental 
Music at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century,”  Journal of the American Musicological Society  50 
(1997): 407. Although Carl Dahlhaus makes strong connections between the musical writings of 
Wackenroder and Tieck and Romanticism, he also connects Wackenroder to the Empfindsamkeit and 
Tieck to Sturm und Drang. Dahlhaus, The Idea of Absolute Music , trans. Roger Lustig (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 54-66. 
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music, as a mimetic art, functions to preserve, express, and communicate emotion.
115
 
Yet, he also suggests that music propels us beyond our individual concerns, drawing the 
human nearer to the divine. For this reason, he considers music the most marvelous of 
the arts.
116
 The nature of human interaction with the divine through music, however, 
remains limited for Wackenroder. In his vision of musical experience, these worlds are 
not united: music simply provides a passage beyond the finite:  
So do I close my eyes before all of the quarrels of the world 
– and become serenely absorbed in the land of music, as in 
the land of belief, where all our doubts and our sorrows lose 
themselves in a resounding sea – […] where no chattering of 
word and language, no whirl of letters and monstrous 
hieroglyphics makes us dizzy,  ut instead all of our hearts’ 
angst is at once healed by a tender touch. – And how? Are 
questions answered for us here? Are secrets revealed to us? 
– Oh, no! but instead of all answers and revelations, airy, 
beautiful cloud formations are shown to us, the sight of 
which soothes us, though we know not how; - with bold 
certainty we wander through the unknown land; - […] and 
our spirits become healthy through the contemplation of 
wonders that are far more ungraspable and sublime.
117
 
 
                                                 
115
 Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, “Die Wunder der Tonkunst,” in Werke (Wilhelmshaven: Florian 
Noetzel Verlag, 2007) 196. 
116
 He holds music “für die wunder arste dieser Erfindungen [the arts], weil sie menschliche Gefühle 
auf eine ü ermenschliches Art schildert, weil sie uns alle Bewegungen unsers Gemüts unkörperlich […] 
zeigt.” Wackenroder, “Die Wunder der Tonkunst,” 195. This tendency to perceive musical experience 
as a means of transcending earthly life is more prevalent in Wackenroder’s writings than that of 
treating music as communicative and imitative of common emotions.  
117“so schliess’ ich mein Auge zu vor all dem Kriege der Welt, - und ziehe mich still in das Land der 
Musik, als in das Land des Glaubens, zurück, wo alle  unsre Zweifel und unsre Leiden sich in ein 
tönendes Meer verlieren, - […] wo kein Wort- und Sprachgeschnatter, kein Gewirr von Buchstaben und 
monströser Hieroglyphenschrift uns schwindlich macht, sondern alle Angst unsers Herzens durch leise 
Berührung auf einmal geheilt wird. – Und wie? Werden hier Fragen uns beantwortet?  Werden 
Geheimnisse uns offenbart? – Ach nein! aber statt aller Antwort und Offenbarung werden uns luftige, 
schöne Wolkengestalten gezeigt, deren Anblick uns beruhigt, wir wissen nicht wie : - mit kühner 
Sicherheit wandeln wir durch das un ekannte Land hindurch, […] und unser Geist wird gesund durch 
das Anschaun von Wundern, die noch weit un egreiflicher und erha ener sind.”  Wackenroder, “Die 
Wunder der Tonkunst,” 193. 
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According to Wackenroder, meaningful revelation of the Absolute is not accessible 
through music, because that which music brings to light is even more incomprehensible 
than the world of language and rationality. While music can transport us, it cannot bring 
us  eyond contemplation to understanding: music gives us access to the “land of 
 elief,”  ut not that of knowledge or comprehension. 118 Thus, while Wackenroder’s 
thought is influential in its granting of a leading and powerful position to music, his 
model of music is transcendental rather than revelatory.  
 Schelling’s estimation of music moves firmly  eyond conceptions of music as a 
mimetic art.
119
 In the Philosophie der Kunst (1802-03), Schelling devotes his attention 
specifically to the relationship between music and the Absolute, rather than considering 
personal musical experience. Like Wackenroder, Schelling is somewhat equivocal as to 
the nature of musical revelation. Though he credits music as having the most boundless 
potential to symbolise the infinite through the finite, he also describes music as the 
most “sealed off” of the arts. In one sense, then, it discloses the absolute to finitude in a  
manner that is closest to its own nature; in another, its insubstantiality renders it hardly 
perceptible: 
Music, which from the one perspective is the most closed of 
all arts, the one that comprehends forms still within chaos 
                                                 
118
 Wackenroder, for whom these limitations of musical experience do not diminish its wondrousness, 
seems frustrated that rational comprehension is the measure of gainful experience for others.  In 
response, he emphasises the impossibility of transferring intuitive experience into  reasoned knowledge, 
arguing that “[e]ine ewige feindselige Kluft ist zwischen dem fühlenden Herzen und der Untersuchung 
des Forschens befestigt, und jene ist ein selbständiges verschlossenenes göttliches Wesen, das von der 
Vernunft nicht aufgeschlossen und gelöst werden kann.”  Wackenroder, “Das eigentümliche innere 
Wesen der Tonkunst, und die Seelenlehre der heutigen Instrumentalmusik,”  in Werke (Wilhelmshaven: 
Florian Noetzel Verlag, 2007), 210. 
119
 Bonds, “Idealism and the Aesthetics of Instrumental Music at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century,”  
405. 
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and without differentiation, and that expresses only the pure 
form of the movements separated from corporeality, 
similarly takes up the absolute model or figure only as 
rhythm, harmony, and melody, that is, for the first potence, 
even though within this sphere it is the most boundless  of all 
arts.
120
 
 
In this way, music is akin to “the general world structure,” the only natural embodiment 
of the infinite: 
The general world structure operates completely 
independently from the other potences of nature. Depending 
on the perspective, it can be the highest and most universal 
element, the sphere in which the confusion of concrete 
reality directly suspends or dissolves itself into purest 
reason. Or it is also the deepest potence. So also music, 
which viewed from the one perspective is the most universal 
or general or the real arts and closest to that dissolution into 
language and reason, even though from the other perspective 
it is merely the first potence of the real arts.
121
 
 
Just as the world structure represents the concrete embodiment of reason, music, among 
the “real arts,” is the least  ound by its material trappings. 
 While Schelling, as we established earlier, maintains that art in general 
represents the a solute “with a solute indifference of the universal and the particular in 
                                                 
120
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §83.4, 118. “Die Musik [ist] von der einen Seite die 
verschlossenste aller Künste […], die die Gestalten noch im Chaos und ununterscheid ar  egreift, und 
die nur die reine Form dieser Bewegungen, abgesondert vom Körperlichen, ausdrückt, den absoluten 
Typus nur als Rhythmus, Harmonie und Melodie, d.h. für die erste Potenz, auf, obgleich sie nun 
innerhalb dieser Sphäre die grenzenloseste aller Künste ist.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §83.4, 
148. 
121
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §83, 118. “Wie sich der allgemeine Welt au ganz 
unabhängig verhält von den andern Potenzen der Natur, und je nachem er von einer Seite betrachtet 
wird, das Höchste und Allgemeine ist, worin sich unmittelbar in die reinste Vernunft auflöst, was im 
Concreten sich noch verwirrt, von der andern Seite aber auch die tiefste Potenz ist: so auch die Musik, 
welche, von der einen Seite betrachtet, die allgemeinste unter den realen Künsten und der Auflösung in 
Rede und Vernunft am nächsten ist, o gleich von der andern nur die erste Potenz dersel en.” Schelling, 
Philosophie der Kunst, §83, 148. 
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the particular,”122 he nonetheless contends that sound is the medium that fulfills this 
end to the fullest extent, since “[t]he indifference of the informing of the infinite into 
the finite, taken purely as indifference, is sonority. Or, within the informing of the 
infinite into the finite, indifference as indifference can emerge only as sonority. ”123 
Tone is best able to represent Indifference (non-difference) in the finite because of its 
lack of materiality. Existing only in time,  ut not in space, tone is “a solute form.”124 
Furthermore, the perception of tone in time is enabled by rhythm, the element that 
creates the finite in time through which the infinite becomes discernible.  Schelling 
descri es rhythm as “the music in music,” since it is through rhythm that, within music 
as tone, unity is imagined through multiplicity.
125
 Because of this structure, music 
represents the absolute indifference of pure unity and the finite. 
 In Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik music’s relationship to the A solute is 
mediated through the human subject.
126
 Hegel explains that both the limitless Divine 
                                                 
122
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §39, 46. “Darstellung des A soluten mit absoluter 
Indifferenz der Allgemeinen und Besonderen im Besonderen   Kunst.” Schelling, Philosophie der 
Kunst, §39, 50. 
123
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §76, 107. “Die Indifferenz der Einbildung des 
Unendlichen ins Endliche rein als Indifferenz aufgenommen ist Klang. Oder: In der Einbildung des 
Unendlichen ins Endliche kann die Indifferenz, als Indifferenz, nur als Klang hervortreten. ” Schelling, 
Philosophie der Kunst, §76, 132. 
 
124
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §76, 108. “Rein als solche und als Indifferenz ist er 
sie nur, inwiefern er von dem Körper abgesondert, als Form für sich ist, als absolute Form.  Diese ist 
nur im Klang, denn dieser ist einerseits le endig – für sich    , andererseits eine blosse Dimension in 
der Zeit, nicht a er im Raume.”  Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §76, 133. 
125
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §79, 112. “Der Rhythmus ist die Musik in der Musik.” 
Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §79, 138. 
126
 These lectures were presented as a series between 1818 and 1820, and were first published in 1835 
in an edition edited  y H.G. Hotho, a student of Hegel’s. James H. Donelan, Poetry and the Romantic 
Aesthetic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 71. 
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and the individual human have in common the principle of subjectivity.  In their 
su jectivity, the human and the A solute are linked, such that “ the Absolute is manifest 
as a living, actual, and therefore human subject, just as the human and finite subject in 
virtue of his being spiritual, makes the absolute substance and truth, the Spirit of God, 
living and actual in himself.”127 If art, for Hegel, is “the concrete, sensuous 
representation of absolute knowledge,”128 then music, as a romantic art, represents the 
utmost stage of the spirit’s journey, where the divine and the individual, united in their 
subjectivity, can only be represented in media that preserve the innerness of the ideal 
life.
129
  
 The content of music is thus the “inwardly veiled life,” 130 the indistinguishable 
unity of Spirit’s su jectivity, which it presents “not as an external shape or as an 
objectively existing work, but as that inner life; consequently its expression must be the 
direct communication of a living individual who has put into it the entirety of his own 
                                                 
127
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 793. “Das A solute erscheint deshal  e ensosehr als 
lebendiges, wirkliches, und somit auch menschliches Subjekt, wie die menschliche und endliche 
Subjektivität, als geistiges, die absolute Substanz und Wahrheit, den göttlichen Geist in si ch lebendig 
und wirklich macht." Hegel, Ästhetik III, 12. 
128
 Donelan, Poetry and the Romantic Aesthetic , 75. 
129
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 793; Ästhetik III, 12. “Therefore if we sum up in one word this 
revelation of content and form in romantic art wherever this relation is preserved in its own special 
character, we may say that, precisely because the ever expanded universality and the restlessly active 
depths of the heart are the principle here, the keynote of romantic art is musical and, if we make the 
content of this idea determinate, lyrical.” Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 527-28. “Fassen wir 
daher dies Verhältnis des Inhalts und der Form im Romantischen, wo es sich in seiner Eigentümlichkeit 
erhält, zu einem Worte zusammen, so können wir sagen, der  Grundton des Romantischen, weil eben die 
immer vergröβerte Allgemeinheit und rastlos arbeitende Tiefe des Gemüts das Princip ausmacht, sei 
musikalisch und, mit bestimmtem Inhalte der Vorstellung, lyrisch.Hegel, Ästhetik II, 141. 
130
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 902. “In sich eingehüllte Le en” Hegel, Ästhetik III, 149 . 
  
50 
 
 
inner life.”131 Furthermore, music’s representation of su jectivity is enhanced  ecause it 
is not only concerned with the subjective in its content, but also in its form.
132
 Hegel 
contrasts the romantic arts with the symbolic and classical arts, emphasising that, in 
order to produce the outward appearance of innerness, music (along with painting and 
poetry) forsakes the spatial aspects of the other arts.
133
 Instead, music’s externality is 
altogether ephemeral, a quality that draws attention to innerness, rather than away from 
it. Hegel explains that “the note is an expression and something external,  ut an 
expression which, precisely because it is something external, is made to vanish again 
forthwith.”134 The note’s act of vanishing, negating its materiality, renders it a force 
that acts on the listener’s  ody through interior vi ration, such that “what comes before 
us is no longer the peaceful and material shape but the first and more ideal breath of the 
soul.”135 Music forms from and dissolves into spirit, flickering only momentarily in the 
sensual world. 
                                                 
131
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 909. “Denn insofern es das su jekte Innere sel st ist, das die 
Musik sich mit dem Zwecke zum Inhalt nimmt, sich nicht als äuβere Gestalt und objektiv dastehendes 
Werk, sondern als subjective Innerlichkeit zur Erscheinung zu bringen, so muβ die Äuβerung sich auch 
unmittelbare als Mitteilung eines lebendigen Subjekts ergeben, in welche dasselbe seine ganze eigenen 
Innerlichkeit hineinlegt.”  Hegel, Ästhetik III, 158-59. 
132
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 889-890; Ästhetik III, 133. 
133
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 794-95; Ästhetik III, 14-15. 
134
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 892. “So ist der Ton wohl eine Äuβerung und Äuβerlichkeit, 
aber eine Äuβerung, welche gerade dadurch, daβ sie Äuβerlichkeit ist, sogleich sie wieder 
verschwinden macht.” Hegel, Ästhetik III, 136. 
135
 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 890. “Das Ohr dagegen vernimmt, ohne sich sel er praktisch 
gegen die Objekte hinauszuwenden, das Resultat jenes inneren Erzitterns des Körpers, durch welches 
nicht mehr die ruhige materielle Gestalt, sondern die erste ideellere Seelenhaftigkeit zum Vorschein 
kommt.” Hegel, Ästhetik III, 134. 
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In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, the relationship of music with the limitless nature 
of the Will lies less in music’s structure and more in its content. A language beyond 
languages, immediately acting on all who perceive it, it is an unmediated representation 
of the Will itself.
136
 In The World as Will and Representation , music exists at the limits 
of possi ility, so that if Schopenhauer’s  conception of the arts is envisioned as a 
spectrum of the objectification of the Will, then music occupies the utmost edge: it is 
Representation nearly dissolving into Will. Unlike the other arts, music does not 
replicate the Ideas; instead, Schopenhauer characterises music as an “immediate […] 
o jectification and copy of the whole Will.” Whereas the other arts present the shadow, 
music reveals the essence.
137
 
                                                 
136
 “Because music does not, like all the  other arts, exhibit the Ideas or grades of the will 
objectification, but directly the will itself, we can also explain that it acts directly on the will, i.e., the 
feelings, passions, and emotions of the hearer, so that it quickly raises these or even alt ers them.” 
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation  II, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1966), Ch. 39, 448. “Weil die Musik nicht, gleich allen andern Künsten, die Ideen, oder 
Stufen der Objektivation des Willens, sondern unmittelbar den Willen selbst darstellt; so ist hieraus 
auch erklärlich, daß sie auf den Willen, d .i. die Gefühle, Leidenschaften und Affekte des Hörers, 
unmittel ar einwirkt, so daß sie diesel en schnell erhöht, oder auch umstimmt.” Schopenhauer, Die 
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung II (Stuttgart: Cotta-Insel Verlag, 1960) Kap. 39, 574. 
137
 “Thus music is as immediate an objectification and copy of the whole will as the world itself is, 
indeed as the Ideas are, the multiplied phenomenon of which constitutes the w orld of individual things. 
Therefore music is by no means like the other arts, namely a copy of the Ideas, but a copy of the will 
itself, the objectivity of which are the Ideas. For this reason the effect of music is so very much more 
powerful and penetrating than is that of the other arts, for these others speak only of the shadow, but 
music of the essence.” Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation  I, trans. E. F. J. Payne 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1966), §52, 257. Die Musik ist nämlich eine so unmittelbare Objektivation 
und Abbild des ganzen Willens, wie die Welt selbst es ist, ja wie die Ideen es sind, deren vervielfältigte 
Erscheinung die Welt der einzelnen Dinge ausmacht. Die Musik ist also keineswegs, gleich den andern 
Künsten, das Abbild der Ideen, sondern Abbild des Willens selbst , dessen Objektität auch die Ideen 
sind: deshalb eben ist die Wirkung der Musik so sehr viel mächtiger und eindringlicher, als die der 
andern Künste: denn diese reden nur vom Schatten, sie aber vom Wesen.  Schopenhauer, Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung I (Stuttgart: Cotta-Insel Verlag, 1960) §52, 359. 
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As discussed above, Schopenhauer maintains that the Will, as a rule, cannot be 
reached through the Representations.
138
 However, through another, more clandestine 
route - a way from within - access to the Will is possible. As individuals, we can gain 
knowledge of our own Willing by acting as both the knowing subject and the thing -in-
itself.
139
 Yet this knowledge, our only immediate knowledge of the Will, is not a 
knowledge of the whole Will, but rather of finite acts of Willing.
140
 The pure unity of 
the Will, characterised by endless striving, is not reached through these means. Instead, 
the individual acts of the Will are characterised by their limits in time, by their ends;
141
 
or through inner knowledge over time, that is, by means of the phenomenon of 
character.
 142
 Thus, the Will as known most immediately to man, through inner 
                                                 
138
 “[...] we can never get at the inner nature of things from without.” Schopenhauer, The World as Will 
and Representation I, trans. Payne, §17, 99. “[...] von aussem [ist] dem Wesen der Dinge nimmermehr 
 eizukommen.” Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I, §17, 156. 
139
 “But now […] I have stressed that other truth that we are not merely the knowing su ject,  ut that 
we ourselves are also among those realities or entities we require to know, that we ourselves are the 
thing-in-itself.  Consequently, a way from within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to 
which we cannot penetrate from without.  It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret alliance, 
which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from 
without.”  Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation II, trans. Payne, Ch. 18, 195. “Nun 
aber habe ich [...] jene andere hervorgehoben, daß wir nicht bloß das erkennende Subjekt sind, sondern 
andererseits auch selbst zu den erkennenden Wesen gehören, selbst das Ding an sich sind; daß mithin 
zu jenem selbst-eigenen und inneren Wesen der Dinge, bis zu welchem wir von außen nicht dringen 
können, uns ein Weg von innen offen steht, gleichsam ein unterirdischer Gang, eine geheime 
Verbindung, die uns, wie durch Verrath, mit Einem Male in die Festung versetzt, welche durch Angriff 
von außen zu nehmen unmöglich war.” Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen  II, Kap. 
18, 253. 
140
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I, trans. Payne, Ch. 18, 197. Schopenhauer, 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen  II, Kap. 18, 255. 
141
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I, trans. Payne, §29, 163-64. Schopenhauer, 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen  I, §29, 241. 
142
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I, trans. Payne, §55, 287-288. Schopenhauer, 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen  1, §55. 414-15. 
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knowledge of our Willing, is not a unity, but rather is Will barely rendered 
Representation through the form of knowledge of time.  
Just as inner knowledge lies on the boundary of Will and phenomenon, so 
Schopenhauer, too, approaches music as Will barely rendered Representation. From his 
descriptions of music, it is clear that Schopenhauer struggles with the Representational 
nature of the musical art. Schopenhauer’s idea of music seems tied to Representation 
only insofar as it is object to the knowing subject (our intellect) and, therefore, i s 
necessarily known through the forms of knowledge (in this case, time). Music, due to 
its universal powers, can either replicate (through expression) our own emotions, or act 
on the Will, calling forth our own emotions. In the first circumstance, an exter nal force 
supplants the role of our Will in inner knowledge; in the second, it serves as a catalyst 
for our knowledge of the Will in that same process.  
While both inner knowledge and music are Representations, as outlined above, 
Schopenhauer depicts them as the Will scarcely clothed by the forms of knowledge. 
They exist at the utmost limits of Representation, where the barrier that closes off the 
Will remains permeable. Both are lauded for their revelatory powers: inner knowledge 
as a “way from within” [“Weg von innen,”]143 and music as an art which “gives the 
innermost kernel preceding all form, or the heart of things.”144 As a Representation that 
serves as a portal for the Will, music, like inner knowledge, defies the mandate that 
                                                 
143
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation II, trans. Payne, Ch. 18, 195. Schopenhauer, 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen  II, Kap. 18, 253. 
144
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation I, trans. Payne, §52, 263. “[...] die Musik 
hingegen den innersten aller Gestaltung vorhergängigen Kern, oder das Herz der Dinge gibt.” 
Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen  I, §52, 367. 
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finite Representations cannot give access to the infinite nature of the Will. Music and 
inner knowledge are thus related modes of knowing. If inner knowledge is a way from 
within, then music extends this passageway, such that the objective knowledge of the 
Will is not attained immediately through the division of one’s consciousness. Rather, 
through music, objective knowledge of the Will begins from without.  
 Music occupies an exceptional position in the Idealist aesthetics of the early 
nineteenth century. In Schelling it is “the most  oundless of all the arts;”145 in 
Schopenhauer it “stands quite apart from all the others;”146 in Hegel it reveals the 
“restlessly active depths of the heart” where the personal and A solute spirit are 
united.
147
 Whereas in Kant’s aesthetics, music  arely registers as a fine art, in the 
philosophies of Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel, it holds the power to disclose the 
Absolute in a sensuous form. The shift from the early Romantics’ concept of the 
infinite-as-unknowa le to the Idealists’ notion of the revelation of the Absolute through 
music emphasises the conviction that music, in unveiling the infinite, discloses what 
ought to have remained secret, at least in finite terms.  When the Absolute shines out of 
music, music becomes the secret made audible.
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §83.4, 118. “die grenzenloseste aller Künste ist”  
Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §83.4, 148. 
146
 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation  I, trans. Payne, §52, 255. “Sie steht ganz 
a gesondert von allen andern.” Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellungen  I, §52, 357.  
147
 Music, in Hegel’s aesthetics, is secondary only to the lyric, which makes the content of the spirit 
determinate. Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 527-28. Hegel, Ästhetik II, 139. 
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Music as Romantic Symbol 
 
In early nineteenth-century Idealist aesthetics, music brings about that which should not 
be possible: it discloses the infinite in the finite.  In other terms, one might say that in 
the sense of Goethe’s maxim    where “true symbolism is where the particular 
represents the more universal, not as dream and shadow, but rather as living momentary 
revelation of the unknowable”    that music is a symbol for the absolute.148 Music is a 
living momentary revelation of the unknowable. In Schelling’s thought, this conviction 
receives its strongest formulation. Schelling writes that “the art form in which the real 
unity purely as such becomes potence and symbol is music.”149 
 The aesthetic writings discussed above provide the foundation for music’s 
uncanny potential. Idealist philosophers present music and the absolute in a latently 
uncanny relationship, but, in the abstraction of their writings, they do not illustrate how 
this latency becomes manifest. For the most part, these writings speak of music as a 
concept – as “music,” rather than a specific piece of music, an activity, a performance.  
They tell us why music, as art form, is suddenly surrounded by an aura of uncanniness 
in the early nineteenth century, but not how this uncanniness is experienced.  While the 
conception of the musical art becomes marked with uncanniness, all musical works are 
                                                 
148
 “Das ist die wahre Sym olik wo das Besondere das Allgemeinere repräsentiert, nicht als Traum und 
Schatten, sondern als le endig augen lickliche Offen arung des Unerforschlichen.”  Goethe, Maximen 
und Reflexionen, 34. 
149
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §77, 109 (italics removed). “Die Kunstform, in 
welcher die reale Einheit rein als solche zur Potenz, zum Symbol wird, ist Musik.” Schelling, 
Philosophie der Kunst, §77, 135. However, Schelling argues elsewhere that music is not a symbolic, 
 ut rather an allegorising art: “Music is an allegorizing art, painting schematizes, the plastic arts are 
symbolic.” Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §39, 48. “Die Musik ist eine allegorisirende 
Kunst, die Malerei schematisirend, die Plastik sym olisch.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §39, 55 
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not necessarily uncanny. In the chapters that follow, I turn from the abstract to the 
particular, examining the thematisation of music, musicians, and instruments as 
uncanny in literature, texted music, and music criticism and the techniques through 
which musical works engage with music’s perceived uncanniness.   
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2 
 
From the Sublime to the Uncanny: 
E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony  
 
 
 
The idea of a musical uncanny and the word unheimlich lurk in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s 
review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. The specific use of the word refers to only a 
small span of music: in the third movement, the treatment of the cello and bass theme at 
the beginning of the second half of the trio awakens an uncanny feeling in the reviewer 
(Example 1). In Hoffmann’s words:   
In the second half cellos and basses start the theme twice but 
stop again, and only at the third attempt do they keep going. 
This may strike many people as amusing, but in the reviewer 
it produced an uneasy [unheimliches] feeling. After several 
imitations of the main theme it is taken up by the flutes, 
supported by oboes, clarinets, and bassoons above a pedal G 
from the horns. It dies away in single notes, first from 
clarinets and bassoons, then from cellos and basses.
150
 
                                                 
150
 E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings , 
ed. David Charlton, trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 247. “Im 
zweyten Theil fangen die Bässe das Thema zweymal an und halten wieder ein, zum dritten Mal geht es 
weiter fort. Manchem mag das scherzhaft vorkommen, dem Rec. erweckte es ein unheimliches Gefühl. 
– Nach manchen Imitationen des Hauptthema ergreifen dies die Flöten, von Oboen, Clarinetten, 
Fagotten unterstützt, zu dem Grundton G, den die Hörner aushalten, und es erstirbt in einzelnen Noten, 
die erst Clarinetten und Fagotte, dann die Bässe anschlagen.” E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Recension,” 
Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung 12, nos. 40 and 41 (4 and 11 July 1810) 653-54. David Charlton notes that 
there is actually only a single clarinet and  assoon after measure 226, where the theme “dies away.” 
Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” ed. Charlton, footnote 17, 247. Joseph Kerman 
also notes Hoffmann’s use of the word unheimlich in this context in his study of Beethoven’s opus 131, 
 ut does not go into any detail as to its use. Rather, he seems to mention Hoffmann’s usage as a 
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Example 1: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 196-206 
 
The presence of the word unheimlich is arresting, on one count, because it suggests an 
additional lens for the essay, which traditionally has been received as the landmark 
piece of criticism for the musical sublime.
151
 I, however, read Hoffmann’s review as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
justification for not explaining in detail what he means by calling opus 131 uncanny, even if he does 
provide a thorough musical analysis: “E. T. A. Hoffmann didn’t ask why the dou le-bass fugato was 
uncanny in the Fifth Symphony. Some people thought it was a joke, he said, a travesty, but to him it 
was unheimlich, uncanny.” Joseph Kerman, “Beethoven’s Opus 131 and the Uncanny,” Nineteenth 
Century Music 25 (2001), 164. 
 
151
 Mark Evan Bonds notes that “[t]he central importance of the su lime in Hoffmann’s review of 
Beethoven’s Fifth has long  een recognized, even though Hoffmann uses the term itself only once.” 
Bonds, Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2006),  45. In actuality Hoffmann does not use the term sublime [Erhaben] 
in the review, though he does, of course, invoke the sublime. Keith Chapin relates the sublimity of 
Hoffmann’s vision of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony to the a andoning of mimesis, a rejection which, I 
will argue, is more in line with the uncanny. Keith Chapin, “Lost in Quotation: Nuances Behind E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s Programmatic Statements,” Nineteenth-Century Music 30, no. 1 (2006) 52. Holly Watkins 
explicitly aligns Hoffmann’s review with the Burkian su lime. Watkins, Metaphors of Depth in German 
  
59 
 
 
moment of transition between the aesthetics of the sublime and the uncanny in music.
152
 
Indeed, the prominence of uncanniness in Hoffmann’s interpretation of Beethoven’s 
music, particularly at the local musical level, raises the question: why do scholars hail 
the review as the very pinnacle of the musical su lime’s aesthetic criticism when it is  
infused with intimations of the uncanny? And more generally, what is the relationship 
between the sublime and the uncanny, both in music and aesthetic theory? I turn to 
these theoretical questions in the second part of the chapter. In that section I contend, 
firstly, that although there is some commonality in the feelings related to the sublime 
and the uncanny, they constitute significantly different experiences (in the general 
sense) and understandings of music, more specifically; and secondly, that the musical 
uncanny begins to contaminate and supplant the musical sublime (in the sense of how 
individual musical works are understood) in the second decade of the nineteenth 
century. Before this, however, I devote more attention to the position of Hoffmann’s 
review in the history of music criticism and to the musical moments that summon the 
author’s uncanny impressions.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Musical Thought: From E.T.A. Hoffmann to Arnold Schoenberg  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) 37. For more on Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven Fifth Symphony and the su lime, see: 
Carl Dahlhaus, “E.T.A. Hoffmanns Beethoven-Kritik und die Ästhetik des Erhabenen ,” Archiv für 
Musikwissenschaft 38 (1981): 79-92; A igail Chantler, “Revisiting E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Musical 
Hermeneutics,” International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music  33, no. 1 (2002) 25; and 
Robin Wallace, Beethoven’s Critics: Aesthetic Dilemmas and Resolutions During the Composer’s 
Lifetime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 32.   
152
 In this assertion, I follow the periodisation suggested by James We ster, who argues in “Between 
Enlightenment and Romanticism in Music History: ‘First Viennese Modernism’ and the Delayed 
Nineteenth Century,” that this aesthetic is so central that the period from 1780-1815 could be conceived 
of as “the age of the Kantian su lime” in music. Only after 1810 and the waning of the su lime style, 
did musical Romanticism “in the emphatic sense” take hold, according to We ster. James We ster, 
“Between Enlightenment and Romanticism in Music History: ‘First Viennese Modernism’ and the 
Delayed Nineteenth Century,” 19th-Century Music 25, no. 2-3 (2001-02): 123-26. I add to this 
periodisation the idea that the uncanny is a central element of musical Romanticism in German  culture. 
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 Hoffmann’s use of unheimlich, supported  y the review’s uncanny imagery, is 
remarkable in that it is one of earliest pieces of music criticism to appeal to this 
aesthetic (both in the sense of a theory of feeling and of art), appearing in the 4 and 11 
July 1810 issues of the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung.  Moreover, it is the first to 
identify a particular moment of music as unheimlich.
 
In contrast, an earlier anonymous 
review of a performance of Mozart’s Don Giovanni, from the 18 May 1803 issue of the 
Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung, ascribes uncanniness to the performance of one Herr 
Fischer, whose behaviour and dangerous proximity to the subterranean arouses this 
feeling. In this review, the straightforward identification of an uncanny feeling is 
accompanied by some of the hallmarks of uncanniness: a sense of disorientation and the 
blurring of boundaries between the natural and supernatural realms.
153
 Yet, this 
experience is not expressly attri uted to Mozart’s music, though it would be curious if 
music had not played a part in forming these impressions. 
 In Hoffmann’s review, however, the description of an uncanny moment is not 
prompted by ghostly figures on stage, but by a musical gesture within an instrumental 
work that supplies no extra-musical associations    though extra-musical associations, 
                                                 
153
 “Sein ganzes Wesen veränderte sich, ein unheimliches Gefuhl, dem er nicht wehren konnte,  efiel 
ihn in der Nahe des Unterirdischen, und die gewaltsamen Aeusserungen der Widersetzlichkeit waren 
von den Bewegungen einer geistigen und physischen T runkenheit  egleitet.” Anonymous, “Am 25. Don 
Juan,” Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung  5, no. 34 (1803): 576. Translation mine. In a survey of articles 
published in German-language music journals from the eighteenth century onwards, I found no earlier 
instances in which music – either in general or with regards to a specific work – is described as 
unheimlich. However, following Hoffmann’s review, the word is used with some regularity. As we have 
seen with Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s fifth symphony, a wri ter need not necessarily use the 
word unheimlich to convey the sense of music’s uncanniness; however, the gradual incorporation of 
that precise word into the vocabulary of music criticism, beginning in 1810 and peaking in the 1820s 
and 1830s, strongly indicates the relevance of the uncanny to music aesthetics in the period under 
discussion. The usage of the word unheimlich with regards to music, in these and other sources, will be 
discussed in greater depth later in chapter three.  
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stemming from various sources, would be attached to this symphony over time. Rather, 
it is the treatment of the cello and  ass theme    with its stalled starts, the instruments 
repeatedly halting and recommencing    that strikes the reviewer as uncanny. Hoffmann 
writes no more about this segment, but even this short digression, where he allows 
himself to divert attention from technical details and turns instead to the stirring of 
uncanniness within his perception, is arresting in this account of musical events.
154
 
 Let us investigate this quotation and its associated music in greater detail. 
Hoffmann seems to collapse two related musical events in this passage (Example 2): the 
first instance of the cellos and basses stalling the theme (beginning in the final beat of 
measure 162) and the second (beginning in the final beat of measure 198).
155
 That is to 
say that there are two passages in which, each time, “the cellos and  asses start the 
theme twice  ut stop again.” This is comparable to Michael Cherlin’s suggestion, citing 
late works by Beethoven as well as pieces of music by Schoenberg,  that an uncanny 
effect can be created by a disruption of the pulse stream.
156
 But, while the disruption 
does catalyse this moment in Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony towards uncanniness, 
attri uting this effect solely to disruption does not fully explain the music’s impact. 
This awkward lurching is unexpected because of the music that precedes it.  
                                                 
154
 As Robin Wallace notes, “few non-specialists are aware that two-thirds of this review consist of 
rigorous technical analysis.” Wallace, Beethoven’s Critics, 20. 
 
155
 The pedal G in the horns that Hoffmann describes only occurs in the first iteration, in measures 183 -
197, and the “dying away in single notes” takes place in the second version of this material, in 
measures 230-36. 
 
156
 Michael Cherlin, Schoenberg’s Musical Imagination  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 177. 
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Example 2: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 133-155. 
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Example 2 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 156-176. 
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 Example 2 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 177-186. 
 
  
65 
 
 
  
Example 2 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 187-195. 
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 Example 2 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 196-217. 
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Example 2 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 218-230. 
 
In measures 140-160, this idea is introduced for the first time in the cellos and basses, 
but is carried forward without disturbance and is given fugal treatment, first with an 
imitation in the violas and bassoons at measure 146, and then with an abandoned stretto 
in the second and first violins at measure 152. This entire section is repeated. The 
momentum, fugal writing, major tonality, and exuberant dynamics of measure 140 -160 
set up an expectation for a sublime moment. For an instant, upon the re-entry of the 
basses and cellos at measure 162, the anticipation of more complex contrapuntal work 
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is felt, which would elevate the learned style to the mathematical sublime.
157
 When the 
basses and cellos return to this theme, however, the momentum is immediately 
interrupted. Instead of the mathematical sublime, which would dazzle the listener into 
contemplation of the infinite, we are presented with an uncomfortable disruption that 
drags the anticipated transcendence back down to the dark materiality of the low 
sonorities of cellos and basses. 
 I understand Hoffmann’s intimation of uncanniness as founded on the disjunction 
between the expectation of music giving rise to transcendental experience and the 
manner in which the music that follows calls attention to itself. In this gesture, an 
experience of the supersensible is redirected from occurring in a realm beyond music, 
beyond sensible experience, to being immanent in the music. No longer is music a 
springboard for an encounter with the infinite, as the aesthetics of t he sublime would 
have it; instead, the music calls attention to an absolute presence within itself. In the 
moment when fugal writing gives way to an insistence on willful movement (Hoffmann 
hears this passage as stopping and restarting, as a willful gesture rather than as formal 
fragmentation), the music refers to the sublime and then rejects it, rendering itself 
indifferent, as phenomenon, from an underlying essence.
158
 This music is uncanny, then, 
                                                 
157
 Elaine Sisman suggests a relationship of the learned style to the musical sublime. While, with 
regards to the coda of Mozart’s “Jupiter” symphony finale, she hears the mathematical su lime in the 
nearly unfathomable complexity of this passage, Sisman also allows for ties to the sublime in less 
singular pieces of music: “if fugue is em lematic of the learned style,  oth are em lematic of the 
elevated style, which in turn may include the aesthetic category of ‘su lime’.” Sisman, Mozart: The 
‘Jupiter’ Symphony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 71 and 79. 
 
158
 This moment might be considered as somewhat analogous to the halting and restarting of the 
spinning wheel music in Schu ert’s “Gretchen am Spinnrade.” With the sudden disruption of the 
spinning music, it calls attention to itself as the embod iment of Gretchen’s passions rather than 
remaining a scene-setting phenomenon. The crucial difference between these two moments is that 
Schu ert’s music refers to the exterior phenomenon of a spinning wheel, which reflects the underlying 
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because it reveals itself to be the means by which the supersensible is made sensible: 
for a moment, an absolute presence in glimpsed in, not beyond, a passage of music.  
Hoffmann’s stance on the symphony exceeds this solitary use of the word 
unheimlich and its corresponding music, especially in his reception of the  third 
movement.
159
 After the dying away of the clarinets, bassoons, cellos, and basses in the 
section described above, Hoffmann meets another passage that disturbs him. Regarding 
the section that  egins at measure 236 (Example 3), Hoffmann writes that “the restless 
longing, which the theme bore in itself, is now heightened to anxiety, which compresses 
the  reast powerfully; only a few  roken off sounds escape from it.” 160 This passage 
marks the return of the first musical material from the movement, only here,  as 
Hoffmann notes, the legato succession of quarter-, half-, and dotted half-notes is 
replaced with the almost exclusive use of quarter notes interspersed with rests to 
maintain the rhythmic outline, and with frequent pizzicato articulation markings.
161
 
                                                                                                                                                             
essence of a woman’s passion; Beethoven’s music refers to the phenomenon of music itself, the 
underlying essence of which is an absolute presence.  
 
159
 Indeed, Peter Schnaus includes unheimlich in his list of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s central musical 
voca ulary: “Um das Wesen der Mus ik oder des Musikalischen auszudrücken, sind für Hoffmann, aus 
ihrer nachdrücklichen und häufigen Verwendung zu schlieβen, folgende Vokabeln von zentraler 
Bedeutung: ‘Romantik’ (‘romantisch’), ‘Reich’, ‘Sehnsucht’ (‘sehnen’), ‘Ahnung’ (‘ahnen’), eine 
Gruppe von adjektiven mit der Vorsil e ‘un’ (‘unendlich’, ‘unermeβlich’, ‘unnenn ar’, 
unaussprechlich’, ‘un estimmt’, ‘un ekannt’, ‘ungeheuer’, ‘unheimlich’) und natürlich ‘Musik’.” Peter 
Schnaus, E.T.A. Hoffmann als Beethoven-Rezensent der Allgemeinen Musikalischen Zeitung  (Munich: 
Musikverlag Emil Katzbichler, 1977) 57. 
 
160
 “Die unruhvolle Sehnsucht, welche das Thema in sich trug, ist jetzt bis zur Angst gesteigert, die die Brust 
gewaltsam zusammenpresst; ihr entfliehen nur einzelne a ge rochene Laute.” Hoffmann, “Recension,” col. 
654. Translation mine. 
 
161
 “Nun folgt die Wiederholung des Thema des ersten Theils von der Bässen;  statt der Violinen haben jetzt 
die Blasinstrumente den Satz in kurzen Noten, der mit einem Ruhepunkt schliesst. Hierauf, wie im ersten 
Theil, der verlängerte Hauptsatz, aber statt der halben Noten stehen jetzt Viertel und Viertels -Pausen; in 
dieser Gestalt kommen auch die andern Sätze des ersten Theils meistens a gekürzt wieder zurück.” 
Hoffmann, “Recension,” col. 654. 
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Throughout the review, Hoffmann casually slips between attributing feelings to 
himself as listener and to the music. For instance, in his summation of the symphony 
(which employs the unmistakable language of the sublime), his concern is with the 
impression of the music on the listener, proclaiming that,  
 “[t]he heart of every sensitive listener, however, is certain to 
be deeply stirred and held until the very last chord by one 
lasting emotion, that of nameless, haunted yearning. Indeed 
for many moments after it he will be unable to emerge from 
the magical spirit-realm where he has been surrounded by 
pain and pleasure in the form of sounds.”162 
 
 
Example 3: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 231-243. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
162
 Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” trans. Clarke, 250. “a er das Gemüth jedes 
sinnigen Zuhörers wird gewiss von einem fortdauernden Gefühl, das eben jene unnennbare, 
ahnungsvolle Sehnsucht ist, tief und innig ergriffen und bis zum Schluss -Accord darin erhalten; ja noch 
manchen Moment nach demselben wird er nicht aus dem wundervollen Geisterreiche, wo Schmerz und 
Lust in Tönen gestaltet ihn umfingen, hinaustreten können.” Hoffmann, “Recension,” col. 658. 
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Example 3 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 244-266. 
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Example 3 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 267-288. 
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Example 3 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 289-308. 
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Example 3 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 309-331. 
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However, in the passage given above, relating to measures 236-324 from the third 
movement, Hoffmann ascribes anxiety, as the intensification of longing, to the music, 
using a bodily metaphor (the anxiety “compresses the  reast powerfully”) to account for 
the abbreviated articulation in this section. While, in some sections of the review, 
Hoffmann explicitly figures musical sounds as the utterance of some being, this is not 
his understanding of the music’s supposed source throughout, since he treats these as 
remarkable moments; and where he does hear music as voice, he identifies a so litary 
instrumental element producing that impression. Given these inconsistencies, I read 
Hoffmann’s characterisation of measures 236-324 as casting the listener’s experiences 
back onto the music. 
 In its context, following the uncanny revelation of a presence within the music 
incited  y the  asses’ and cellos’ disruptive gestures, I hear this passage as an 
affectation of music as phenomenon. It is music that deliberately diminishes its opacity. 
If, in early nineteenth-century philosophy, music is understood as clothing or veiling 
the absolute so that it is perceptible in the sensible realm, then in this section, when the 
listener has already recognised the immanence of the absolute in music, the music 
makes itself threadbare, leaving bare spots in its phenomenality for the supersensible to 
seep through. Returning to Hoffmann’s impression of anxiety, the listener is, thus, no 
longer at a comfortable distance from the infinite, no longer in a position where longing 
for the infinite is the suitable stance. Instead, the listener is made unnervingly aware 
that this music is an infinite power made manifest, indeed barely containe d. 
 In short order, Hoffmann resumes a more overt characterisation of the music as 
uncanny and restores anxiety and horror to the reactions of the listeners. He writes that 
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the timpani’s “heavy, dissonant  lows” on C ( eginning in measure 325,  ut  ecoming  
dissonant in measures 371-74) seeming “like a strange and dreadful voice, arouse a 
horror of the extraordinary, of ghostly fear”163 (Example 4). This is the moment, 
referred to earlier, in which Hoffmann hears an instrument as voice.
164
 The timpani, as 
voice, is indeed “strange and dreadful.” Its resonance, depth, o scured pitch, and 
melodic flatness do not read as vocal (or at least as humanly vocal) in the way that the 
violin so often demands to be heard. By hearing the timpani, the instrument that 
eschews the sensuality of melody in favour of pure rhythm, as voice,  Hoffmann marks it 
as an inhuman presence. Michael Cherlin’s ideas a out rhythm and the uncanny are 
once again relevant here: an uncanny effect can arise “when the pulse-stream, instead of 
being perceived as the underlying conveyor of musical thought, draws attention to itself 
as signifier.”165 While my understanding of the rhythmic presence of the timpani is not 
as signifier, the foregrounding of the timpani, of rhythm, is indeed uncanny in this 
passage. 
 In the Philosophie der Kunst, Schelling explains that “within music itself, that 
particular informing of unity into multiplicity, an informing that is itself encompassed 
                                                 
163
 Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” trans. Clarke, 247. “Warum der Meister das 
zum Accord dissonierende C der Pauke bis zum Schluss gelassen, erklärt sich aus dem Charakter, den 
er dem Ganzen zu geben strebte. Diese dumpfen Schläge ihres Dissonirens, wie eine fremde, furchtbare 
Stimme wirkend, erregen die Schauer des Ausserordentlichen – der Geisterfurcht.” Hoffmann, 
“Recension,” column 654. The timpani’s C is s truck beginning in measure 325, but only becomes fully 
dissonant in measure 371 against the V7 chord.  
164
 The uncanny confusion between instrument and voice will be discussed in further depth in the fifth 
chapter, “The Music of the Living-Dead.” 
165
 Cherlin, Schoenberg’s Musical Imagination, 177.  
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as a particular unity – in this case the real unity – is rhythm.”166 By calling rhythm “the 
music in music” Schelling means that this is the musical element in which the 
indifference of unity and multiplicity is ultimately achieved.
167
 It is fitting, then, that 
Hoffmann hears the timpani, a purely rhythmic articulation, as an inhuman voic e, for 
rhythmic gesture is understood as merging unity and multiplicity.  
 
Example 4: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 320-331. 
 
                                                 
166
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §79, 109. “Die in der Musik sel st wieder als 
besondere Einheit begriffene Einbildung der Einheit in die Vielheit oder reale Einheit ist der 
Rhythmus.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §79, 135-36. This is  ecause “rhythm is no more than the 
periodic subdivision of homogeneity whereby the uniformity of the latter is combined with variety and 
thus unity with multiplicity.”  Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §79, 110. Rhythm is “nichts 
anderes als eine periodische Eintheilung des Gleichartigen, wodurch das Einförmige desselben mit 
Mannichfaltigkeit, die Einheit also mit Vielheit ver unden wird.” Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, 
§79, 136. 
167
 Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. Stott, §79, 112. “Der Rhythmus ist die Musik in der Musik.” 
Schelling, Philosophie der Kunst, §79, 138. 
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Example 4 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 332-360. 
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Example 4 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Third Movement (Allegro), mm. 361-374. 
 
  
80 
 
 
Here, we again encounter the promised materialisation of an absolute presence, no 
longer sensed in the gaps between ethereal notes, but forcefully proclaiming itself 
through and against the music that discloses it. And indeed, in this section the 
substantiality of the music that accompanies the timpani is even further reduced, 
comprising largely of sustained pitches against the opening theme, prolonged and 
developed, in the first violins. With the final dissonance of measures 371-74, we hear 
the timpani, the unbearable voice of the absolute, straining against the surrounding veil 
of music. 
 Although Hoffmann’s most extended suggestion of a musical uncanny stems 
from the second half of the third movement, there are also brief intimations of 
uncanniness in the first and final movements, moments that Hoffmann hears in relation 
to one another across the span of the symphony. In an evocative passage, he describes 
the concluding chords of the symphony (Example 5) in a manner that recalls the 
betrayed obscurity of the uncanny:
168
 
The final chords themselves are oddly placed. The chord that 
the listener takes as the last is followed  y one  ar’s rest, 
then the same chord, one  ar’s rest, the same chord again, 
one  ar’s rest, then the chord again for three  ars with one 
crotchet in each, one  ar’s rest, the chord, one  ar’s rest, the 
chord, one  ar’s rest, and a C played in unison  y the whole 
orchestra. The perfect composure of spirit engendered by the 
succession of closing figures is destroyed again by these 
detached chords and rests, which recall the separate strokes 
in the symphony’s Allegro and place the listener once more 
                                                 
168
 Lawrence Kramer also notes the uncanniness of this passage. Kramer, Franz Schubert: Sexuality, 
Subjectivity, Song (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 152. In an article by Joseph 
Kerman, the author relates that Lawrence Kramer suggested that the uncanniness of a musical element 
would grow with each su se uent repetition, since that repetition should not occur. Hoffmann’ s 
insistence on restating each appearance of the chord agrees with this theory. Kerman, “Beethoven’s Opus 
131,” 158-59. 
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in a state of tension. They act like a fire that is thought to 
have been put out but repeatedly bursts forth again in bright 
tongues of flame.
169
 
 
The final moments of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, especially taking into account 
Hoffmann’s  low-by-blow narration of the repeated chord, might suggest compulsive 
repetition (there is something o sessive a out Hoffmann’s cataloguing of every single 
sounding of the chord). But Hoffmann is just as interested in the moments of unrest, in 
the silences between the iterations of the chord, as he is in the chord itself. The 
expectation of finality is robbed from these silences, since Beethoven has infused them 
with the fore oding of volatility. Hoffmann’s account of the symphony’s ending ‒ with 
its insistent reconfiguration of chord and rest, harping on the irrepressible impulse to 
sound the chord yet again – is similar to the uncanny effect he attributes to the 
repetitive bass theme in the third movement Allegro. Both are moments where the 
willfullness of musical apparition is foregrounded. When Hoffmann describes the 
irregular restriking of the final chord as anxiety-inducing, likening it to “a fire that is 
thought to have been put out but repeatedly bursts forth again in bright tongues of 
flame,”170 his language invokes an emphatic repeated shattering of latency. The music is 
supposed to be over, and with this resolution, the boundary between the finite and  
                                                 
169
 Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” trans. Clarke, 250. “Die Schluss-Accorde 
selbst sind eigen gestellt; nach dem Accorde nämlich, den der Zuhörer für den letzten hält, ein Takt 
Pause, derselbe Accord, ein Takt Pause, nochmals der Accord, ein Takt Pause, dann drey Takte 
hindurch in jedem in Viertelsnoten einmal jener Accord, ein Takt Pause, der Accord, ein Takt Pause, C 
unisono vom ganzen Orchester angeschlagen. Die vollkommene Beruhigung des Gemüths, durch 
mehrere an einander gereihte Schlussfiguren herbeygeführt, wird durch diese einzeln in Pausen 
angeschlagenen Accorde, welche an die einzelnen Schläge in dem Allegro der Symphonie erinnern, 
wieder aufgehoben und der Zuhörer noch durch die letzten Accorde aufs neue gespannt. Sie wirken, wie 
ein Feuer, das man gedämpft glaubte und das immer wieder in hell auflodernden Flammen in die Höhe 
schlägt.” Hoffmann, “Recension,” columns 657-58. 
170
 Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” trans. Clarke, 250.  
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Example 5: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Fourth Movement (Allegro), mm. 422-32. 
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Example 5 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, Fourth Movement (Allegro), mm. 433-46. 
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infinite realms restored. But the music and its inherent presence, repeatedly refusing to 
be banished, insist upon their joint ability to summon themselves at will.  
 When Hoffmann refers to “the separate strokes in the symphony’s Allegro” in 
the quotation above, Charlton believes that he likely alludes to the passage of music 
from the first movement to which he ascri ed an “ominous, eerie effect” (Example 6). 171 
In the passage in question, from measure 196 to 240 (and especially measures 210 -227 
and 233-240), the wind/brass group alternates with the strings in playing a pair of 
chords or a single chord. As in the finale, this section depends on the interplay between 
two elements; but whereas the finale contends with silence and sound, this section 
employs distant timbres and pitch levels to create the impression of a rift opening in the 
fabric of the music. 
 By emphasising the uncanny moments in Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony, I do not intend to refute its well-established expressions of sublimity. 
Allusions to music  ringing the listener to “an unknown realm, a world quite separate 
from the outer sensual world surrounding  
                                                 
171
 Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” ed. Charlton, 250, footnote 26. “The wind 
instruments take up this theme fortissimo in F minor [m. 195], but after three bars the strings seize 
upon the previous two bars and alternate with the winds in playing them five more times, followed by 
further alternation of single chords in a gradual diminuendo [m. 198]. [...] The strings then play this F 
sharp minor chord which is repeated by them and the winds alternating every bar [m. 216]. [...] Now 
the first inversion chord is treated in the same way, gradually getting softer and softer [m.222]. This 
again has an ominous, eerie effect.” Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony,” trans. 
Clarke, 242-43. “Die Blasinstrumente fangen dies Thema in F moll Fortissimo an, aber, nach dem 
dritten Takte ergreifen die Saiten-Instrumente die beyden letzten Takte, und diese Takte imitirend 
wechseln Saiten- und Blasinstrumente noch fünfmal, dann schlagen sie wieder wechselsweise und 
immer diminuendo einzelne Accorde an. [...]Gleich darauf schlagen die Saiten-Instrumente den 
Fismoll-Accord an, der von ihnen und von den Blasinstrumenten dann noch abwechselnd immer einen 
Takt hindurch viermal wiederholt wird. [...] Nun folgt eben so der Sexten -Accord immer schwächer und 
schwächer. Das wirkt wieder ahnungsvoll und schauerlich!” Hoffmann, “Recension,” columns 638 -39 
[formatting and musical examples removed]. I also hear uncanniness in a similar passage in the fourth 
movement of Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique, albeit in a less philosophically-loaded sense.  
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Example 6: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, First Movement (Allegro), mm. 199-225 
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Example 6 continued: Beethoven, Fifth Symphony, First Movement (Allegro), mm. 226-239. 
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him”172 clearly invoke the sublime. However, I see this review as a moment when the 
theory of the musical sublime begins to give way to a sense of music as uncanny, for 
alongside Hoffmann’s su lime sentiments lurks a trou ling uncanniness. The lens of 
Hoffmann’s review is irregular: tilt it this way and you see su lime awe, tilt it again 
and it shows uncanny revelation. 
 
The Sublime and the Uncanny 
Until this point, I have not addressed a fundamental issue for my argument as a whol e: 
the distinction between the sublime and the uncanny. In speaking of the sublime, I am  
particularly concerned with Kant’s version of that aesthetic, in part  ecause of its 
chronological proximity to the early nineteenth centuries, and also for its relevance to 
musical thought in the late eighteenth and very early nineteenth century.
173
 In order to 
claim that Hoffmann’s review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is a point of transition 
from the musical sublime to the musical uncanny, the significance of this transition 
must be clear. This distinction is especially necessary when, as is sometimes the case in 
the early nineteenth century, the musical uncanny and sublime are both concerned with 
                                                 
172
 Hoffmann, “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony.” trans. Clarke, 236. “Die Musik schliesst dem 
Menschen ein unbekanntes Reich auf; eine Welt, die nichts gemein hat mit der äussern Sinnenwelt, die 
ihn umgie t.” E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Recension,” column 630.  
173
 Christian Friedrich Michaelis, for example, who chiefly codified the musical sublime in the early 
nineteenth century, writes in response to Kant’s Critique of Judgement. Christian Friedrich Michaelis, 
“Ue er das Erha ene in der Musik (1801),” “Einige Bemerkungen ü er das Erha ene der Musik 
(1805),” and “Ue er den Rang der Tonkunst unter den Schönen Künsten (1799),” in Ueber den Geist 
der Tonkunst, ed. Lothar Schmidt (Chemnitz: Gudrun Schröder Verlag, 1997) 168 -74, 242-244, and 
147-48. James Webster convincingly argues that later (that is, late eighteenth -and early nineteenth-
century) ideas of the musical su lime “were no longer rhetorical,  ut precisely Kantian.” James 
Webster, “The Creation, Haydn’s Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Su lime,” in Haydn and his World, 
ed. Elaine Sisman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 64 -66. 
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the relationship of music to the absolute.
174
 To clarify this difference, I first discuss 
how the relationship between the finite and infinite in these two aesthetics correlates to 
the symbol concepts discussed in the previous chapter. Secondly, I address the 
commonalities in the feelings associated with the sublime and the uncan ny, but 
elucidate that the experiential process that accompanies each of these is distinct. 
Finally, I briefly return to the significance of these ideas for music.  
 The shift between the Kantian idea of the symbol and the Romantic symbol 
concept underpins the distinction between the sublime and the uncanny. While for Kant, 
the sym ol serves to provide a sensi le link to a distant concept for which “no sensi le 
intuition can  e ade uate,”175 the Romantic symbol concept, broadly speaking, is 
synecdochal in the sense that it conceives of the symbolised as immanent in the 
                                                 
174 The marking of the point of division between the sublime and the uncanny is further necessitated 
because of the reception of the uncanny in contemporary literary criticism, the area in which it receives 
the most scholarly attention. For a host of literary critics, following Harold Bloom, the uncanny (or, to 
 e more specific, Freud’s notion of the uncanny) is a twentieth -century version of the sublime and 
Bloom goes so far as to call “The Uncanny” “Freud’s theory of the su lime” Harold Bloom, Agon: 
Towards a Theory of Revisionism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 101 and 205. However, in 
one respect, this theory does not address any firm notions of the sublime or the uncanny, focusing on 
common characteristics that are not central to their identities. And in another respect, this argument 
relates to an analogy made by David Ellison - that the uncanny is to Modernism what the sublime is to 
Romanticism – that does not make a meaningful comparison between the sublime and the uncanny at 
all. David Ellison, Ethics and Aesthetics in European Modernist Litera ture: From the Sublime to the 
Uncanny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 53. For more on the confluence of the 
su lime and the uncanny in literary criticism, see Neil Hertz, “Freud and the Sandman,” in The End of 
the Line:Essays on Psychoanalysis and the Sublime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 97-
121; Vijay Mishra, The Gothic Sublime (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1994) 
78; David B. Morris, “Gothic Su limity” New Literary History 16 (1985): 299-319; Andrew Smith, 
Gothic Radicalism: Literature, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis in the Nineteenth Century  (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2000).  
 
175
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §59, 221. The sym olic is where “[...] einem 
Begriffe, den nur die Vernunft denken, und dem keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann 
[...].”Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §59, 253.  
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symbol.
176
 The manner in which the sublime and the uncanny operate is dependent on 
these two models of how the particular and universal relate to each other.  
For Kant, the locus of sublimity is in the mind. Unlike Burke, who devotes much 
attention to cataloguing “su lime o jects” and their  ualities, 177 Kant denies the quality 
of sublimity to the
 
phenomena that instigate the sublime experience:  
All that we can say is that the object lends itself to the 
presentation of a sublimity discoverable in the mind. For the 
sublime, in the strictest sense of the word, cannot be 
contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of 
reason, which, although no adequate presentation of them is 
possible, may be excited and called into the mind by that 
very inadequacy itself which does not admit of sensuous 
presentation. Thus the broad ocean agitated by storms cannot 
be called sublime. Its aspect is horrible, and one must have 
stored one’s mind in advance with a rich stock of ideas, if 
such an intuition is to raise it to the pitch of a feeling which 
is itself sublime – sublime because the mind has been incited 
to abandon sensibility, and employ itself upon ideas 
involving higher finality.
178
 
 
For Kant, then, neither the stormy ocean nor a musical tempest can properly be called 
sublime, because sublimity is an action of the mind in pursuit of the supersensible. As 
much as the sublime experience finds its catalyst in a phenomenon that calls to mind 
                                                 
176
 This shift is explained in more detail in the first chapter . 
177
 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, ed. J. T. 
Boulton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), 124.  
178
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §23, 92. “Wir können nicht mehr sagen, als daβ 
der Gegenstand zur Darstallung einer Erhabenheit tauglich sei, die im G emüte angetroffen werden 
kann; denn das eigentliche Erhabene kann in keiner sinnlichen Form enthalten sein, sondern trifft nur 
Ideen der Vernunft, welche, obgleich keine ihnen angemessene Darstellung möglich ist, eben durch 
diese Unangemessenheit, welche sich sinnlich darstellen läβt, rege gemacht und ins Gemüt gerufen 
werden. So kann der weite, durch Stürme empörte Ozean nicht erhaben genannt werden. Sein Anblick 
ist gräβlich; und man muβ das Gemüt schön mit mancherlei Ideen angefüllt haben, wenn es durch eine 
solche Anschauung zu einem Gefühl gestimmt werden soll, welches slbst erhaben ist, indem das Gemüt 
die Sinnlichkeit zu verlassen und sich mit Ideen, die höhere Zweckmäβigkeit enthalten, zu  eschäftigen 
angereizt wird. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §23, 107. 
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boundlessness, the reaction that is set off requires a sharp break from this initiating 
material. Sublimity occurs past the vanishing of the initiating phenomenon. Thus, while 
the sensible symbol for infinitude calls to mind the pure infinite of which no sensible 
intuition is possible, the symbol is simply a point of departure for the leap to the 
concept. In terms of music, then, music that is understood as sublime is an analogical 
symbol that refers to the infinite, initiating an experience of transcendence.  
 The nineteenth-century uncanny is not subject to the same distancing from its 
phenomenal origins as the sublime undergoes in its refinement by Kant. The appearance 
of the symbolised in the symbol makes the uncanny manifest, and the continued 
presence of the symbol – the fact that the symbolised is appearing through the symbol, 
and not beyond it – is integral to the situation’s uncanniness. Thus, whereas the su lime 
state is provoked by a catalyst which it must leave behind, the uncanny state is an 
emergence from latency to appearance. Music that is understood as uncanny reveals that 
it is a manifestation of the infinite, rather than the spur for a transcendent experience. 
 Although they have different relationships to their initiating phenomena, the 
sublime and the uncanny are related, to a certain extent, in the sorts of feelings with 
which they are associated. Freud and Kant define the uncanny and the sublime, 
respectively, as particular subsets of the fearful or terrifying. Basing his analysis on 
nineteenth-century literature and language sources, Freud contends that the term 
unheimlich leads us to “expect that a special core of feeling is present which justifies 
the use of a special conceptual term.  One is curious to know what this common core is 
which allows us to distinguish as ‘uncanny’ certain things which lie within the field of 
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what is frightening.”179  Similarly, Kant reasons that “[i]f we are to estimate nature as 
dynamically sublime, it must be represented as a source of fear (though the converse, 
that every object that is a source of fear is, in our aesthetic judgement, sublime, does 
not hold).”180 Yet, the sublime is a mixed sensation, a rapid oscillation between 
attraction and repulsion
181
 – in short, neither a purely negative nor a positive 
sensation.
182
 Similarly, as was established at the outset, the unsettling quality of the 
uncanny can be experienced in a myriad of shades between cataclysmic and delightfully 
shudder-inducing. 
 While the feelings caused by the sublime and the uncanny are comparable, their 
experiential process differs. The sublime experience is characterised by an initial 
                                                 
179
 Freud, “The Uncanny,” trans. Alix Strachey, ed. James Strachey, in Writings on Art and 
Literature.(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 193-94. “A er man darf doch erwarten, daβ ein 
besondere Kern vorhanden ist, der die Verwendung eines besonderen Begriffswortes rechtfertigt. Man 
möchte wissen, was dieser gemeinsame Kern ist, der etwa gestattet, innerhalb des Ängstlichen ein 
»Unheimliches« zu unterscheiden.” Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 243.  
180
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §28, 109. “Wenn von uns die Natur dynamisch als 
erhaben beurtheilt werden soll, so muβ sie als Furcht erregend vorgestellt werden (obgleich nicht 
umgekehrt jeder Furcht erregende Gegenstand in unserm ästhetischen Urtheile erhaben gefunden 
wird).” Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §28, 260. 
181
 “This movement [caused  y the su lime], especially in its inception, may be compared with a 
vibration, i.e. with a rapidly alternating repulsion and attraction produced by one and the same Object.  
The point of excess for the imagination (towards which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) 
is like an abyss in which it fears to lose itself; yet again for the rational idea of the supersensible it is 
not excessive, but conformable to law, and directed to drawing out such an effort on the part of the 
imagination: and in turn as much a source of att raction as it was repellent to mere sensi ility.” Kant, 
The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §27, 107. “Diese Bewegung kann (vornehmlich in ihrem 
Anfange) mit einer Erschütterung verglichen werden, d.i. mit einem schnellwechselnden Absto βen und 
Anziehen eben desselben Objekts.  Das Überschwengliche für die Einbildungskraft (bis zu welchem sie 
in der Auffassung der Anschauung getrieben wird) ist gleichsam ein Abgrund, worin sie sich selbst zu 
verlieren fürchtet; aber doch auch für die Idee der Vernunf t vom Übersinnlichen nicht überschwenglich, 
sondern gesetzmäβig, eine solche Bestrebung der Einbildungskraft hervorzubringen: mithin in eben 
dem Maβe wiederum anziehend, als er für die bloβe Sinnlichkeit abstoβend war.” Kant, Kritik der 
Urteilskraft, §27, 258. 
182
 Kant, concisely, calls it a “negative pleasure.” Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, 
§23, 91. Kant calls it a “negative Lust.” Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §23, 245. 
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moment of astonishment in which the soul is suspended, motionless, in horror (this state 
is often referred to as “ lockage” in modern critical writings). 183 Kant describes the 
experience of the su lime as “a momentary check to the vital forces followed at once  y 
a discharge all the more powerful.”184 The moment of blockage, then, is followed by an 
experiential peak, as reason rushes beyond sensual perception to encompass the concept 
of the infinite, then a brief lingering in this elevated state, and finally, a return to 
normal. The experiential condition of the sublime peak does not mean that the music 
associated with the sublime is necessarily
 
limited to a momentary span, although Elaine 
Sisman does argue for this stipulation.
185
 Although the effect of the dynamical sublime 
in music is often created by striking contrasts or a climactic moment, both of which are 
necessarily fleeting, James Webster has suggested that longer spans of music can be 
understood as evoking the sublime.
186
 
 In contrast to the sublime experience, the uncanny produces a lingering 
disorientation, spilling back onto prior events: if the experience of the sublime is a 
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 Neil Hertz, “The Notion of Blockage in the Literature of the Su lime,” in Psychoanalysis & the 
Question of the Text, ed. Geoffrey H. Hartman (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1978), 68. 
184
 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §23, 91. The experience of the su lime is “das 
Gefühl einer augenblicklichen Hemmung der Lebenkräfte und darauf sogleic h flogenden desto stärkeren 
Ergrieβung dersel en erzeugt wird.” Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §23, 106. In this regard, Kant’s 
theory of the su ime is in line with Burke’s. Burke states that “the passion caused  y the great and 
sublime in nature... is Astonishment; and astonishment is the state of the soul, in which all its motions 
are suspended, with some degree of horror.” Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful, 57. 
185
 In keeping with the experiential mode l of the su lime, Elaine Sisman specifies that, in music, “the 
su lime must always  e  rief.” Sisman, Mozart: The ‘Jupiter’ Symphony , 76. 
186
 We ster provides the example of Haydn’s Creation: athough the moment of the creation of light 
creates sublimity through contrast, the “Representation of Chaos” constitutes an extended invocation of 
the sublime. Webster, “The Creation,” 64-66. 
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peak, then the uncanny is a haze. Because the type of uncanny that I am addressing is 
caused by revelation of immanence, even moments that do not constitute manifestations 
of the uncanny become laden with uncanny potential. As such, the rests between the 
repeated bursting forth of the final chords of Beethoven ’s fifth symphony, and even the 
silence that follows the ultimate chord, are latently uncanny.  
 Whereas the sublime deals in boundaries (of the finite and infinite) and 
resolution, the uncanny revels in seemingly impossible intermingling and hesitancy. 
Though both the musical sublime and uncanny might engage with the infinite, they do 
so in fundamentally different ways. While the musical sublime constitutes a sensible 
intuition of sublimity, providing a point from which to leap into the sublime experience, 
into the infinite that is the expansion of the mind, uncanny music claims to draw the 
infinite through its very materiality. When music that engenders the sublime ends, 
stability is re-established; when uncanny music ends, a rift in perception lingers. 
 There is one further distinction, however, that must be made for the sublime and 
the uncanny in music, which concerns the issue of representation.  I explained above 
that the analogical symbol (or allegory, as Schelling calls it) is a representative figure, 
while the synecdochal (or romantic) symbol does not represent, to be precise, since it is 
one with the sym olised. In the case of the su lime, since it functions on Kant’s 
principle of the analogical symbol, that which calls the sublime to mind must be a 
sensible reflection of the su lime. Furthermore,  ecause the su lime is “the a solutely  
[schlechthin] great,”187 so must the phenomenon which represents it be sufficiently 
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 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , trans. Meredith, §25, 94. “Erha en nennen wir das, was 
schlechthin groβ ist.” Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, §25, 110. 
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great, either in magnitude or in power, to evoke it. In nature, mountain ranges, the 
stormy sea, and hurricanes are symbols for the sublime. Similarly, the sonic power of 
the symphony or oratorio, astonishing contrasts, the unfathomability of complex 
counterpoint are among the types of music that initiate the sublime experience.
188
 
Conversely, the phenomenal aspect of the uncanny (when it is created through the 
symbolic relationship) is not representative. In the case of music acting as uncanny 
symbol for the absolute, music is not bound to a representational function, but instead 
betrays that it is host to the absolute. This means that music that is uncanny in this way 
need not be great, and indeed, can have a stronger uncanny effect if it is diminutive, as 
we will see in later chapters. It is also, in part, for this reason that the uncanny does not 
correspond to a clearly-defined set of characteristic musical ideas, but rather  that it 
inhabits a variety of musical disruptions.  
   
According to my research, with Hoffmann’s review we encounter the first instance, 
with regards to a specific work, where music – both conceptually and at the detailed 
analytic level – is described as uncanny.189 That is, it is the first instance in which the 
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 Mark Evan Bonds, “The Symphony as Pindaric Ode,” in Haydn and his World , ed. Elaine Sisman 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) , 139. Kiene Brillenburg Wurth, Musically Sublime: 
Indeterminacy, Infinity, Irresolvability (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), 14. James 
We ster, “The Creation, Haydn’s Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Su lime,” in Haydn and his World, 
ed. Elaine Sisman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 66. Sisman, Mozart: The ‘Jupiter’ Symphony, 
71 and 79. 
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 Although my research does not always depend on the use of the word unheimlich in determining 
whether music is represented as uncanny (the fourth and fifth chapters, in particular, rely on uncanny 
themes rather than vocabulary), this claim is based on the use of the specific term. My research 
surveyed German music periodicals from the 1780s to the 1850s, including: Allgemeine musikalische 
Zeitung, Wiener Allgemeine musikalische Zeiting , Allgemeiner Musikalischer Anzeiger, Berliner 
allgemeine musikalische Zeitung, Caecilia, Euterpe, Jahrbücher des Deutschen Nationalvereins für 
Musik und ihre Wissenschaft, Magazin der Musik, Musikalischer Almanach, Musikalischer Almanach 
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aesthetic basis for an uncanny comprehension of music, outlined in the previous 
chapter, appears in music criticism . On the conceptual level, Hoffmann’s essay acts as a 
counterpart to the aesthetics of Schelling (and the ideas which will be developed in 
Hegel’s and Schopenhauer’s systems), wherein music  holds the power to reveal the 
absolute in the finite. But whereas in Schelling the specific uncanniness of music’s 
revelatory potential must be read into the aesthetics, in Hoffmann the sensation that 
music’s revelation calls forth in the reviewer – and all “sensitive listeners” – is 
described directly in the text. For Hoffmann, Beethoven’s instrumental music (and the 
Fifth Symphony in particular) exploits the potency endowed to it by aesthetics: it gives 
the infinite passage through the finite, and so becomes uncanny. And because 
Hoffmann’s perception of Beethoven’s symphony is based on the common 
philosophical principles of Idealist aesthetics, and not merely his own delightfully 
distorted vision of the world, he can reasonably expect that it will induce similar effects 
on other listeners. 
 Unlike the consideration of “music” in aesthetic writings – that is to say, of 
music as an art abstracted from works – Hoffmann’s characterisation of the Fifth 
Symphony as uncanny goes beyond the conceptual level to locate uncanniness in 
specific passages of music. However, it is important to note that Hoffmann’s conceptual 
stance on the symphony informs his analytical readings of specific passages. Without 
the basis of that underlying belief, Hoffmann’s analysis (and my own in the present) 
would be only so much empty detail: sometimes a repetition is just a repetition. But, 
                                                                                                                                                             
für Deutschland, Musikalisches Taschenbuch, Musikalisches Wochenblatt, Neue Berliner Musikzeitung,  
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because Hoffmann reads the entire symphony as a narrative of the revelation and 
repression of the absolute, musical moments which suggest these actions, such as the 
“repeatedly  ursting forth” flames of the final cho rds, make manifest the uncanny 
without bearing the weight of having to depict the absolute. To be sure, representations 
of the absolute in music are precisely not uncanny, but sublime. 
 If we revisit the crossroads of the sublime and the uncanny, it should  now be 
clear that these two aesthetics intersect at an experience of the absolute, but diverge 
over the limits of this experience and the ability to contain the absolute in sensuous 
form. When Hoffmann writes of encountering the infinite through Beethoven ’s music 
we find ourselves at this crux: one arm breaking away from the possibility of 
representing the absolute, the other burrowing deep into materiality and revela tion. The 
sublime object (which Kant would argue is not sublime at all) approaches the limit, but 
goes no further: sensible and supersensible never meet. The uncanny, on the other hand, 
brings us to the liminal juncture where absolute and phenomenon commingle.  
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3 
 
Ombra, Liminality, and the Chaos of Becoming 
 
 
 
From the underworld scenes of Gluck’s Orfeo ed Euridice to the reappearance of the 
stone guest in Mozart’s Don Giovanni, sinister situations have been accompanied by 
equally dark music. Characterized by a loose assortment of musical markers, including 
minor keys, a slow tempo, high style, unusual instrumentation and various melodic, 
harmonic, and gestural strategies for conveying fear, agitation, and unease, the ombra 
topic originated in infernal scenes in sixteenth-century Italian intermedi and came to 
prominence in the eighteenth century, primarily in operatic supernatural scenes. Ombra 
music, then, was used to convey not only the emotional reactions of operatic characters 
confronting the shadow side of experience, but was also associated with those dark 
forces: the oracles, furies, demons, and other supernatural terrors.
190
 
                                                 
190
 In addition to the general characteristics listed above, the ombra topic draws on a variety of musical 
markers, including flat keys, unusual modulations, chromaticism, diminished seventh chords, 
Neapolitan and augmented sixth chords, fragmented melodies, augmented and/or diminished leaps, 
monotone lines, descending tetrachord bass  lines, sigh motifs, tremolo effects, rising and falling scales, 
syncopation, majestic or ponderous dotted rhythms, sudden contrasts, octave doubling, crescendo 
effects, unexpected silence, unusual instrumentation, low tessitura, dark timbre, and the use of 
trombones. In order to constitute a clear instance of ombra, passages of music must make use of several 
of these signs in combination. Furthermore, due to its roots in opera, the understanding of music as 
engaging the ombra topic is usually contextual and read in relation to setting, supernatural figures, and 
sinister occasions. Clive McClelland, Ombra: Supernatural Music in the Eighteenth Century  
(Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2012) 221-25; Wye J. Allanbrook, Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart:  Le 
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However, in the late eighteenth century, and continuing into the early nineteenth 
century, composers began to employ the ombra topic in instrumental music. When 
ombra occurs in late eighteenth-century instrumental works, it is often found in the 
slow introductions to symphonic works, such as Haydn’s Symphony No. 75 in D and 
Mozart’s Symphony No. 38 in D (Prague). By drawing on the ombra topic, this sort of 
mysterious introduction creates a feeling of anticipation. In this situation, it implies a 
musical narrative of chaos resolving to the comparative stability of the Allegro, or a 
passage from a state of darkness and irrationality into light and rationality.
191
 This 
association points to the second meaning of ombra music in the eighteenth century: a 
significance that finds common ground with the musical sublime.
192
 
 One cannot mention narratives of the domination of order over chaos, the 
resolution of uncertainty to perfect clarity, without calling to mind Haydn’s The 
Creation, and in particular the turmoil and generation of the Prelude, “The 
Representation of Chaos” (“Die Vorstellung des Chaos”), through to the awe-inducing 
instant of the creation of light in “In the  eginning God created Heaven and Earth” (“ Im 
                                                                                                                                                             
nozze di Figaro and Don Giovanni (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983) 361. Birgitte Moyer, 
“Om ra and Fantasia in Late Eighteenth-Century Theory and Practice,” in Convention in Eighteenth- 
and Nineteenth-Century Music: Essays in Honor of Leonard G. Ratner , ed. Wye J. Allanbrook, Janet 
M. Levy, and William P. Mahrt (Stuyvesant, New York: Pendragon Press, 1992) 283-306. Leonard 
Ratner, Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style  (New York: Schirmer Books, 1980) 283. Ombra is 
not a topos recongnised in eighteenth-century music criticism. The term did not enter musical discourse 
until 1908, when Hermann A ert used the term ‘Om ra -Szenen’ in his  ook Niccolò Jommelli als 
Opernkomponist. McClelland, Ombra, 1; Moyer, “Om ra and Fantasia,” 288.  
 
191
 McClelland, Ombra, 205-6. 
192
 McClelland initially argues that ombra fits well with Burke’s formulation of the su lime.  However, 
he does concedes that Burke directly discusses music very little. McClelland, Ombra, 10-13. There is 
no question, however, that ombra and the sublime in music share some characteristics.  As McClelland 
concludes, after a comparison of om ra with Michaelis’ essays on the  u alities of musical su lime, “it 
is not possi le to e uate the ‘su lime’ with ombra. It can be argued, though, that ombra does represent 
a possi le source for the su lime in music.”  McClelland, Ombra, 15. 
 
  
99 
 
 
Anfange schuf Gott Himmel und Erde”). In “The Representation of Chaos,” om ra 
characteristics, including chromaticism, dynamic contrasts, and repeated eighth-note 
passages in the strings, call to mind the dark formlessness of the pre-creation void.
193
 
Aside from the musical strategies in the moment of the creation of light (the compelling 
contrasts of minor to major, soft to loud, scattered instrumentation to full orchestra)
194
 
that make it the quintessential instance of the musical sublime, the more extended 
journey from darkness to light is a drawn-out invocation of the sublime.
195
 In the late 
eighteenth century, then, the two central functions of ombra music were to evoke dark 
supernaturalism and trepidation in operatic works, and to represent or imply a passage 
from chaos to order. In this second function, ombra overlaps with the darker aspect of 
the sublime: the construction of the sublime usually continues into the initi al moments 
of order that follow the chaos, as in Haydn’s moment of light,  ut ombra music does 
not. 
 This chapter addresses the reception of ombra music as uncanny in early 
nineteenth-century instrumental music. In the second decade of the century the word 
unheimlich, or uncanny, comes into usage in German music criticism and is repeatedly 
used to describe music that displays ombra characteristics. I have argued in previous 
chapters that the word unheimlich has a range of meanings from the comparatively 
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 McClelland, Ombra, 221. 
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 We ster, “The Creation,” 66. 
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 Carl Dahlhaus, “E.T.A. Hoffmanns Beethoven-Kritik und die Ästhetik des Erhabenen ,” Archiv für 
Musikwissenschaft 38 (1981) 104. Indeed, for We ster, the “Representation of  Chaos” is also part of 
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banal (ghostly, foreign) to the full invocation of its complexity as an aesthetic. Taking 
this into account, I document that the manner in which this vocabulary is employed with 
reference to nineteenth-century ombra music suggests that the critics’ usage is  in line 
with the latter significance of uncanny, wherein music is understood as revealing itself 
as one with the Absolute.  
 My examination of the (often frustratingly brief) remarks of critics is 
accompanied by a consideration of the repertoire addressed. In addition to drawing 
attention to the ombra signifiers in these works, I also argue that this music employs the 
ombra topic in a manner distinct from its eighteenth-century instrumental music 
predecessors. Although the ombra music is often used in an introductory capacity in the 
nineteenth-century repertoire, the works reject the chaos to order narrative that is 
implicit in the eighteenth-century model by recalling or restating the ombra passage at 
intervals throughout the movement. 
 Based on this critical and musical shift, I argue that in these works ombra music 
sheds the specificity of its eighteenth-century associations. Rather than signifying 
supernatural figures and the terror that they inspire,  or the progression from chaos to 
order, this music reveals an inherently musical chaos. From its use in infernal and 
supernatural scenes, nineteenth-century instrumental ombra music retains a sense of the 
effacing of boundaries; and from its function as part of a chaos -to-order narrative, it 
retains a sense of the act of becoming. In these works, ombra aligns with the 
significance of music in Idealist aesthetics. It becomes the music of liminality, wherein 
music   itself caught at the  oundary  etween a solute unity and phenomenon – 
presents itself as the threshold through which the absolute momentarily steps into the 
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finite world.
196
 This music, which stylistically gives the impression  of flickering in and 
out of being, of unspecifiability, is to be understood as the uncanny moment when 
music calls attention to itself as the sensuous manifestation of the Absolute.  
 In current scholarship, Ombra music in the early nineteenth century is perceived 
as undergoing a crisis of signification. In his recent monograph , Clive McClelland 
asks: “what is signified  y using the language of ombra in a context where there are no 
clues other than the music itself ”197 This question reappears throughout McClelland’s 
study, and even as he insists that instrumental music employs ombra as a topical 
reference, he admits that what, specifically, is signified is less clear.
198
 McClelland 
seems to be observing a strange liquidation of significance from a musical topic . 
Contrary to Michael L. Klein’s suggestion that the musical markers of ombra signify 
the uncanny (even when used in isolation, rather than as a collection of musical 
elements), I find that the only thing that these passages are pointing to is music 
itself.
199
 These passages are metamusical in the sense that they borrow from an 
established topic (one that is even, shall we say, past its prime?), abstract its previous 
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 Liminality also features in Cohn’s study on the uncanny properties of hexatonic poles. Cohn 
identifies liminality as a form of disorientation, the property Ernst Jentsch believes to induce uncanny 
sensations. Cohn “Uncanny Resem lances,”  288. 
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 McClelland, Ombra, 203.  
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 McClelland, Ombra, 211. 
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 In his venture to associate various fearful topics with the uncanny (the death topos, ombra), Michael 
Klein also suggests a relationship between ombra and the uncanny. However, his definition of uncanny 
emphasises the emotional responses to uncanniness, and thus differs greatly from mine. His association 
of ombra and the uncanny is not based on nineteenth-century reception, but rather on the eerie 
sensation caused by many ombra signifiers. In short, though I agree with Klein that there is a 
relationship between ombra and the uncanny, our ideas of what constitutes both a reference to ombra 
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associations, and redirected them to point at music, rather than an external event. In 
this sense, they do not signify the uncanny or the absolute; rather, they self -reflexively 
foreground music as the synecdochal symbol for the absolute, thereby demonstrating 
its uncanniness. Over the course of this chapter, I will consider some of these uses of 
“unheimlich” in music criticism, along with the music this word descri es, with the 
intention of delineating the liminal aspect of uncanny music.  
 
Unheimlich and Nineteenth-Century Zauberopern 
Although this chapter is primarily interested in the transformation of the significance 
and compositional use of the ombra topic in early nineteenth-century instrumental 
music and the usage of unheimlich in music criticism, it would be false to imply that 
this music did not persist in opera in the nineteenth century or that unheimlich always 
assumes the implications that I developed above. However, this convention is not 
always so differentiated from the new instrumental tradition that I have outlined, and 
indeed, it seems that the operatic use of ombra music sometimes draws on its more 
a stract significance, as the reception and music of We er’s Der Freischütz 
demonstrates. 
 As I have specified, the word “unheimlich” does not always  ear the weight of 
its full complexity, especially since the word functions both as the collision of its 
different meanings and in reference to the simple concepts of “foreign,” “haunted,” and 
other related ideas. In some uses of the word in opera criticism, unheimlich seems to 
function in this simple capacity. In these situations, it provides a descriptor of the 
fantastic plots of Zauberopern and their attendant sinister music. However, these uses 
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are imprecise, with little to no musical detail provided, and rely on the opera’s su ject 
matter more than its musical language. For instance, in a review of Louis Spohr’s Der 
Berggeist appearing in the Berliner Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung , the author 
vaguely describes the overture as inspiring the listener with the horrors of the uncanny 
spirit realm:  
Already the overture connects the resolution of the magic 
with its beginning and prepares the listener for the horror of 
the uncanny spirit realm, which the tone poet ‒ in air-,  
earth-, water-, fire-, and flower-forms ‒ ventured to  anish 
away through the highest power of his art-magic, for which, 
indeed, the deepest depths of harmony had to be plumbed.
200
  
 
Similarly, a review of Heinrich Marschner’s Der Vampyr from the 16 April 1828 
edition of the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung makes the unspecific statement: “the 
whole thing produces a powerful impression and the diabolical rings uncannily 
throughout.”201 And in a 30 September 1840 review of J.P.E. Hartmann’s Zauberoper 
“Der Ra e” (with a li retto  y Hans Christian Andersen), also found in the Allgemeine 
Musikalische Zeitung, the critic gives a compara le description: “the music hastens, 
roaring and uncanny, from one scene to the next without lingering long, in vivid 
horror.”202 The lack of specificity with regards to musical detail in these uses of 
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 “So verknüpft schon die Ouverture die Auflösung des Zaubers mit dessen Beginnen und bereitet den 
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unheimlich and the insistence on extra-musical aspects of the operas suggests that such 
instances are more a reaction to the Zauberoper genre than to the music of these operas 
in particular, and furthermore, that they are simply calling attention to the frightening, 
supernatural characteristics of these entertainments.  
However, opera criticism also occasions more meaningful applications of 
unheimlich, where musical techniques are specifically addressed as uncanny. For 
instance, in the 27 February 1830 issue of the Berliner Allgemeine Musikalische 
Zeitung, an essay credits Carl Maria von Weber and Der Freischütz with having 
“esta lished a new norm for German opera music” (which, however, the author is 
chagrined to see so frequently imitated). Referring to the musical characteristics of the 
“Wolf’s Glen” scene, the author notes We er’s use of diminished seventh chords, 
“uncanny Tremulando[s],” “fragmentary Bass pizzicato[s]” and “prophetic 
drum eats.”203 To these details, A.B. Marx adds the low register of the clarinet, which 
he claims was first, and most notably, used by Weber to an uncanny, impish effect.
204
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 Anonymous, “Wien, in Novem er,” Berliner Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung 7, no. 9 (27 February 
1830) 70. 
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 “Auch der Klang der Klarinett ist nicht durchweg ein ganz gleicher.  Die tiefsten Töne (besonders die 
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Mercer-Taylor highlights the “virtually leitmotivic element” of the F# diminished seventh harmony 
associated with Samiel, used  oth a chord and a series of tonal centers in the “Wolf’s Glen” scene. 
Donald J. Grout and Hermine Weigl Williams, A Short History of Opera  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 430. Peter Mercer-Taylor, “Unification and Tonal  A solution in ‘Der 
Freischütz’,” Music & Letters 78, no. 2 (1997): 220-224.  
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Both Marx and the reviewer in the Berliner Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung call 
attention to elements that, in tandem, are uniquely present in the very opening sostenuto 
section of the finale, and, to a lesser extent, in the final moments of the scene, with the 
reappearance of Samiel. These musical elements are not associated with the 
pictorialisms of the melodrama that accompany the casting of the bullets (the plunging 
woodbirds, the rearing black boar, the raging storm, and so on) . What begins as barely 
perceptible through music, and therefore uncanny, becomes more bl atantly represented 
in the melodrama, uncanny only in the one-dimensional sense of the word. In addition 
to the musical elements already listed, the ombra signifiers that I would add include the 
alternation of sonorities (in measures 13-39 the woodwinds, horns, and upper voice of 
the chorus alternate with the chorus’ monotone  asses), a chromatic  ass line, and stark 
dynamic contrasts. 
Opening and closing the Wolf’s Glen scene, the passages of music delineated 
above (measures 1-39 and 412-430) announce the distinction of the scene from the 
world of the opera, and more particularly, they herald the presence of supernaturalism 
in that scene. As constituents of an opera, and a supernatural opera in particular, these 
segments of the Wolf’s Glen scene necessarily take on connotations that are more 
situational and specific than those I have proposed in nineteenth-century instrumental 
music. Furthermore, as opera they are also tied more closely to the historical 
connotations of the ombra scene, even if nineteenth-century critics perceived novelty in 
We er’s musical language. However, these passages are not so far removed from their 
instrumental counterparts. Unlike the pictorial sequences in the melodrama, which 
announce magical beings just as perceptibly as phantasmagoric projections, the opening 
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and closing sections of the scene open a pathway for the supernatural in a manner that 
allows it to remain unspecified. In this way, the beginning and ending passages of the 
Wolf’s Glen scene act as the threshold of the supernatural power that attends it. Rather 
than signalling any particular supernatural figure, they are the musical effacing of 
boundaries between the natural and supernatural worlds, the moment when 
supernaturalism permeates and withdraws from the realities o f the opera. 
 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and the Chaos of Becoming  
In instrumental music, the connections between uncanniness, ombra stylistic traits, and 
the coming into being of an infinite presence through music are most explicitly linked 
in a passage from Wilhelm von Lenz’s influential Beethoven et ses trois styles (1852). 
Lenz characterises the opening measures of the Ninth Symphony as the gradual 
materialisation of a prime mover through music: 
The Symphony begins with an uncanny whispering of fifths. 
This is the great introduction of the Ninth Symphony! The 
significance of this introduction the meaning of the fifth, as 
such. The fifth describes a state of becoming. Without giving 
specific forming, it [the fifth] prepares for its materialisation. 
It sounds empty to the ear, to be sure, but preoccupies the 
soul with all sorts of imaginings that generate a heightened 
expectation. This effect arises from the urge to fill in; the 
fluctuation between major and minor third torments the 
listener. One describes the first sixteen measures suitably 
through the word Chaos. (Very beautiful.)  
The theme of the first movement breaks forth even more 
victoriously from the chaos of the fifths, since they are not 
filled by an expected third ‒ the theme is the sudden 
appearance of a first world-moving principle. The conception 
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of earliest states of affairs prevails throughout the first 
movement.
205
   
 
Although Lenz ascri es the “state of  ecoming” enacted  y the opening measures to the 
“urge to fill in” provoked  y the harmonic  ambiguity of the open fifth, one might note 
that, in addition to this whispered harmonic indistinctness, the opening exhibits the 
ombra signifiers of string tremolos, fragments of melody separated by pauses, and a 
strong crescendo effect (see Example 7). If Lenz imagines the fifth as the basis for the 
introduction’s significance, then these other attributes are what build on its simple 
underpinning. Lenz maintains that the “uncanny whispering of fifths” (which we can 
extrapolate as referring to both the interval and its ombra-style presentation) effects a 
“state of  ecoming.” In Lenz’s writing, the fifth (like  music more generally in early 
nineteenth-century aesthetic philosophies) enacts this state of  ecoming “without giving 
[it] specific forming.” As a midway point between absolute unity and the specifiable, 
the open fifth “prepares for its materialisation.” The indefiniteness of the open fifth, 
then, can  e likened to music’s not-quite-materiality, the very quality that allows it to 
transmit the infinite. 
                                                 
205
 “Die Symphonie  eginnt mit einem unheimlichen Quintengeflüster.  Das ist die grosse Introduction 
der neunten Symphonie! Die Bedeutung diese Introduction is t die Bedeutung der Quinte überhaupt. Die 
Quinte bezeichnet einen Zustand des Werdens.  Ohne bestimmte Gestaltung zu geben, bereitet sie doch 
deren Absonderung vor. Sie klingt dem Ohre zwar leer, beschäftigt aber die Seele mit allerlei 
Vorstellungen, die eine gesteigerte Erwartung erzeugt.  Diese Wirkung entsteht durch den Drang nach 
Füllung; den Horenden peinigt das Schwanken zwischen grosser und kleiner Terz.  Man bezeichnet die 
ersten 16 Takte passend durch das Wort Chaos. (Très-beau.) 
 Das Thema des ersten Satzes bricht um so siegreicher aus dem Chaos der Quinten hervor, da 
diese durch eine erwartete Terz nicht ausgefüllt werden ‒ das Thema ist die plötzliche Erscheinung 
eines ersten weltbewegenden Prinzips. Die Vorstellungsart frühester Zustände der Dinge waltet durch 
den ganzen ersten Satz.” Wilhelm von Lenz, Beethoven et ses trois styles  (St. Petersberg, 1852), 234-
35. 
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Example 7: Beethoven, Ninth Symphony, first movement, measures 1-8. 
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Example 7 continued: Beethoven, Ninth Symphony, first movement, measures 9-17. 
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 According to Lenz, “[o]ne descri es the first sixteen measures suita ly through 
the word Chaos.” However, when he employs the word “chaos,” he does not claim  that 
they, like the opening of Haydn’s The Creation, seek to recall an outside event.206 
Rather, it articulates his foreboding that something is coming into being, stirring 
through the trembling strings, which makes the opening uncanny to him. By figuring 
music as the site of chaos, it also becomes the ephemeral alternate site of manifestation, 
where the absolute is less bound by the constraints of musical and worldly materiality: 
as Lenz remarks, the theme that comes forth from the ombra opening “is the sudden 
appearance of a first world-moving principle.” 
 As a second point of contrast to the musical chaos of Haydn and the eighteenth -
century, this music is not merely an initiating chaos.  When Lenz remarks that a 
“conception of earliest states of affairs prevails throughout the first movement,” he 
seems to refer o li uely to the movement’s return, on several occasions, to this opening 
music. The materiality of the music is repeatedly dismantled throughout the movement, 
as music dissolves time and again to its most permeable state.  
 
The Uncanny Resurfacings of Schubert’s Octet in F major, D. 803  
Although the critical reception of Schu ert’s Octet in F major, D. 803 is not nearly as 
specific and evocative as Lenz’s with regards to this notion a out music, the treatment 
of a similar type of musical material perhaps reveals its uncanniness to a greater degree.  
                                                 
206
 As James Webster notes, in The Creation music “maintained its traditional aesthetic function as 
mimesis.” Webster, “The Creation, Haydn’s Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Su lime,” 97. 
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The musical language in the Andante molto introduction to the Allegretto finale of 
Schu ert’s Octet in F major, D. 803 features the ombra characteristics of tremolo 
strings, rapidly shifting dynamics, persistent semitone motion (both diatonic and 
chromatic), and the alternation of performing forces (the clarinet, horn, and bassoon 
alternate motives with the cello and contrabass in measures 11-14). It is likely that 
these musical features prompted the critic in the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung to 
describe a 30 May 1827 performance of this work as featuring an “almost uncanny 
prelude” followed  y a “pi uant” Finale.207 
In addition to these characteristics, as the chromaticism of the Andante molto 
would imply, the harmonic constitution of the opening section is evasive, working to 
obscure connections with an F tonic before gradually moving towards it and f inally 
establishing F major at the beginning of the Allegro. The opening key signature (four 
flats), combined with the bass note and cello tremolo on f (measures 1-2, Example 8), 
immediately suggests F minor, a fitting response to the F major of the fifth movement 
Menuetto.  But with the entrance of the full ensemble in the pick-up to the second 
measure, the f tremolo is quickly reinterpreted as the bass note of a D-flat major chord 
in first inversion. However, the reign of D-flat is short-lived, ending in measure three, 
when a second inversion C minor chord acting as a cadential 6-4 suggests a 
reinterpretation of D-flat as the Neapolitan of C minor. This shift to C minor leads to 
the pianissimo G major triad in measure five, depositing us an unsettling trit one away  
 
                                                 
207
 Anonymous, “Nachrichten. Wien: Musikalisches Tagebuch vom Monat April,” Allgemeine 
Musikalische Zeitung  29, no. 22 (30 May 1827), 370. “Scherzo vivace nebst Alternativ, in F; endlich, 
nach einem fast unheimlichen Vorspiele, das pikan te Finale in dersel en Tonart.”  
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Example 8: Schubert Octet D.803, Andante molto introduction to finale, measures 1-14. 
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Example 8 continued: Schubert Octet D.803, Andante molto introduction to finale, 
measures 15-22. 
 
from where we began. Measures six to ten repeat the harmonic pattern of the first five 
measures, but transposed up a perfect fourth, a shift that requires a harmonic descent of 
a semitone between measures five and six. After further evasions, the F tonic is finally 
established in measure eighteen (the beginning of the Allegro) after a dominant arrival 
on C in measures fifteen to seventeen. The withholding of harmonic stability throughout 
the Andante molto section, in addition to the ombra characteristics noted above, 
suspends the sense that the movement is coming into being over seventeen lingering 
measures. 
However, while both the reviewer in the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung and 
the late eighteenth-century narrative of chaos to order that marks the ombra opening 
imply that the slow, uncanny introduction is something to move past (the “piquant” 
Finale emphatically follows the “uncanny” Andante molto; the movement from 
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introduction to movement proper is a journey from darkness to light), in the final 
movement of  
 
Example 9: Schubert Octet D.803, Finale (Allegro), measures 81-101. 
 
 
Schu ert’s Octet the uncanniness of the Andante molto repeatedly threatens eruption, 
and in due course surges through to disrupt the facade of the Allegro.
208
 In measure 
                                                 
208
 Cone alludes to these interruptions: “Later on a cold wind seems to blow through even some of his 
sunniest or most placid movements. Listen, for example, to the Andante of the String Quartet in G, to 
the Adagio of the String Quintet, to the Andante molto that introduces and interrupts the finale of the 
Octet.” Edward T. Cone, “Schu ert’s Promissory Note: An Exercise in Musical Hermeneutics,” 
Nineteenth-Century Music 5, no. 3 (1982), 241. Janet Schmalfeldt also notes the return, but does not 
comment on its effect on the listener: “Multimovement works in which the slow movement serves as the 
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ninety-one, after an abrupt halt on the dominant of C, followed by two measures of 
silence, the viola introduces a low tremolo on G, which continues unaccompanied for 
nearly two measures before the entry of the horns’ and winds’ melody dispels the 
impression that the Andante molto will return (Example 9). And yet the viola’s tremolo 
persists with only the slight interruptions of a repeated eighth -note figure for twenty 
measures. 
In measure 201, the viola tremolo returns (Example 10). However, this time it is 
joined by additional signals, such as the alternation of the s trings with the winds-horns 
group (beginning in measure 214 and continuing until 234), pervasive semitone motion  
 
 
 
Example 10: Schubert Octet D.803, Finale (Allegro), measures 193-202 
                                                                                                                                                             
expressive core: [...] materials from the Adagio introduction to the first movement return within the 
Andante molto “ombra scene” as introduction to the finale; the Andante molto itself returns just before 
the coda.” Schmalfeldt, In the Process of Becoming: Analytic and Philosophical Perspectives on Form  
in Early Nineteenth-Century Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 156. 
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Example 10 continued: Schubert Octet D.803, Finale (Allegro), measures 203-230 
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Example 10 continued: Schubert Octet D.803, Finale (Allegro), measures 231-251 
 
 
(measures 223-238), ppp dynamic marking gradually building to fortissimo (measures 
223-241), and the gradual re-establishment of F major in measure 241 after a prolonged 
C major sonority (a C major triad in measures 223-26, then a dominant seventh in 
measures 227-240). Though this passage does not directly imitate the Andante molto 
introduction, it does recall a significant portion of its characteristics.  
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Finally, after suggesting its withheld presence at intervals throughout the 
movement, the Andante molto resurfaces in earnest in measures 370-375 (Example 11). 
Offering a condensed and embellished version of the original Andante molto, this 
second statement draws its potency less from the drawn-out search for an F tonality, 
and more from the shock that the musical material has returned at all, especially after so  
many false allusions to the language of the Andante molto throughout the sixth 
movement of the Octet. As Lawrence Kramer suggests with regard to the uncanny 
behaviour of music in general, repetition does not inure us to the presence of an 
uncanny musical element, and since any statement of it should not occur, repetition 
only multiplies its uncanniness.
209
 Thus, the music of the Andante molto grows more 
uncanny with each subsequent repetition, especially as the allusions to its musical 
characteristics between its two full statements, as described above, compound the sense 
that it is being suppressed by the comparative gaiety of the Allegro. 
 This final return, and the insinuated returns that appear over the course of the 
Allegro, disperse the uncanniness of the initial introduction throughout the movement. 
In Schu ert’s Octet, the chaos of  ecoming is not something to be moved beyond, not 
merely an initiating force, but rather is a force that can invade and enliven music at any 
moment. While it is likely that the reviewer in the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung  
called the Andante molto introduction to this movement uncanny because of its ombra-
inspired musical language, it is noteworthy that the movement as a whole shares the 
principle of interference that Hoffmann identified in his Beethoven review, but which,  
                                                 
209
 This otherwise unpublished remark is related in Kerman, “Beethoven’s Opus 131 and the Uncanny,” 
158-59. 
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Example 11: Schubert Octet D.803, Andante molto interlude in finale, measures 370-
375. 
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here, is achieved through the use of only one musical technique. Thus, the metamusical 
property of the Andante molto is enhanced because not only does it, in employing the 
ombra topic, reflect on the powers of music, but its content is also deployed 
compositionally as a second layer of music that insists on surfacing periodically 
throughout the movement. As such, the uncanniness of this work aligns closely with 
Schelling’s image of flowers over an a yss. At intervals , the very ground of the Allegro 
threatens to give way to the cavernous sonorities of deep tremolos. And at the 
 eginning and end of the movement, the uncanny principle ‒ that revelation that music 
holds the uncontainable – fully surfaces. 
 
Beethoven’s “Archduke” Trio and the Unseen Mover  
In contrast to the previous examples, a mid-century performance of the Scherzo of 
Beethoven’s “Archduke” Trio, Opus 97 offers what might be construed as an instance 
of failed uncanniness. Yet this perceived failure is illuminating, precisely because the 
tensions between the two musical sections are not played out to the sati sfaction of the 
reviewer. In a review of a chamber concert at the Platteissaale in Prague on 10 
December 1847, the writer Obolus complains that he does not agree with some aspects 
of the performance. He remarks that “especially in those passages in the Scherzo, where 
after long, uncanny delving about in the deep tone regions, the triumphant idea in C -
sharp major [actually D-flat major] and then again in E major suddenly breaks forth, the 
effect was not  rilliant enough [...].” The review makes it clear that the  lame lay on 
the performer (“truthfully, the fault did not lie with Beethoven”); indeed, he opens the 
review by proclaiming the high standing of the trio’s Andante and Scherzo 
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movements.
210
 The problem that the reviewer seems to identify is not that the passages 
under consideration failed to create an impression of uncanniness (his description of 
these sections concisely conveys the appropriate atmosphere),
211
 but rather that the 
uncanniness is not sufficiently stifled  y the “ rilliant” section. After the lingering, 
lurking sense that music was the site of a gradual uncanny manifestation, the performers 
failed to banish this impression, dispelling it with the luminosity of virtuosity and the 
pretense that music is spectacle and surface. However, like the passages identified as 
uncanny in the first movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony and the final movement 
of Schu ert’s Octet, the relevant part of Beethoven’s Scherzo is not an isolated event, 
but returns repeatedly throughout the movement.  
The uncanny section of the Scherzo begins at the outset of the Trio, with the 
pick-up to measure 126, and is immediately signalled by a shift in dynamics from 
fortissimo to piano; the cello’s metre-obscuring B-flat, which is tied over the barline; 
and the pervasive chromaticism beginning with the C-flat in measure 126 (Example 12). 
These features will continue throughout the movement’s four uncanny episodes 
(measures 126-159, 183-195, 219-256, and, in the coda, 412-434). In each of these, 
                                                 
210
 Obolus, “Korrespondenz aus Prag: Erstes Abonnements-Kammer-Konzert im Platteissaale am 10. 
December um halb 5 Uhr A ends,” Wiener Allgemeine Musik-Zeitung 8, no. 12 (27 January 1848) 46-
47. “Hr. Deutsch lies [lieβ] zwar, wie immer, an Fertigkeit nichts vermissen, aber abgesehen davon, daβ 
einige kleine Unreinheiten vorkamen, was diesem Künstler sonst fast nie arrivirt, war ich auch mit dem 
Vortrage öfters nicht einverstanden; insbesondere im Scherzo an jener Stelle, wo nach längerem, 
unheimlichen Herumwühlen in den tiefen Tonregionen plötzlich die triumphirend Idee in Cis,  und dann 
wieder in E-dur hervorbricht, war der Effekt zu wenig brilliant; ... – und wahrhaftig, an Beethoven war 
die Schuld nicht gelegen.”  
211
 The uncanny passages have also had this effect on modern critics: Angus Watson remarks that there 
is “something of the night” a out these segments. Watson, Beethoven’s Chamber Music in Context  
(Woodbridge, U.K.: The Boydell Press, 2010), 197. Ian Bent suggests that it “gives perhaps a first 
glimpse of the yawning apocalyptic chasms of [Beethoven’s] third manner.” Ian  Bent, Music Theory in 
the Age of Romanticism  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 326. 
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muted imitative lines gradually give way to a crescendoing series of octaves or chords, 
which progressively work towards esta lishing the new key of each “ rilliant” section. 
The imitative passages, especially, are highly chromatic: so much so, that in measures 
126-143, for example, all twelve pitches are engaged. Metric ambiguity is created by 
regular ties over the barline: the central motivic unit begins on the third beat of a 
measure, is tied over to the first beat, and lasts a total of six beats (of quarter -note 
value). However, as the imitative texture dissolves, this rhythmic unit is set against 
metrically aligned six- or three- eat units (such as the cello’s sustained notes in 
measures 150-153 and 186-190). In other instances, the rhythmic stability that begins to 
set in as the “ rilliant” section approaches is undermined, prolonging the uncanny 
section, such as in measures 249-56 of its third version, where the regular metre created 
by the neighbour-note gestures in the violin and cello (and continuing on, by the regular  
 
Example 12: Beethoven Trio Op.97, Scherzo, mm.112-34. 
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Example 12 continued: Beethoven Trio Op.97, Scherzo, mm.135-76. 
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Example 12 continued: Beethoven Trio Op.97, Scherzo, mm.177-219. 
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Example 12 continued: Beethoven Trio Op.97, Scherzo, mm.220-259. 
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sforzandi) is o scured  y the suggestion of duple meter in the piano’s alternation of F 
and G octaves in the right hand. The compressed, serpentine route of  the uncanny 
passages is particularly striking in that it contrasts pronouncedly with the opening of 
the Scherzo, in which the clear directionality of the B-flat major scale is 
unambigulously laid out (Example 13). 
 
Example 13: Beethoven Trio Op.97, Scherzo, measures 1-24. 
 
In his article “Scherzo and the unheimlich: The Construct of Genre and Feeling 
in the Long 19th Century,” Lóránt Péteri argues that the scherzo genre (as a movement 
in a sonata cycle) is highly inclined to create the fitting conditions for musical 
uncanniness.
212
 Péteri attributes this quality to the sprightly, dance-like characteristics 
of the genre, which “immediately raise the  uestion of what or who is moving, what or 
                                                 
212
 Péteri, “Scherzo and the Unheimlich,” 322. 
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who is  eing set in motion.”213 Rather than evoking human dancers, Péteri argues that, 
because of its sense of perpetual motion and its use of permutational techniques to 
generate musical material, the Scherzo conjures the danse macabre, clockwork, or 
musical automata such as E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Olimpia. 214 Addressing the scherzo-like 
Alla danza tedesca of Beethoven’s String Quartet in B-flat major, Opus 130, Péteri 
suggests that the permutational breakdown of musical logic that follows the eighth 
repetition of the theme stands in direct contradiction to the aesthetics of musical 
revelation.
215
 In this moment, according to Péteri,  
The Beethoven music reveals its fabricated, artificial, 
insubstantial nature at that self-reflective moment of theme 
permutation and ‘music a out music’. In other words, it 
denies the listener of what is always its accustomed main 
task (in the opinion of E.T.A. Hoffmann himself): to enchant 
and lure us ‘…into the marvellous spiritual empire of the 
Infinite’. So the mechanical character of the musical dice-
play attacks the autonomous instrumental work of art f rom 
within, along with its ‘musical logic’ or ‘organic 
construction’ and its metaphysics resting on the Su lime of 
Burke or later the Unspeakable of Hoffmann.
216
 
 
Péteri, then, positions com inatorial work and “music a out music” – qualities 
that, for him, make music uncanny - in opposition to Hoffmann’s notion of music as 
                                                 
213
 Péteri, “Scherzo and the Unheimlich,” 322. 
214
 Péteri, “Scherzo and the Unheimlich,” 323-24. 
215
 Emil Platen, also addressing Beethoven’s use of permutation in his Scherzos, similarly invokes Opus 
130. Platen delineates Beethoven’s com inatorial use of rhythmic motives in the opening section of this 
movement, comparing it to an earlier letter from Beethoven to Nikolaus Zmeskall, which begins with 
the salutation “Lie ster Baron Dreckfahrer” and ends with the playful “Adieu Baron Ba...ron 
ron/nor/orn/rno/onr/. (Voila  uel ue chose aus dem alten Versatzamt.)” [ “There’s something from the 
old curiousity shop”]. Curiously, Platen does not discuss the uncanny section of the Scherzo at all, even 
though Beethoven makes conspicuous use of what we might call motivic cells in that section . Emil 
Platen, “‘Voila Quel ue Chose aus dem Alten Versatzamt‘: Zum Scherzo des Klaviertrios B -Dur opus 
97,“ Beethovens Klaviertrios: Symposion München 1990  (Munich: G. Henle Verlag, 1992),  179-80. 
216
 Péteri, “Scherzo and the Unheimlich,” 324-25. 
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passage to the A solute. However, as we have seen in the Review of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony, Hoffmann hears music as host to the Absolute presence most when music 
falters and is subject to uncanny disruptions. Péteri is entirely correct in pointing out 
that this musical interference is in opposition to the aesthetics of the sublime and that 
this uncanny music does not “enchant and lure us” into the infinite. Rather, this music 
forces us into a more immediate, unexpected, and awful confrontation: it is not only the 
dance-like element of some scherzi that “raise[s] the  uestion of what or who is 
moving, what or who is  eing set in motion,”  ut also, and in a far less mechanical way, 
those very moments when music calls attention to how easily it can be dismantled, 
revealing that its materiality is a tenuous construct that forms the most insubstantial 
veil around that which actually moves it.  
  
Creation through Music: Spohr’s “Die Weihe der Töne” 
The reshaping of ombra’s musical chaos as a materialisation of the a solute through 
music has a parallel development in programmatic music that deals  with the creation of 
the world.  For contemporaneous critics, this theme invited comparisons to the 
magnificent example of Haydn’s Creation. However,  etween Haydn’s conception of 
creation and early nineteenth-century versions of the origin myth, a telling shift takes 
place: music becomes a vital element of creation.  In Spohr’s programmatic Fourth 
Symphony “Die Weihe der Töne” (“The Consecration of Tones”) of 1832 and its 
accompanying poem by Karl Pfeiffer, music is thematised as an agent of creation, as the 
crucial link between the infinity of God and the physical words. Carl Maria von 
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We er’s early work Der erste Ton (The First Tone), a “melodramatic cantata,”  is 
another such narrative.
217
 
 “Die Weihe der Töne” recounts the creation of music through music, as the 
corresponding poem by Karl Pfeiffer elaborates, here in a prose translation:  
Solitary lay the fields in the flower-splendor of spring; amid the 
silent forms wandered Man through the night, following only his 
wild impulse, not the mild footprints of the heart; Love found no 
tones, Nature no language. 
 
Then eternal Kindness wished to announce itself, and breathed 
Sound into the breast of Man! And it let Love find a language that 
penetrated to its heart and made it happy. The nightingale greets 
him with tones of love, the forest rustles forth harmonies to him, 
the Zephyr’s murmur fills his  reast with longing, the  rook’s 
waves whisper him to rest. Then, at the tones’ sacred wafting, the 
spirit, freed from every earthly bond, soars triumphant to the 
heights of Heaven, and greets the fair fatherland of dreams.
218
 
                                                 
217
 Carl Maria von We er’s Der erste Ton (1808), su titled  y the composer as a “melodramatische 
Kantate für Declamation, Chor und Orchester,” is a short work that com ines recitation punctuated  y 
orchestral commentary with a concluding fugal chorus. Set to a text by Johann Friedrich Rochlitz 
written especially for Weber, Der erste Ton is often compared to Haydn’s The Creation due to similar 
subject matter and musical treatment of chaos in these works.  Jacqueline Waeber, En musique dans le 
texte : le mélodrame de Rousseau à Schoenberg  (Paris: Van Dieren éditeur, 2005), 260-62. 
 
218
 Prose translation by Lawrence Gilman, Stories of Symphonic Music (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1907), 
256. 
  
Einsam lagen die Gefilde 
In des Lenzes Blumenpracht;  
Durch die schweigende Gebilde 
Wandelte der Mensch in Nacht,  
Folgte nur dem wilden Triebe, 
Nicht des Herzens sanfter Spur;  
Keine Töne fand die Liebe,  
Keine Sprache die Natur.  
 
Da wollte sich die ew’ge Güte künden,  
Und hauchte in des Menschen Brust den Klang!  
Und liess die Liebe eine Sprache finden,  
Die ihm beseligend zun Herzen drang.   
Ihn gruβt die Nachtigall mit Liebestönen;  
Es rauscht der Wald ihm Harmonieen zu;  
Des Zephyrs Säuseln füllt die Brust mit Sehnen, -  
Des Baches Wellen flüstern ihn zur Ruh.  
Da schwinget  ei der Töne heit’gem Wehen  
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In this section of the poem, which corresponds to the first movement of the symphony 
(the strophe break indicates the division between the Largo introduction and the 
Allegro), the poet recounts a creation narrative wherein mankind and the natural world 
are animated through music. Prior to music’s presence, the world is depicted as empty 
matter without connection or motivation: beings ricochet about  haphazardly. With the 
sudden presence of music, the world spirit (“eternal Kindness”) is a le to move in the 
finite world. Music is the vehicle for infusing the world with spirit. And this 
consciousness-through-music, now activated in men and the natural world, acts both as 
a web of communication between these beings, and as a means of escaping the purely 
finite.  
 The Largo introduction of “Die Weihe der Töne,” similarly to the introduction of 
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, is descri ed as an “uncannily whispering Prologue” in an 
1835 review in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik.
219
 As Joshua Berrett points out in the 
introduction to an edition of this symphony, the use of fragmented motives isolated by 
periods of silence is reminiscent of the opening of Bee thoven’s symphony (Example 
14).
220
 In its use of clarinets and bassoons paired in octaves, sudden dynamic shifts, and 
flat key areas, it demonstrably draws on the musical language of ombra. The musical 
                                                                                                                                                             
Der Geist, besfreit von jedem Erdenban, 
Sich triumphirend zu des Himmels Höhen,  
Und grüβt der Träume schönes Vaterland. 
 
Karl Pfeiffer, in Joshua Berrett, ed., The Symphony 1720-1840: Series C, Volume IX: Louis Spohr – 
Three Symphonies (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980) 5.  
 
219
 “...in diesem zwar kurzen, aber unheimlich flüsternden Prolog ...” Seyfried, “Die Weihe der Töne: 
Characteristisches Tongemälde in Form einer Symphonie,” Neue Zeitschrift für Musik 2, no. 27 (3 April 
1835): 107. 
 
220
 Joshua Berrett, “Introduction” The Symphony 1720-1840: Series C, Volume IX: Louis Spohr – Three 
Symphonies (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980), xxii.  
  
131 
 
 
language changes but continues to refer to ombra in the beginning of the Allegro, as the 
process of the emergence of “music” into the world  egins.  
 
 
 
Example 13: Spohr, Fourth Symphony “Die Weihe der Töne,” first movement, measures 
1-7. 
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Example 13 continued: Spohr, Fourth Symphony “Die Weihe der Töne,” first 
movement, measures 8-14. 
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Example 13 continued: Spohr, Fourth Symphony “Die Weihe der Töne,” first 
movement, measures 15-20. 
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Example 13 continued: Spohr, Fourth Symphony “Die Weihe der Töne,” first 
movement, measures 21-27. 
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Spohr’s “Die Weihe der Töne” is perhaps the most dizzying example of music 
commenting on music, as the symphony not only employs the ombra style to 
demonstrate music’s liminal powers, but also explicitly recounts a narrative of creation 
through music. In all of the repertoire discussed in this chapter, however, the ombra 
topic becomes an occasion for metamusical reflection. The topical quality of this music 
is maintained in that it can be heard as engaging the conventions of this style. However, 
in the instance of the instrumental music without extra-musical association considered 
here, the elimination of a narrative context (whether the narrative of an opera or the 
more simple, implied chaos to order narrative) and the declining prevalence of operatic 
ombra music, collude to distance this new use of ombra from its original associations. 
Instead, this music appropriates the essential distillation of the ombra reference – that 
of coming into being and the dissolution of boundaries – and redirects this significance, 
applying it to music itself. This music, then, is demonstrating the liminal status of 
music as a barely-material means of conveying the absolute in the sensuous world. 
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4 
 
The Wilderness at Home 
 
 
In its obscurity and vastness, the forest assumes a double-faced uncanniness in German 
Romanticism: double-faced, because the eerie foreboding of latent revelation it sustains 
shifts towards menace or magnificence, depending on the circumstances. For Robert 
Pogue Harrison, the forest “is all nuance. It  lurs distinctions, evoking the lost kinship 
between animate and inanimate, darkness and light, finite and infinite, body and soul, 
sight and sound.”221 This chapter is about a wilderness emerging in the home, and the 
series of enfoldings and entanglements that allow this to occur. I begin by examining 
the twin thematisation of the forest and music as bearing the uncanny ability to manifest 
the infinite in German Romantic literature, devoting particular attention to literature in 
which the two are inextricably linked, and to the primary symbol of this fusion: the 
Waldhorn.
222
 In literature, in contrast to philosophy, encounters with the infinite are not 
always plainly expressed, and may, in certain contexts, be experienced as a blending of 
fantasy and reality, since our common experience of the world of phenomena precludes 
                                                 
221
 Robert Pogue Harrison, Forests: The Shadows of Civilization  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 186. 
222
 Henceforth, Waldhorn will be treated as an English word, wi thout italics or capitalisation, and 
pluralised in the English fashion.  
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the infinite. In other instances, the confusion between fantasy and reality takes on an 
explicitly supernatural cast. Although the literature that I address thematises the forest 
and the music of the waldhorn in both ways, I am careful to distinguish between the 
two. 
 The chapter also considers musical works which develop the theme of joint 
musical-woodland uncanniness through the waldhorn topic, touching on the Overture to 
Der Freischütz and focusing on Fanny Mendelssohn Hensel’s third Anklänge song to a 
text by Joseph von Eichendorff. In addition to drawing out the psychological 
complexity of the latter, I also take into account its status as a piece of nineteenth-
century domestic music repertoire through which the wilderness invades the home.  
 
The Wilderness 
 
Although the forest plays an important role in German myths and tales prior to the 
nineteenth century, and music and landscape were brought together in literary, musical, 
and visual media,
223
 a specific network of symbols and significance only came to 
prominence in the era of German Romanticism. The term Waldromantik encapsulates 
the complex of meaning built around the forest as symbol in German romantic 
literature, music, and visual art (though, according to some, Waldromantik is no more 
than a popular and inferior subgenre of romantic literature, exemplified by the writings 
of Tieck and Eichendorff, and held in lower esteem than the “pure” Romantic literature 
                                                 
223
 Painted scenes on keyboard instruments constitute one such example. Andrea Gottdang, Vorbild 
Musik: die Geschichte einer Idee in der Malerei im deutschsprachigen Raum 1780-1915 (Munich: Deutscher 
Kunstverlag, 2004), 118-19. The use of the forest as an enchanted setting for opera before the nineteenth 
century is extensively documented in David Buch,  Magic Flutes and Enchanted Forests: The 
Supernatural in Eighteenth-Century Musical Theatre (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).  
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of Brentano and Novalis).
224
 Waldromantik differentiates simple woodland themes from 
a particularly romanticized notion of the forest: one in which the natural and mystical 
realms, and natural sounds and art music intersect. In Waldromantik literature, as 
opposed to painting, art music is always an integral element. Writers such as Tieck 
intersperse the natural sounds of their nature poetry (birdsong, water murmurings, and 
the rustlings of the trees) with the musical sounds of the organ, waldhorn, and flute – 
instruments that are often depicted as strangely subjectless.
225
 The forest becomes a 
singing, resounding space.
226
 Individually compelling, the forest and music, united, 
form an intense nexus of revelatory potential, for landscape plays the natural 
counterpart to the artifice of music’s power to manifest the mystical.  
Deeply enmeshed in this tangle of forest, supernaturalism, imitations of natural 
sounds, and art music, Der Freischütz is the example that is inevitably put forward 
when defining a musical Waldromantik.
227
 I mention Der Freischütz here not only as a 
touchstone for Waldromantik in music, but also to return to the central uncertainty of 
forest uncanniness. The romantic forest-topic suggests the crossing of boundaries, 
                                                 
224
 “Recognition and esteem were most readily granted to those Romantic writers who sold out, more or 
less, to diluted or degraded notions of the Romantic, such as Zauberromantik, Schauerromantik and so-
called German Waldromantik. Hence the popularity of Tieck (according to He  el the ‘King of the 
Romantics’), who invented the key word Waldeinsamkeit [...].”Eichendorff and Hoffmann are also cited 
as practitioners of this degenerate genre, which is somewhat s trange, as Hoffmann’s literature is far 
less forest-centric than that of the other two writers. Wolfgang Beutin, et al., A History of German Literature: 
From the Beginnings to the Present Day, trans. Clare Krojzl (New York: Routledge, 1993), 217. 
 
225
 Claudia Albert, Tönende Bilderschrift. “Musik” in der deutschen und französischen Erzählprosa des 
18. und 19. Jahrhunderts (Heidelberg: Synchron Wissenschaftsverlag, 2002), 52. 
 
226
 Gottdang, Vorbild Musik, 118-19. 
 
227
 Hermann Abert, “Carl Maria von Weber und sein Freischütz,” Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters 33 (1927): 
18. 
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according to Ute Jung-Kaiser, but where and what does this bring us?
228
 In the instance 
of Der Freischütz, which we will consider in more depth later, the forest gives passage 
to dark supernatural forces, and the narrative and musical atmosphere of the opera leave 
little doubt as to the character of that which results from forest conjuring. Addressing 
the literature of Eichendorff and Hoffmann, Niels Werber suggests that the dark and 
unfamiliar territory of the forest is responsible for the sinister turn of its particular 
uncanniness.
229
 But the uncanny tone of waldromantik art is not always so resolved, and 
it skews towards dazzling radiance or petrifying darkness at the whim of the artist.  
Waldromantik art sometimes thematises the forest as leading to an 
unambiguously divine experience. As Jung-Kaiser notes, the equivalence of forest and 
cathedral is characteristic of nineteenth-century artworks,
230
 as evinced, in particular, by 
many of the paintings of Caspar David Friedrich, including The Cross in the Fir Forest 
(c.1811), Abbey in the Oakforest (1810), and The Cross in the Mountains (1808).
231
 A 
written counterpart to these images, but also embracing the sonic elements of the forest, 
Hermann Rollett’s poem “Geheimes Flüstern hier und dort,” explicitly links  the forest 
                                                 
228
 Ute Jung-Kaiser, Der Wald als romantischer Topos (Bern: Pater Lang, 2008), 9. 
229
 “Der Wald ist nicht nur un ekannt, sondern auch dunkel. ‘Finster nacht und dero unheimligkeit’ 
kommen gerne als Paar einher.’“ Niels Werber, “Gestalten des Unheimlichen. Seine Struktur und Wirkung bei 
Eichendorff und Hoffmann,” E.T.A. Hoffmann Jahrbuch 6 (1998): 9. 
 
230
 This analogy also persists into the twentieth century. Jung-Kaiser, Der Wald als romantischer Topos, 
15. 
 
231
 As William Vaughan notes, “Friedrich was listed in the famous review written  y Meyer in Kunst 
und Alterthum, ‘Neudeutsche religiös-patriotische Kunst’, among those whose ‘religious mysticism’ 
had led to the diversion of contemporary art away from good taste and wholesome  eauty.” William 
Vaughan, German Romantic Painting (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 81. 
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to religious sentiments, and imagines the forest as a “consecrated space” [“geweihter 
Ort”] and a natural edifice, a “lovely, free house of God” [“lie es, freies Gotteshaus”]:  
 
Geheimes Flüstern hier und dort,   Secret whispers here and there, 
verborg'nes Quellenrauschen,  muted rushing of the spring, 
o Wald, o Wald, geweihter Ort,  o Forest, o forest, consecrated space, 
laß mich des Lebens reinstes Wort,  let me discern the purest word of life,  
in Zweig und Blatt belauschen!  in branch and leaf! 
 
Und schreit' ich in den Wald hinaus, And I stride out into the forest, 
da grüßen mich die Bäume,  there the trees greet me, 
du liebes, freies Gotteshaus,  you lovely, free, house of God, 
du schließest mich mit Sturmgebraus you enfold me with storm-thunderings 
in deine kühlen Räume!   in your cool spaces! 
 
Was leise mich umschwebt, umklingt,  Whatever lightly floats and sounds about me,  
ich will es treu bewahren,   I want to faithfully uphold it  
und was mir tief zum Herzen dringt,  and what pierces me deeply in my heart, 
will ich, vom Geist der Lieb' beschwingt, I want, elated by the spirit of love, 
in Liedern offenbaren!
232
   to reveal it in songs! 
 
 
Rollet’s poem maps a transition from latent to full-fledged uncanniness. Over the 
course of the poem, a divine presence gradually manifests itself through natural 
phenomena, until it is fully known to the heart of the poet. At first, the poet dwells on 
the hidden-away  uality of the forest’s mysteries, “the purest word of life” [“des 
Le ens reinstes Wort”] that the poet longs to hear. He describes an acoustic scene of 
“secret whispers” [geheimes Flüstern], and the “muted rushing of the spring” 
[verborg'nes Quellenrauschen]. As the poet immerses himself further into the forest, 
these auditory intimations grow more pronounced and couple with sensations that verge 
on the palpa le: the roaring storm of the second stanza enfolds him [“du schließest mich 
                                                 
232
 Hermann Rollett in Clara Wieck Schumann, “Geheimes Flustern hier und dort,” in Sämtliche Lieder 
für Singstimme und Klavier: Volume II, ed. Joachim Draheim and Brigitte Höft (Wiesbaden: Breitkopf 
& Härtel, 1992), 40-41. 
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mit Sturmge raus”] and an unnamea le entity floats and sounds around him [“Was leise 
mich umschwe t, umklingt”]. Finally,  it makes its material presence felt by permeating 
the heart of the poet [“was mir tief zum Herzen dringt“], and the poet, in turn, is 
compelled to transform barely perceptible natural sounds into the revelatory medium of 
music [“will ich, vom Geist der Lie '  eschwingt, / in Liedern offen aren!”].  
“Geheimes Flüstern hier und dort” was set  y Clara Wieck Schumann as the third 
of her Sechs Lieder, Op. 23. Schumann’s setting seems to hone in on the secretiveness 
of the forest, rather than a moment of revelation to which the final line alludes. The 
piano accompaniment, with its delicate arpeggiation evocatively suggests the “geheimes 
Flüstern” of the title, and the listener senses the emergent divinity of the forest voices. 
The strophic setting, however, does not allow for a progression of ever-more-present 
intimations, as found in the poem, and the expected revelation [“in Liedern 
offen aren!”] never comes to the fore. Like the poem, which only speaks of the 
namelessness of that which is sensed (whatever – was; it - es), Wieck Schumann’s song 
only promises revelation, and declines to depict it musically even as the poem refuses 
to speak it. 
The gentle uncanniness of Rollett finds its counterpart in Joseph von 
Eichendorff’s short story from 1808, “Magic in Autumn” (“Die Zau erei im Her ste”), 
in which the forest play host to an indeterminate realm to which music serves as a 
passage. Over the course of the story, Raimund, now a recluse, recounts to the knight 
Ubaldo the tale of his estrangement from the world, after a chance meeting in the forest 
initiates their acquaintance. Raimund tells Ubaldo that, entranced by a lovely woman 
and led to her strange woodland court by captivating music, he had abandoned his life 
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and killed his dear friend, whom he thought to be a rival for her affections. After a 
period of time spent in the forest, Raimund recounts, his perception of his situation 
suddenly shifted, and he realised that he had been enchanted. Raimund fled the court 
and secluded himself in a remote cave, hoping to atone for his misdeeds. While hearing 
the tale, Ubaldo recognizes Raimund as the companion of his youth: Ubaldo is the very 
man Raimund mistakenly believes that he killed. Ubaldo informs Raimund that he has 
been ensnared in a fantasy: the woman Raimund pursued into the forest was the 
supernatural dou le of U aldo’s wife, and Raimund never actually attempted to murder 
Ubaldo. Upon hearing this, Raimund despairs of his confused and misspent life and 
flees from Ubaldo. The music that initially lured him into the forest resurfaces, 
enthralling him once again, and the tale ends with the utter dissolution of Raimund’s 
familiar world:  
His castle, the mountains, and the whole world sank darkly 
behind him. 
   
‘Rich, full greetings of love  
  Do the horn calls offer you. 
  Come, oh come! Before they fade away!’  
 
It echoed again – and, lost in madness, poor Raimund went 
away into the forest after the sounds and was never seen 
again.
233
 
 
                                                 
233
 “Sein Schloβ, die Berge und die ganze Welt versank dämmernd hinter ihm.  
 »Reichen, vollen Liebesgrüβ 
 Bietet dir der Hörner Schallen.  
 Komm, ach komm! Eh sie verhallen!« 
Hallte es wider – und, im Wahnsinn verloren, ging der arme Raimund den Klängen nach in den Wald 
hinein und ward niemals mehr wiedergesehen.”  Eichendorff, “Die Zau erei im Herbste,” in Das Marmorbild 
und andere Erzählungen (Zürich: Diogenes Verlag, 2005), 27. Translation mine.  
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The music of the horn calls, like the forest, seems to exist in the overlap between two 
worlds, signalling their momentary alignment and the possibility of passage between 
them. The horns appear only briefly in his world, and then fade into obscurity. The 
 oundary crossed throughout “Magic in Autumn” is not only the verge of the forest. 
Eichendorff’s story ends with the rupturing of  oundary  etween fantasy and reality.  
 
The Tones of the Waldhorn and Distant Song 
In “Magic in Autumn,” the tones of the waldhorn awaken intense longing in Raimund, a 
yearning that ultimately propels him to abandon the known world. Yet these tones act 
more strongly than simply arousing an emotion; they also usher Raimund from the 
domain of reality to that of fantasy. While the role of the waldhorn, symbol of the 
musical component of Waldromantik, is multidimensional in early nineteenth-century 
German literature, our current understanding of the waldhorn in music (and its 
representative, horn fifths or the waldhorn topic) falls flat in comparison.
234
 By 
examining the role of the waldhorn in literary works and creating a  composite portrait 
of its significance, I will refine our notion of the horn’s possi le musical connotations.  
 In early nineteenth-century music, horn fifths are most commonly understood as 
distance tropes, and more specifically, the distance of a pastora l or woodland landscape 
                                                 
234
 Jeffrey Perry suggests that the term “Waldhorn topic” is preferable to horn fifths, since the former 
does not imply that music evocative of the horn is limited to fifths textures. Jeffrey Perry, “The 
Wanderer's Many Returns: Schubert's Variations Reconsidered ,” The Journal of Musicology  19 (2002): 
407. 
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or of subjects within that landscape.
235
 As a metaphorical extension of distance into the 
realm of personal time and experience, horn fifths act as symbols of memory. Charles 
Rosen cites Schu ert’s “Der Linden aum” from Winterreise as an instance in which 
horn fifths signify “distance, a sence, and regret,” and remarks upon the presence of a 
similar horn call figure in the opening of Beethoven’s Les Adieux, which presumably 
creates an analogous impression.
236
 For Rosen, these connotations arise from the new, 
more central role of landscape in the literary and visual arts: he suggests that the horn 
call motives “appear in Schu ert and Beethoven with a novel aura of the su lime and 
the melancholy derived from the new ambitions of landscape painters and poets.”237 
These  ualities are only em ryonic in C. F. D. Schu art’s Ideen zu einer Ästhetik der 
Tonkunst, where the horn is described as almost never expressing pathos or the truly 
great, but rather that its versatile character is most often turned towards soft and sweet 
articulations, tender plaints, and awakening echoes.
238
 And yet, if the early nineteenth-
century notion of the waldhorn turns further inwards from here, reading Schu art’s 
echoes as reminiscences, Schubart also distances himself from the horn’s earlier 
associations. Some three  uarters of a century earlier, around the time of Bach’s 
Brandenburg Concerti, waldhorns are linked to the pomp of a royal hunting expedition, 
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 Robert S. Hatten, Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), 56. Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation 
(Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1995), 135. 
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 Rosen, The Romantic Generation, 116-17. 
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 “How much of its effect is due to its individual sonority and how much to its associations with the 
poetry of the time we can only speculate (and its frequent appearance in verse must have been due to 
the sonority of the hunting horns as well as to the experience of hearing them from a distance in the 
forest).” Rosen, The Romantic Generation, 135. 
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 C.F.D. Schubart, Ideen zu einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst (Stuttgart: J. Schei le’s Buchhandlung, 1839), 317. 
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a sonic counterpart to the heraldry in which their image is featured.
239
 For Schubart, 
however, the pageantry and importance of these connotations is only peripheral to the 
identity of the waldhorn. We will return to this ever-heightening interiority of the horn 
in the second half of the chapter.  
 Early nineteenth-century writers were often sensitive to the changes in 
instrument technology that modified the uses and connotations of instruments. Claudia 
Albert notes that Tieck took note of the innovations made to the horn in the years 
around 1790, which shifted the horn, somewhat, from an instrument associated with 
hunting and the military to a symbol of secrecy. These changes, naturally, also affected 
the tone of the horn, which afterwards was sometimes compared to a mixed sound, as 
though the flute and viola were playing in unison.
240
 This quality of sonic mixing is 
reflected in the uncertainty characters experience when identifying perceived sounds. In 
Tieck’s Eckbert the Fair (Der blonde Eckbert), the sound of the waldhorn mixed with a 
shawm is the description offered for a strange vocal emission. When Bertha recounts 
her first arrival at the old woman’s hut, the uncanniness of the locale is dramatised 
through music:  
As we decscended the hill, I heard a marvellous song that 
seemed to come from the hut, as though from a bird.  It sang 
the following: 
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 Horace Fitzpatrick, “The Waldhorn and its Associations in Bach’s Time,” R. M. A. Research 
Chronicle 3 (1963): 51-54. 
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“Forest solitude 
That pleases me 
Tomorrow as it does today 
Through to eternity 
Oh how it pleases me 
Forest solitude” 
 
These few words were steadfastly repeated; if I had to 
describe it, it was almost as though far in the distance 
waldhorns and shawms played against each other.
241
 
 
This scene is permeated with the types of uncanny behaviour that we have encountered 
in musical repertoire. In the confused sonorities of the waldhorn and shawms there is 
timbral juxtaposition and disorientation. The description of this sound signals the 
dissolution of boundaries, most immediately between different instruments, human 
voice, and animal voice. Furthermore, the sounds contain within themselves spatial 
bewilderment: the tones sound as though they were at a great distance, but are clearly 
emerging from the nearby hut. The steadfast repetition of the melody, too, is unsettling. 
This impression is intensified by its palindromic lyrical structure, which creates 
momentum and gives the impression of the potential for eternal recurrence. 
 The song reappears throughout the story, and most potently at the tale’s very 
end, when Eckbert encounters the old woman and learns that she has been pursuing him 
and Bertha in other guises: 
                                                 
241
 “Als wir vom Hügel hinuntergingen, hörte ich einen wunderbaren Gesang, der aus der Hütte zu 
kommen schien, wie von einem Vogel, es sang also:  
»Waldeinsamkeit 
Die mich erfreut,  
So morgen wie heut 
In ew’ger Zeit,  
O wie mich freut 
Waldeinsamkeit.« 
Diese wenigen Worte wurden beständig wiederholt; wenn ich es beschreiben soll, so war es fast, als 
wenn Waldhorn und Schalmeie ganz in der Ferne durcheinander spielen.”  Ludwig Tieck, Der blonde 
Eckbert, in Der blonde Eckbert, Der Runenberg (Stuttgart: Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, 2002), 9-10. 
 
  
147 
 
 
He climbed, dreaming, up a hill; it was as though he caught 
the sound of lively nearby barking, birches rustled against 
each other, and he heard a song with strange tones singing:  
 
“Forest solitude 
Pleases me again, 
No woe befalls me, 
Here lives no envy, 
Once again it pleases me: 
Forest solitude.” 
 
It now occurred to the consciousness, to the senses of 
Eckbert: he could not find his way out of the puzzle of 
whether he now dreamt, or whether he had dreamt before of 
a wife named Bertha; the most marvellous mixed itself with 
the most ordinary, the world around him was enchanted, and 
he was not capable of any thought, any memory.
242
 
 
The sound of the voice is once again mentioned here, even if the strange blend of 
waldhorn, shawm, human, and animal voice is not specified. But, here, this  uncanny 
sound also signals a cross-permeation of fantasy and reality, which become inextricably 
entangled for Eckbert – so much so, that it even obliterates memory.   
 If the sonority of the waldhorn plays a supporting role in the uncanniness of Der 
blonde Eckbert then Tieck’s novel Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen comes close to 
making the waldhorn a central character. Indeed, Tieck’s own play, Prince Zerbino; Or, 
the Voyage to Good Taste, pokes fun at the frequency with which the instrument is 
                                                 
242
 “Er stieg träumend einen Hügel hinan; es war, als wenn er ein nahes munteres Bellen vernahm, 
Birken säuselten dazwischen, und er hörte mit wunderlichen Tönen ein Lied singen:  
 »Waldeinsamkeit 
 Mich wieder freut,  
 Mir geschieht kein Leid,  
 Hier wohnt kein Neid, 
 Von neuem mich freut 
 Waldeinsamkeit.« 
Jetzt war es um das Bewusstsein, um die Sinne Eckberts geschehn; er konnte sich nicht aus dem Rätsel 
herausfinden, ob er jetzt träume, oder ehemals von einem Weibe Bertha geträumt habe; das 
Wunderbarste vermischte sich mit dem Gewöhnlichsten, die Welt um ihn her war verzaubert, und er 
keines Gedankens, keiner Erinnerung mächtig .” Tieck, Der blonde Eckbert, 24. 
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heard in that novel. After several other anthropomorphized instruments have taken their 
turn, the waldhorn speaks: 
Waldhorn: Hear how the forest speak to you. The songs of 
the trees… 
 
Nestor: (with his hand over the mouth of the horn) For God’s 
sake, be quiet now, for you are the most fatal of all of these 
instruments to me. There is a book that just came out, I think, 
Stern ald’s Wanderings, where every third word goes to the 
waldhorn, and again and again the waldhorn. Since then I am 
entirely sick of you. – I must go now. – One more glass of 
wine! Goodbye Mr. Table and Stool, and to you all my 
friends. My heart will never forget you.
243
 
 
To the reader of Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen, it might seem as though Nestor only 
 arely exaggerates the persistence of the instrument’s presence in the novel. The sound 
of the instrument, heard in the distance by the central characters, functions almost as a 
leitmotiv: it is an auditory signal of their deeper thoughts and emotions, voiced 
instrumentally before those sounds provoke them to speech.  
The waldhorn is often used in the novel to denote simple remembrance and 
longing, as suggested in the musical equivalence considered above. In one scene, Franz 
comes to a clearing in the forest and, recognising the place, remembers an incident from 
his youth when he encountered a young girl:  
The child, a charming blond girl, came to him and asked for 
his flowers. He gave them all to her without holding back his 
                                                 
243
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favourites for himself. In the meantime, an old servant blew 
on a waldhorn and brought forth tones that, at the time, rang 
out strangely wonderful to the ear of the young Franz. So 
passed a considerable time, in which he considered the full 
countenance of the child, which smiled at him and regarded 
him like a full moon. Then the stranger drew away again, and 
he awoke as though from a rapture to himself and to the 
ordinary sensations and emotions, the ordinary habits, the 
ordinary life from one day to the next. Throughout, the 
lovely tones of the waldhorn always resounded in his being 
[Existenz] and before him appeared glowing and blooming 
the sweet features of the child to whom he had given his 
flowers. Afterwards, he often reached out his hands to her in 
his sleep, since he thought that the girl leaned over him to 
give the flowers back.
244
 
 
In this passage, the waldhorn is initially established as being associated with the 
memory because it served as the acoustic backdrop to his first acquaintance with Marie, 
the young girl. However, past and present, outer and inner spaces are permeated by th e 
tones of the horn. When the horn calls return to him after that event, they sound in his 
inner being, calling forth memories, and his unconscious reaching gestures eloquently 
articulate his longing. In “Magic in Autumn,” too, prior to the revelation of the sinister 
forces taking hold of Raimund, the horn is employed as an emblem of distance (both 
across a unified landscape and from that environment) and longing: “Then suddenly I 
heard several forest horns which some distance away from the mountains seemed  to 
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 Das Kind, ein liebliches blondes Mädchen, kam zu ihm und bat um seine Blumen, er schenkte sie ihr 
alle, ohne selbst seine Lieblinge zurückzubehalten, indes ein alter Diener auf einem Waldhorne blies, 
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answer each other. Several voices accompanied them. Never before had music filled me 
with such wondrous longing as these tones did [...].
245
 
In other passages in Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen, the waldhorn is used to 
signify more than simple personal remembrance or distance. Here, the distance sheds 
connotations of landscape, and takes on the larger significance of the immeasurable 
distance between the ordinary world and the indistinct realm of the infinite. This 
metaphysical distance is given a supernatural cast when Raimund follows the sound of 
the waldhorn into the forest and is never seen again, and when the marvellous and 
ordinary  ecome intertwined in Eck ert’s consciousness,  ut it is depicted more 
explicitly, and is concerned with the finite/infinite relationship in the passage below. As 
in Rollet’s poem, music emerges gradually from the landscape, first in Rudolph’s 
reading of the stream’s rushing and the trees’ rustling as songs on the verge of 
comprehensibility, then in the blurred sounding of the horns: 
“Do you not often feel,” continued Rudolph, “a wonderful 
leap of your heart towards the fantastic and the strange? One 
cannot then ward off the dream-images, and from then on one 
expects a most strange continuation to our usual way of life. 
[...] Then it is as if the wood-stream wanted to voice its 
melody clearly, as if the trees lost their tongues, with which 
their rustlings would merge into lucid song. Now love begins 
to advance on distant flute-tones, the beating heart wants to 
fly towards it, the present is made magical as though through 
a powerful spell, and the shimmering minutes do not dare to 
fly away. A ring of well-being keeps us enclosed within its 
magical powers, and a new, transfigured being gleams like 
mysterious moonlight into our real life.” 
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 Eichendorff, “Magic in Autumn,”  Music in German Romantic Literature: A Collection of Essays, Reviews, 
and Stories, trans. Linda Siegel (Novato, CA: Elra Publications, 1983), 230. “Da hörte ich plötzlich 
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Sehnsucht erfüllt als diese Töne [...]” Eichendorff, “Die Zau erei im Her ste,” 13. 
  
151 
 
 
“Oh, you poet!” cried Franz, “If you weren’t so reckless, you 
would compose a great, miraculous poem, full of flickering 
brilliance and transforming sounds, full of will-o’-the-wisps 
and moonshine; I listen to you with pleasure, and my heart is 
already wonderfully moved  y these words.”  
 
Now they heard a poignant forest-music of intermingled 
horns sounding in the distance; they stood still and listened to 
hear whether it was fantasy or reality; but a melodic song 
streamed through the trees to them like a flowing brook, and 
Franz believed that the spirit world had suddenly unlocked 
itself to them because they perhaps, without knowing it, had 
found the great magic word; as if now the secret invisible 
stream steered its way to them and enveloped them in its 
currents.
246
 
 
Rudolph’s suggestion that, upon hearing the forest voices merge into the distant art 
music of the flute, “a new, transfigured  eing gleams like mysterious moonlight into 
our real life” initiates the recognition that, together, the space o f the forest and the 
fusion of natural sounds and art music are summoning the presence of the absolute into 
the sensuous world, clothed in the visible yet immaterial form of moonlight. Later in 
the passage, the conflation of nature, music, and the absolute  intensifies, with the 
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 “‘Fühlst du nicht oft’, fuhr Rudolph fort, ‘einen wunder aren Zug deines Herzens dem Wunder aren 
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Wundergedicht erschaffen, voll von gaukelndem Glanz und wandelnden Klängen, voll Irrlichter und 
Mondschimmer; ich höre dir mit Freuden zu, und mein Herz ist schon wunderbar von diesen Worten 
ergriffen.’ 
Nun hörten sie eine rührende Waldmusik von durcheinender spielenden Hörnern aus der Ferne; sie 
standen still und horchten, ob es Einbildung oder Wirklichkeit sei; aber ein melodischer Gesang quoll 
durch die Bäume ihnen wie ein rieselnder Bach entgegen, und Franz glaubte, die Geisterwelt habe sich 
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sie in seine Fluten aufgenommen.” Tieck, Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen, 854-55. 
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narration describing a song, wending through the forest like a stream, which takes on 
the power of the endless flow of the infinite. Furthermore, this last part of the passage, 
in which Franz feels as though they released this great tide  y happening upon “the 
great magic word”  ears a striking resem lance to Eichendorff’s lapidary poem, 
“Wünschelrute” (“Divining Rod,” 1838), which similarly descri es the awakening of 
the world to song: 
Schläft ein Lied in allen Dingen, There sleeps a song in all things 
Die da träumen fort und fort  That dream there on and on  
Und die Welt hebt an zu singen, And the world begins to sing 
Triffst du nur das Zauberwort. If you only find the magic word
247
 
 
Both Tieck’s prose and Eichendorff’s poem e uate song with the unified spirit of all 
things. The song awakened is the cross-permeation of the Absolute with materiality, 
where all matter resounds with spirit.  
 In German Romantic literature the significance of the waldhorn is multifaceted. 
In addition to signifying distance or its corollaries – longing (distance lamented) and 
memory (temporal distance) - the waldhorn can also denote metaphysical distance. 
More specifically, it announces the immanent merging of the physical and supernatural 
or infinite realms. Thus, in “Magic in Autumn” the horn not only reawakens Raimund’s 
desire to flee into the forest, but also indicates the opening of a temporary portal. This 
passage allows him to step into an enchanted realm and then closes, causing the castle 
and mountains to disappear behind him and sealing him away from the world. In Der 
blonde Eckbert, both Bertha and Eckbert hear an unearthly sound like a mingled 
waldhorn and shawm when they encounter supernatural beings and cannot distinguish 
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between fantasy and reality. And in Franz Sternbald’s Wanderungen , waldhorns herald 
the streaming of the infinite into the landscape of the forest. 
The waldhorn, then, denotes distance and a personal reaction to that distance, 
whether it be spatial, temporal, or metaphysical. By extension, a similar meaning can be 
attributed to the self-conscious use of the horn or sonic representations of the 
instrument (such as horn fifths played on the piano) in musical works. Spatial and 
temporal distances, and their associated reactions of longing and memory, have 
previously  een acknowledged among the waldhorn’s connotations,  ut the waldhorn’s 
function of ushering fantasy or the infinite into the perceptible world, evident in 
literature, has not yet been acknowledged in music.  
  In the overture to We er’s Der Freischütz, the chorus of waldhorns bears a 
prominent position. After a mysterious opening eight measures in bare octaves, the 
violins take up a gently oscillating eighth-note motive supported by sustained lower 
strings, with the waldhorn chorus entering in the tenth measure (Example 15). The 
familiar quality of this music has been pointed out. Elmar Budde remarks that the 
formal periodic and cadential structure of this phrase is so simple that it is experienced 
as something long known.
248
  In a nationalistic sense, Richard Taruskin argues that the 
harmonic writing and range make this an equivalent style to that of the traditional 
Männerchor, organisations devoted to patriotic hymns and the like.
249
 Although Weber 
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works with conventional instruments, the choral singing texture of the horns imparts to 
it this vocal quality. This is in keeping with the depictions of waldhorn music in 
literature encountered above, which always emphasise the intermingled quality of their 
sound, whether among several horns or two different instruments, and sometimes even 
characterising the sound quality as strangely vocal . 
In a weak sense, the uncanniness of this music is suggested by the strong sense 
of recollection that it promotes and the confusion between voice and instrument 
inherent in the arrangement. It is familiar, but distorted, emerging as though from a 
distance. The sonority of the horns enhances this impression. It is characterised by the 
blur and echo of reminiscence, a feature that Weber highlights through his string 
writing, which envelops the horns in a sonic haze.  However, I would also suggest that 
this music evokes the stronger sense of the uncanny that is shared by music and the 
woods, and that is thematised in the literary works explored above; that is, that the 
horns creating a sense of distance that also carries metaphysical implications. 
The waldhorn loudly announces in Prince Zerbino: “Hear how the forest speak to 
you.”250 In the Overture to Der Freischütz, emerging from the solemnity and stillness of 
the opening motives, I hear the waldhorn music as heralding the forest as the uncanny 
territory that opens to the absolute. That is, I understand this music as behaving as 
Eichendorff and, especially, Tieck lead us to expect.  In parallel to the presentation of 
the waldhorn music in Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen, when “Franz believed that the 
spirit world had suddenly unlocked itself to them because they perhaps, without  
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Example 15: Weber, Der Freischütz, Overture, measures 1-18. 
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Example 15 continued: Weber, Der Freischütz, Overture, measures 19-40. 
 
knowing it, had found the great magic word,”251 this music carries with it a sense of 
boundless expansion and secrets unlocked. In the instance of this Overture, the forest’s 
waldhorn music (in itself already a synecdochal symbol for the absolute) is linked with 
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the ombra topic. This connection intensifies the association of the forest with the 
infinite by coupling the music of the woods and distance with a topic that indicates the 
merging of the finite and infinite worlds. In measures twenty-five to thirty-six, ombra 
references, including tremolo strings, chromaticism, dynamic shifts, and off -beat 
timpani strikes, succeed the music of the horn quartet. Thus, Weber moves immediately 
from the waldhorn music, which thematises the forest and music as collaborative 
symbols for the infinite, to a purely musical distillation of this idea.  
 
Thresholds 
In the preceding chapters, I developed the idea of the uncanny permeation of the 
Absolute into music in the early nineteenth century, of music’s position at the 
boundaries of the finite and infinite, and its ability to act as a threshold which gives  
passage between these two states of being. If a short reminiscence is permitted, we will 
return for an instant to the mythology of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. Scott Burnham, 
retelling Schindler’s tale of fate knocking at the door and drawing on E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s review, argues for a dual interpretation of musical thresholds. For him, the 
symphony foregrounds not only the intrusion of the supersensible into music, but also a 
supernatural presence at one’s doorway: 
Hoffmann’s intimation that a supernatural voice finds 
expression in the Fifth Symphony has been seconded by 
anyone taking to heart Schindler’s story a out Fate knocking  
at the door. For this story perfectly sums up the terror of the 
opening: a supernatural presence has appeared here below, is 
at one’s very door, and demands entry into that most 
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personal manifestation of the human sphere, the home. The 
supernatural and the human are face to face[.]
252
 
 
Only in Schindler’s narrative, however, does the unearthly  eing demand  admittance to 
the home, for there is nothing domestic a out Beethoven’s symphony. While the 
intrusion of an infinite presence into music bears abundant uncanny impact, let us not 
magnify it by pretending that this supposed knocking transports to our cozy households, 
where we are entirely taken aback by this unforeseen visitor.  
 A central concern of this study has been to establish a distinction between the 
sublime and the uncanny. The sublime, as I have argued, does not cross thresholds, 
whether figurative or literal. It brings the finite to the verge of the infinite, but does not 
allow passage between the two. And, musically, it remains in the public spher e and 
flourishes in the symphony, oratorio, and opera.
253
 It does not come knocking on your 
door, seeking admittance to your private realm. The musical uncanny, far less fixed 
than the sublime, does not share these boundaries. While, as we have seen, it also  
inhabits the large genres and expansive performing forces, it does not require their 
dynamic potential. The uncanny is the meeting of oppositions, where even the domestic 
has the potential to open expansively into the utterly foreign.  
 The notion that the Lied, the most domestic and even feminine of genres, might 
claim a vantage point on the absolute seems absurd when framed in terms of the 
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aesthetics of the sublime. How would the Lied – diminutive, private, lacking in dynamic 
power or considerable scale – aspire to this magnitude?254 Yet, the musical uncanny, in 
opposition to the sublime, does not activate through representation. The exception to 
this principle, as we saw in the third chapter, is when a piece of music reflects on itself 
by foregrounding one of its components as musical in a way that is foreign to the 
remainder. Thus, ombra passages intrude into instrumental works from the realm of 
opera, acting in a self-consciously musical manner and redirecting their significance 
from pointing to an external phenomenon to that of music itself. In domestic music, the 
waldhorn topic functions in a similar way. Distanced from its natural performing forces 
and reassigned to the piano, the waldhorn topic becomes at once a self -reflexive 
representation of music and, like its literary counterparts, an imagined sound.  
 When Elmar Budde summarises the appeal of the forest for domestic music, he 
explains that not only the potential for imitating the soundscape of the forest, but also 
the state of innerness and prayerfulness that the forest inspire make them an irresistible 
theme.
255
 While this is indeed the mode of woodland experience in many works that I 
have explored throughout this chapter, its allure is not always so tame. In 1841, Fanny 
Mendelssohn Hensel composed three Lieder, sometimes regarded as a miniature song 
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cycle, to a small group of poems called Anklänge (Reminiscenses) from Joseph von 
Eichendorff’s collection Sängerleben (A Singer’s Life).256 Although all three songs 
reflect on woodland experiences, the third song, in particular, constitutes a musical 
manifestation of the ideas encountered in Waldromantik literature throughout this 
chapter. In the text of the third song, fleeing to the forest is identified with lifting 
oneself up to the brilliance of the heavens, such that the final line of text, the seemingly 
irrational wish to “fly eternally forest-ward,” is read as a longing to draw more and 
more into the unconditioned.  
 The waldhorn topic is suggested textually in the lines “Hörnerklang und Lieder 
kämen / Nicht so schmerzlich an mein Herz” (Horn-sounds and songs would come / Not 
so painfully to my heart), which form the epicentre of the lyric and Mendelsson 
Hensel’s setting. Indeed, it is possible that Mendelssohn Hensel restructured this text in 
order to feature music as the kernel of its expression (she divided one of Eichendorff’s 
poems into the two texts for Anklänge II and III). This is certainly what her setting 
suggests, as these two lines receive exceptional treatment.  
Anklänge (Reminiscences) III 
Könnt ich zu den Wäldern flüchten,  If I could flee to the forest, 
Mit dem Grün in frischer Lust   With the greenery in fresh delight 
Mich zum Himmelsglanz aufrichten --  Lift myself up to the heavens’  rilliance - -  
Stark und frei wär da die Brust!   Strong and free would my breast be there! 
 
Hörnerklang und Lieder kämen   Horn-sounds and songs would come 
Nicht so schmerzlich an mein Herz,  Not so painfully to my heart, 
Fröhlich wollt ich Abschied nehmen,  I would take my leave happily, 
Zög auf ewig wälderwärts.    Would fly eternally forest-ward.
257
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While this is a text about the absence of the forest, it is a knowing absence. The 
protagonist has experienced the forest as access to the absolute and suffers painful 
recognition of the horn calls that symbolise it musically. 
 The “Hörnerklang” section in the song prominently signals its discontinuity from 
the rest of the Lied. Set off by a fermata, this section abruptly shifts from fortissimo to 
pianissimo dynamics and gradually moves from C major to A minor through semitone-
motion in measure forty-five. The new accompaniment texture is even more striking, 
leaving behind the exuberant arpeggiations of the remainder of the song in favour of 
pulsing sixteenth-note chords in the first half of the “Hörnerklang” section, and an inner 
pedal-E surrounded by exposed outer notes evoking the horn in the second half 
(Example 16). Mendelssohn Hensel’s horn evocations differ from the traditional 
clearly-voiced fifths. As though recalling the confusing listening experience in G erman 
romantic literature, where horn sounds are perceived as a blend and collision of 
instruments, this passage moves from closely-voiced dissonances to parallel intervals, 
maintaining throughout an urgent and unavoidable pulse.In this passage, Mendelssoh n 
Hensel also features melodic allusions to both her earlier piano work Abschied von Rom 
(1840)
258
 and the first Anklänge song, intensifying the horn’s association with memory 
and referring to experience of the infinite that takes place in Anklänge I.
259
 
                                                 
258
 Todd, Fanny Hensel: The Other Mendelssohn, 272. 
259
 In contrast to the third song, Eichendorff’s poem featured in the first Anklänge song involves 
conventional sublime elements: the poet speaks of great heights, mountain -tops, and bird flight.  
However, at the epicentre of the lyric, the poem’s romanticism reveals itself.  In the concluding lines of 
the second verse – “Sind denn nicht die Far en Töne / Und die Töne  unte Schwingen ” (“Are not the 
colours tones / And the tones colourful wings ”) – colours, tones, and wings are mingled in a 
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Example 16: Mendelssohn Hensel, Anklänge III (1841), measures 41-58. 
                                                                                                                                                             
unassuming little birds. Through song, they disclose the power of music, reminding the protagonist that 
tones are colourful wings: music is flight. 
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 These allusions, along with the evocations of the horn, recall the horn’s 
association with memory, only that here, music is the subject and not only the catalyst 
of the reminiscences. The uncanniness of the horn call is compounded by the 
protagonist’s experience of it as a memory. This is a clear instance of music that the 
protagonist wishes to repress, but which is nevertheless rising in her consciousness. It is 
a return of the repressed, where music is the repressed element that resurfaces as 
distorted allusions amidst an eerie pulsating texture.
260
 The waldhorn, here, moves even 
further inwards, appearing in the song as a transformed memory heard only in the 
interiority of the protagonist.
 
 Fanny Mendelssohn Hensel’s Anklänge songs recall the potent mixture of 
longing – for the past, for the forest, and for passage to the infinite – displayed in Franz 
Sternbalds Wanderungen: 
 “Must these tones plague me throughout my entire life ” 
sighed Franz; “if I am satisfied and at peace with myself for 
once, then they penetrate like a hostile swarm in my 
innermost soul and again rouse sick children, memories and 
unfamiliar longing. Then it surges in my heart as though I 
should fly over as if on wings, high up over the clouds, and 
from up above fill my breast with new, beautiful sounds, and 
sate my languishing spirit with the highest, ultimate well -
being. I want to stream through the whole world with songs 
of love, to touch the moonshine and the rosy dawn, that they 
resound with my sorrow and my joy, that trees, branches, 
leaves, and grasses take up the melody, so that all playing my 
song must repeat it as though with a million tongues
261
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The uncanny experience of the intermingling of finite and infinite  tears Franz from his 
mundane and individual experience. Like Franz, the protagonist of these songs is 
catalysed by musical events (bird song, the musical sounds of the wind and forest, horn 
calls, and songs) to seek out the kernel of being. But whereas music, of course, can only 
exist verbally in Waldromantik literature, Mendelssohn Hensel causes music to function 
in a varied and exceptionally sophisticated manner in her Anklänge songs. In these 
songs, music reaches into the past through musical reminiscences, expanding the song 
temporally. Horn call motives refer to the space of the forest and suggest 
instrumentation beyond the literal piano-vocal combination of the Lied. These songs, 
then, are not only uncanny in the sense that they thematise music’s a il ity to reveal the 
infinite, but also because they belie the heimlich trappings of the Lied genre, expanding 
infinitely from a drawing room into the unknown realm of the forest. 
 
Cozy 
The journey from the homeland into the unknown is a foundational motive o f 
Romanticism, and this expedition often leads to the exploration of uncanny terrain – 
both physical and psychological, according to Niels Werber.
262
 While I agree with 
Werber, I would argue for a less distinct division of the homeland from the unknown, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Gemüt, und wecken die kranken Kinder, Erinnerung und unbekannte Sehnsucht wiede r auf. Dann drängt 
es mir im Herzen als wenn ich wie auf Flügeln hinüberfliegen sollte, höher über die Wolken hinaus, 
und von oben herab meine Brust mit neuem, schöneren Klange anfüllen, und meinen schmachtenden 
Geist mit dem höchsten, letzten Wohllaut ersättigen. Ich möchte die ganze Welt mit Liebesgesang 
durchströmen, den Mondschimmer und die Morgenröte anrühren, daβ sie mein Leid und Glück 
widerklingen, daβ die Melodie Bäume, Zweige, Blätter und Gräser ergreife, damit alle spielend mein 
Lied wie mit Millionen Zungen wiederholen müβten.’-” Tieck, Franz Sternbalds Wanderungen , 869-70. 
 
262
 Werber, “Gestalten des Unheimlichen. Seine Struktur und Wirkung bei Eichendorff und Hoffmann,” 23. 
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and for a greater blurring, one might say, of the heimlich and unheimlich. For what 
happens when Wer er’s expedition is dispensed with altogether, or takes place in the 
miniscule gesture of fingers striking piano keys? In performing or listening to Fanny 
Mendelssohn Hensel’s Anklänge song, a collision of known and unknown elements, 
inner and outer spaces, and domestic and wild sounds is experienced.  Indeed, 
Mendelssohn Hensel’s song would seem to  e a radical statement against the gendered 
containment that Richard Leppert descri es in “Sexual Identity, Death, and the Family 
Piano.” Leppert relates a motto found on a harpsichord, which reads “‘Ar or eram vilis 
 uondam sed viva tace am / Nunc  ene si tangor mortua dulce sono’ (I was once an 
ordinary tree, although living I was silent; now, although dead, if I am well played, I 
sound sweetly).”263 Mendelssohn Hensel’s song reads as defiantly straining against  oth 
the gendered implications encapsulated in the motto (her heroine’s mission is escape to 
the woods and her song is hardly sweet) and its opposition of natural sounds and art 
music. For Mendelssohn Hensel, the piano produces the sounds of the forest through its 
imitation of the waldhorn, and the forest is never silent.  
In E. T. A. Hoffman’s “Gedanken über den hohen Wert der Musik” from 
Kreisleriana, the author satirises the conception of music as “ e uem,” or “cozy,” one 
of the chief indicators of heimlichkeit. For Hoffmann, writing as the fantastically 
eccentric Kapellmeister Kreisler, the notion that music can or should produce a 
“wonderfully cozy feeling”264 is rather insipid, and his distaste for the saccharine 
                                                 
263
 Richard Leppert, “Sexual Identity, Death, and the Family Piano,” 19th-Century Music 16 (1992), 
108. 
264
 E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Thoughts on the Great Value of Music,” Fantasy Pieces, trans. Joseph M. 
Hayse (Schenectady, New York: Union College Press, 1996) , 27. “Wunder ar  e uemen Reiz,” E. T. A. 
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cultural inclinations of the bourgeois is evident in his satirical depiction of the 
Biedermeier household:  
Now I shall lead even those of you with an incurable 
loathing for this noble art to the domestic hearth. Father, 
worn out by the serious exertions of the day, in housecoat 
and slippers contentedly puffs his pipe to ‘Chopsticks’ 
played by his oldest son. Noble little Rosie, on her part, 
having studied not only the ‘Dessauer March’  ut ’Bloom, 
sweet violet’ as well, plays so  eautifully that her mother’s 
transparent tears of joy fall on the stockings she is busy 
darning. Finally, wouldn’t the timid, hopeful croakings of his 
youngest offspring annoy him were it not that the noise of 
the darling children’s music keeps everything in key and 
tempo?
265
 
 
Here, music is rendered yet another household object, suitable for a sphere in which the 
piano was essentially regarded as sound-producing furniture.
266
 The musical 
performances of the children act as background music for their father, or encourage the 
cheap sentimentality of their sock-darning mother. Music is regulative, rather than 
emancipating: it marshals the children’s’ natural impulses for sound into stric t key and 
tempo; mother’s tears fall in time.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Hoffmann, “Gedanken ü er den hohen Wert der Musik,” Fantasiestücke in Callots Manier (Frankfurt 
am Main: Insel Verlag, 1967), 32. 
265
 Hoffmann, “Thoughts on the Great Value of Music,” 28.  “Euch, ihr heillosen Verächter der edlen 
Kunst, führe ich nun in den häuslichen Zirkel, wo der Vater, müde von den ernsten Geschäften des 
Tages, im Schlafrock und in Pantoffeln fröhlich und guten Muts zum Murki seines ältesten Sohnes 
seine Pfeife raucht. Hat das ehrliche Röschen nicht bloß seinetwegen den Dessauer Marsch und »Blühe 
liebes Veilchen« einstudiert, und trägt sie es nicht so schön vor, daß der Mutter die hellen 
Freudentränen auf den Strumpf fallen, den sie eben stopft? Würde ihm nicht endlich das 
hoffnungsvolle, aber ängstliche Gequäke des jüngsten Sprößlings beschwerlich fallen, wenn nicht der 
Klang der lie en Kindermusik das Ganze im Ton und Takt hielte ”  Hoffmann, “Gedanken über den 
hohen Wert ser Musik,” 32-33. 
266
 James Parakilas, Piano Roles: Three Hundred Years of Life with the Piano  (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 78. 
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 Hoffmann’s satirical depiction (in the voice of Kreisler) of  ourgeois music as 
heimlich, in the word’s uncorrupted sense - as comfortable, contained, and 
undemanding – stands in utter opposition to Mendelssohn Hensel’s Anklänge song. Of 
course, Hoffmann’s portrayal is deli erately a surd, for he feels the “high worth” of 
music far beyond its banal role as background music for sock darning. While Fanny 
Mendelssohn Hensel’s songs are domestic in terms of genre, we might conceive of them 
as far more uncanny than a supernatural  eing appearing at one’s doorway, for instead, 
these Lieder cause the drawing room to vanish darkly, supplanted by the sacred, 
ominous chambers of the forest: The piano opens into the ringing sound of a horn call. 
The tones of the horn, in turn, recall distant memories, the landscape of the forest, and 
the dark intermingling of mystical and mundane.   
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5 
 
The Music of the Living-Dead 
 
 
The act of instrumental performance creates a grotesque amalgamation of forms and 
beings, a living-dead juxtaposition of breath and metal, wood, sinew, and string. As with so 
much of the musical uncanny in the early nineteenth century, the notion and representation 
of instrumental performance (and, by extension, of the instrument itself) veers from the 
prosaic to the fantastic, ranging from the most subtle suggestion that ordinary musical acts 
carry traces of weirdness, to the over-magnification of these traces to the point of utter 
transformation. Let us begin with the everyday reality of instrumental performance, as 
represented by a sketch of renowned string  ass player Antonio Dall’Occa  y E. T. A. 
Hoffmann (Example 17). 
Appearing in a personal letter from Hoffmann to Hofrath Rochlitz from 12 
September 1820, the sketch caricatures the virtuoso in performance, as related by 
Hoffmann’s la el: “Dall’ Occa Conzertspielend.”  267 However, the strange posture of the 
bassist in relation to his instrument and the peculiar composition of the various elements of 
the sketch demonstrate that the artist’s imagination is at play in the  
                                                 
267
 E.T.A. Hoffmann, E.T.A. Hoffmanns Briefwechsel: Gesammelt und erläutert von Hans von Müller 
und Friedrich Schnapp , volume II, ed. Friedrich Schnapp (Munich: Winkler-Verlag, 1967), 270-71 and 
plate facing 272. 
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Example 17: Sketch  y E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Dall’Occa Conzertspielend.”  
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illustration. The  ass dominates the drawing: the performer’s torso is all  ut hidden  ehind 
the bulk of the instrument, replaced by the more resonant body of the string bass, and his 
head and arm integrate themselves into the curved sides of the body. While the 
disem odied hand and heads floating around the central figure are most likely Hoffmann’s 
workings-out of the sketch, they also seem to suggest weird reconfigurations of the human-
instrument body. Witnessing, for example, the strange juxtaposition of the human head 
with the  ass’s peg- ox, one can easily imagine the  ass’ neck supplanting the human one.  
This sketch, even though it reads as caricature, opens up questions as to the nature 
of early nineteenth-century German conceptions of musical instruments and their 
relationships with the individuals that play them. What we see in this sketch is the barest 
hint of the idea that, through the process of creating music, the human body and the 
instrumental form come together, merging to create a grotesque new being. The image, 
however, gives no insinuation of the inner process that complements this physical 
transformation, a process that was theorised quite widely and even quasi-scientifically in 
nineteenth-century aesthetics, and that captured the imaginations of the literary writers of 
the time, prompting the fantastic transformations to which I alluded above. It is in the 
Lieder of the early to mid-nineteenth century, though, that this concept revels most fully in 
its fundamental ambiguity: the either/or of living/dead, human/instrument, and soul/sound. 
In this chapter, I chart the transformation of this idea through the genres of aesthetics, 
literature, and song – though, true to nineteenth century form, the boundaries of these 
genres are hardly firm. Although the progression from one genre to another is roughly 
chronological, the development in which I am most interested, as al luded to above, is the 
ever more obscure point of division between human and instrument. This boundary, when it 
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refuses to be pin-pointed, permits the instrument to exist suspended in an ambiguous 
living-dead state. 
Throughout this dissertation, the confusion of instrument and voice has been a 
recurring theme. In Hoffmann’s review the timpani’s “heavy, dissonant  lows” are “like 
a strange and dreadful voice”; Bertha hears singing that sounds like the blending of 
waldhorns and shawms in Der blonde Eckbert; and Weber voices his horn quartet like a 
Männerchor in the Overture of Der Freischütz. In contrast to the argument in the 
dissertation thus far, the uncanniness of the instrument does not arise from the symbolic 
relationship that I outlined in the first chapter, in which music is the synecdochal 
symbol for the absolute. However, it does arise from the same symbolic principle. As I 
will demonstrate through readings of literary and aesthetic works, the uncanniness of 
the instrument arises from it being understood as a symbol for the soul of the performer, 
and for the confusion between the categories of animate and inanimate that this 
symbolic relationship engenders.   
 
The Living-Dead Thing 
When the title character of Hoffmann’s story “Councillor Krespel,” describes his violin as 
a “dead thing, to which I, myself, only first gave life and voice,”268 he draws comparisons 
to a strange coinage that appears elsewhere in his writings, the striking turn of phrase 
“le endigtote Dinger,” or “living-dead things.” Hoffmann employs this expression to 
describe the myriad mechanical figures (human automata, a hen, a flock of parrots) 
                                                 
268
 “tote Ding, dem ich selbst doch nur erst Le en und Laut ge e.”  E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Rat Krespel,” 
E.T.A. Hoffmann Werke , volume II (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1967) , 235. All translations of 
“Rat Krespel” are mine.  
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belonging to Severino in The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat Murr.
269
 He also uses the 
expression to describe the uncanny allure of the Turkish fortune-telling automaton in the 
story “Automata.” In that story, Ludwig expresses his distaste for human automata – those 
“true statues of a living death or a dead life” - for they “replicate a person less than they 
mimic the human.”270 In the instance of these automata, their paradoxical living-dead status 
is caused by the disjunction between their mechanical materials and their convincingly 
human acts. As Ludwig points out, their movement is strictly an exterior phenomenon: 
lacking inner activity, they yet provide a simulacrum of life. 
The state of confusion caused by an encounter with something that is living/dead or 
animate/inanimate is one of the long-established causes of uncanniness. In the precursor to 
Freud’s “Das Unheimliche,” Ernst Jentsch’s 1906 essay “On the Psychology of the 
Uncanny,” the author states: 
                                                 
269
 “My child,” said the Master, in his grave manner, “my child, something  eautiful and wonderful,  ut 
it is not good for you to learn of it. However, let these devices here, alive yet dead, go through their 
tricks while I tell you all that is necessary and useful for you to know a out on certain su jects.” E. T. 
A. Hoffmann, The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat Murr: Together with a Fragmentary Biography of 
Kapellmeister Johannes Kreisler on Random Sheets of Waste Paper, trans. Anthea Bell (London: 
Penguin, 1999), 301. “‘Kind’, erwiderte der Meister in seiner ernsten Manier, ‘Kind, etwas Schönes 
und Wunder ares, a er es taugt nicht recht, daβ du es erfährst. Doch! – Laβ die lebendigtoten Dinger 
hier ihre Faxen ausspielen, während ich dir von manchem soviel vertraue, als dir zu wissen nötig und 
nützlich.’” Hoffmann, Lebensansichten des Katers Murr  in E.T.A. Hoffmann Werke , volume III 
(Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1967), 471.  Ernst Lichtenhahn believes that the passage from Kater 
Murr is in reference to musical instruments, but it clearly refers to automatons. Ernst Lichtenhahn, 
“‘Le endigtote Dinger’: Zur romantischen Auffassung von Musikinstrumente und Klangwirklichkeit,” 
in Festschrift Hans Conradin zum 70. Geburtstag, series: Publikationen der Schweizerischen 
Musikforschenden Gesellschaft. Series II, Vol. 33, ed. Volker Kalisch, Ernst Meier, Joseph Willimann, 
and Alfred Zimmerlin (Bern and Stuttgart: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1983), 72.  
 
270
 “‘Mir sind,’ sagte Lugwig, ‘alle solche Figuren, die dem Menschen nicht sowohl nachge ildet sind, 
als das Menschliche nachäffen, diese wahren Standbilder eines lebendigen Todes oder eines toten 
Le ens, im höchsten Grade zuwider.’.” E.T.A. Hoffmann, “Die Automate,” E. T. A. Hoffmann Werke II 
(Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1967), 354. Katherine Hirt provides an interesting evaluation of this 
remark in the context of Hoffmann’s estimation of automatic musical production. Katherine Hirt,  When 
Machines Play Chopin: Musical Spirit and Automation in Nineteenth-Century German Literature  
(Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2010), 36. 
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Among all the psychical uncertainties that can become an original 
cause of the uncanny feeling, there is one in particular that is able 
to develop a fairly regular, powerful and very general effect: 
namely, doubt as to whether an apparently living being is animate 
and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in 
fact be animate - and more precisely, when this doubt only makes 
itself felt obscurely in one's consciousness.
271
 
 
For Jentsch, this specific type of uncanny feeling can be created by imitations of the human 
body, such as wax figures and automata, particularly when this similitude is enhanced by 
an apparent capability for the physical actions or mental processes of a human being. In 
particular, Jentsch cites automatons that can play a musical instrument or dance,
272
 an 
o servation that corresponds to the greater part of Hoffmann’s uses of “le endigtot.” It is 
telling, though perhaps unsurprising, given the popularity of musical automata, that Jentsch 
cites musical production as an indicator of humanness in these devices. By playing music, 
the automaton demonstrates that it is capable of performing the movements necessary to 
the task: the pianist-automaton’s fingers dance across the keyboard, the flutist-automaton 
purses its lips. Musical activity also confronts Ludwig’s o jections to automata, for beyond 
mechanical motions, the ability to make music usually also implies cognition and 
sensibility. The sound produced is a confirmation of the unseen workings within the robotic 
musician. Freud, however, finds himself not entirely convinced  y Jentsch’s statement that 
an uncanny feeling can be traced to intellectual uncertainty, even that which pertains to the 
                                                 
271
 Ernst Jentsch, “On the psychology of the uncanny (1906),”  trans. Roy Sellars, Angelaki 2, no. 1 
(1997), 11. 
272
 Jentsch, “Zur psychologie des Unheimlichen,” Psychiatrisch-Neurotogische Wochenschrift 8, Nos. 
22-23 (1906) 203. 
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animation or lack thereof of a being or object.
273
 He nonetheless accepts the uncanniness of 
automatons, connecting this to the infantile wish for dolls to be alive.
274
  
A music instrument, unlike an automaton, does not simulate life through the 
mimicry of human behaviours; nevertheless, for Hoffmann and others it is more than a 
lifeless mechanism. Lacking human imitation, both in form and in deeds, how is it that 
musical instruments fall into the same uncanny existential status as those automatic beings: 
living,  ut dead  Hoffmann’s elucidation of the instrument’s role  egins to satisfy this 
question for us. In Kreisleriana, Hoffmann envisions music as a vivifying force that, 
dormant in the hearts of humans, finds its articulation through the body of the instrument. 
Hoffmann writes: 
Music is everywhere. Notes - that is, melodies that speak the higher 
language of the realm of spirits - repose only in the hearts of men. But 
does not the spirit of music, like the spirit of tones, permeate all nature? 
The mechanically agitated body vibrates and resounds, wakens to life and 
expresses its existence; or, rather, its inner organism steps forth into our 
consciousness.
275
 
 
Hoffmann’s choice of words is noteworthy. He writes that musical notes “repose [ruhen] 
only in the hearts of men.” The word ruhen implies not merely that music is situated in the 
hearts of men,  ut rather that there it rests, sleeps, or reposes. Thus, while music’s origin is 
                                                 
273
 Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 250-54. 
274
 Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 256-57. 
275
 E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Johannes Kreisler’s Apprentice Letter,” Fantasy Pieces, trans. Joseph M. Hayse 
(Schenectady, New York: Union College Press, 1996), 293. “Der Ton wohnt ü erall, die Töne, das 
heißt die Melodien, welche die höhere Sprache des Geisterreichs reden, ruhen nur in der Brust des 
Menschen. – Aber geht denn nicht, so wie der Geist des Tons, auch der Geist der Musik  durch die 
ganze Natur? Der mechanisch affizierte tönende Körper spricht, ins Leben geweckt, sein Dasein aus, 
oder vielmehr sein innerer Organismus tritt im Bewußtsein hervor.” E. T. A. Hoffmann, “Johannes 
Kreislers Lehr rief,” Fantasiestücke in Callots Manier (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1967), 275.  
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in the heart, there it remains dormant, inactive. It is only through the mechanically affected 
resounding body that it is able to awaken and make itself known.
276
 The foreign body of the 
instrument is the chamber in which the resting resonances of the heart are amplified and 
externalized, both revealing the music of the heart and imparting the instrument with an 
echo of human interiority. The musical instrument, then, is a latently animate object. 
Resting, it is only so much dead matter,  ut once “mechanically agitated” it stirs to a 
semblance of being. Yet, not only does it become animate, but it also shares its essence  
with us: as Hoffmann writes, its “inner organism steps forth into our consciousness.”  
In terms of theories of the uncanny, then, the musical instrument occupies a more 
subtle position than does the automaton - musical or not. Bearing no resemblance to the 
human form, and inactive on its own (with the exception of certain oddities that sound 
without human agents, such as the Aeolian harp or the musical clock), the musical 
instrument primarily depends on the connotations of sound and the potential for sonic 
creation to lend it an aura of animation. Furthermore, as Hoffmann’s sketch of Dall’Occa 
implies, the uncanniness of the musical instrument lies, in part, in its capacity seemingly to 
merge with a living, performing body. By articulating human sentiments, the instrument 
masquerades as an extension to our animate bodies, making audible that which we are 
incapable of expressing without it.  
                                                 
276
 Of course, the body to which Kreisler refers need not be limited to the body of the instrument. Kreisler 
envisions a world in which music is evident in all of nature, and even evokes a synaesthetic exper ience of 
the world, such that even colours and odours could  e experienced as sounds. Hoffmann, “Johannes 
Kreislers Lehr rief,” 276. Nevertheless, musical instruments are the foremost instance of “mechanically 
agitated  ody” and, indeed, are created to waken sound, the very purpose that Kreisler so vividly describes.  
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The uncanny status of the musical instrument in early nineteenth-century German 
culture, then, is founded on two confusions: one spiritual, one physical. Although music 
does not play a role in theories of the uncanny, Freud’s thoughts on the external expression 
of something sensed only remotely in oneself are applicable in the musical context of 
instrumental performance. According to Freud, an external manifestation of a vaguely 
familiar ‒  ut not fully known ‒ impulse within oneself, when occurring in a  eing separate 
from oneself, accounts for the uncanniness of madness and other disorders, for the 
“ordinary person sees in them the workings of forces hitherto unsuspected in his fellow-
man but which at the same time he is dimly aware of in a remote corner of his own 
 eing.”277 In other words, the uncanniness of this situation stems from witnessing the 
exterior manifestation of a vague inner inclination. As argued above, the musical 
instrument functions in a parallel manner, giving outward expression to something not fully 
articulated in the soul of the performer. Furthermore, this situation causes a spiritual 
confusion ‒ a sharing of essences, as Hoffmann would have it ‒ where the music and the 
soul it represents cannot be solely attributed to either the performer or the instrument.  
The physical confusion builds from this spiritual uncertainty. Jentsch suggests that 
“the effect of the uncanny can easily  e achieved when one undertakes to reinterpret some 
kind of lifeless thing as a part of an organic creature, especially in anthropomorphic terms, 
in a poetic or fantastic way.”278 In the case of the instrument, this reinterpretation is based 
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 Freud, “The Uncanny,” 151. “der Laie sieht hier die Äußerung von Kräften vor sich, die er im 
Nebenmenschen nicht vermutet hat, deren Regung er aber in entlegenen Winkeln der eigenen 
Persönlichkeit dunkel zu spüren vermag.” Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 266.  
278
 Jentsch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny ,” 13. “Umgekehrt lässt sich die Wirkung des 
Unheimlichen leicht erzielen, wenn man in dichterischer oder phantastischer Weise irgend ein lebloses 
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on the physical postures required for performance, as seen in Hoffmann’s sketch. However, 
it also stems from the attribution of agency to the instrument in musical creation. Imagined 
as an equal contributor in the act of creation, the instrument becomes an extension of the 
performer’s  ody. While I have outlined the basis for the physical confusion of instrument 
and human in performance, how does this impression linger when the instrument is not 
engaged  Jentsch’s theory of “latent animatedness” helps  to account for this phenomenon: 
the uncanniness of human remains, or parts thereof, such as skulls, can be attributed to the 
“thoughts of latent animatedness” that these things inevita ly provoke.279 Once removed 
from their living context, these items retain a residue of life. Like the image that Freud 
 orrows from Gutzkow’s novel Der Ritter vom Geiste of the buried spring or dried-up pond 
where one cannot walk without imagining waters surging forth anew,
280
 one cannot come 
across an instrument without calling to mind its music and the connotations  of animation 
borne by those sounds.  
 
Resonances 
While Hoffmann has provided a catch phrase for this conception of an instrument and I 
have used his sketch and fragments of his writings to introduce the concept of the living-
                                                                                                                                                             
Ding als Theil eines organischen Geschöpfs, besonders auch in anthropomorphistischer Weise 
umzudeuten unternimmt.” Jentsch, “Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen,” 203-4.  
279
 Jentsch, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny,” 15. “Gedanke eine latente Beseelung,” Jentsch, “Zur 
Psychologie des Unheimlichen,” 205.  
280
 In the excerpt, “The Zecks” refers to the Zeck family. “‘Die Zecks sing alle h.’ ‘H.?.. Was verstehen 
sie unter h.?..  ’ – ‘Nun…es kommt mir mit ihnen vor, wie mit einem zugegra enen Brunnen oder einem 
ausgetrockneten Teich. Man kann nicht darü er gehen, ohne daβ es Einem  immer ist, als könnte da 
wieder einmal Wasser zum Vorschein kommen.’”  In Freud, “Das Unheimliche,” 247; Freud quotes from 
Gutzkow’s novel Der Ritter vom Geiste via the Daniel Sanders Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. 
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dead instrument and theorise it in terms of the uncanny, this notion did not exist solely in 
his works. I will now turn to the aesthetics of the instrument in the final years of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The writings of Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, 
Johann Gottfried Herder, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel complement the impression 
of the human-instrument relationship and the resulting notion of the living-dead instrument 
presented above. In addition, they suggest some of the earlier eighteenth-century roots of 
this idea.  
In the essay “The Marvels of the Musical Art,” Wackenroder reflects on the 
astonishing reality that sounds can be transmitted through the raw materials of which 
musical instruments are composed, for who could have discovered that we could let timber 
and copper resound?
281
 His implication is that the rising of such stirring sounds from inert 
materials is indeed marvelous. Furthermore, in “The characteristic inner Nature of the 
musical Art and the Psychology of Today’s Instrumental Music,” Wackenroder expresses 
his awe that musical instruments, comprised of these simple materials, arise to meet the 
musician halfway. He writes that 
no other art but music has a raw material which is, in and of 
itself, already impregnated with such divine spirit. Its vibrating 
material with its ordered wealth of chords comes to meet the 
                                                 
281
 “And how, then, did man arrive at the marvellous idea of having wood and metal make sounds  How 
did he arrive at the precious invention of this most exceptional of all arts ” Wilhelm Heinrich 
Wackenroder, “The Marvels of the Musical Art,” in Confessions and Fantasies, Mary Hurst Schubert 
(University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), 180; “[…] und wie 
gelangte den der Mensch zu dem wunderbaren Gedanken, Holz und Erz t önen zu lassen? Wie kam er zu 
der köstichen Erfindung dieser ü er alles seltsamen Kunst ” Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, “Die 
Wunder der Tonkunst,” In Werke: Herzensergießungen eines kunstliebenden Klosterbruders und 
Phantasien über die Kunst, ed. Markus Schwering (Wilhelmshaven: Florian Noetzel Verlag, 2007), 
194. 
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creating hands halfway and expresses beautiful emotions, even 
if we touch it in an elementary, simple way.
282
 
 
Wackenroder, then, implies activity and collaboration on behalf of the instrument . Just as 
Hoffmann’s instrument amplifies the murmurs of the musician’s heart and infiltrates his or 
her consciousness, so too do Wackenroder’s instrument and musician engage in a 
reciprocal relationship in which the instrument’s role is strangely active. Wackenroder 
credits the instrument with activity that is equal to that of the performer, even attributing 
much of the affective power of the music to the instrument, rather than to the performer’s 
skill. 
Herder similarly invokes the notion of a cross-permeating relationship in his 
Kalligone (1800), where he famously writes that “music performs on a clavichord within us 
which is our own inmost  eing.”283 In this passage, the fundamental remoteness of the 
musical instrument is effaced, and instead Herder presents a conception of music that 
merges external and internal, dead matter and living flesh. This statement fancifully 
extrapolates on two musical fixations of the mid- to late eighteenth century: the 
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 Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, “The Characteristic Inner Nature of the Musical Art and the 
Psychology of Today’s Instrumental Music,” in Confessions and Fantasies , Mary Hurst Schubert 
(University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971), 189. “Demnach hat 
keine andre Kunst einen Grundstoff, der schon an sich mit so himmlischem Geiste geschw ängert wäre 
als die Musik. Ihr klingender Stoff kommt mit seinem geordneten Reichtume von Akkorden den 
Bildenden Händen entgegen, und spricht schon schöne Empfindungenaus, wenn wir ihn auch nur auf 
eine leichte, einfache Weise berühren.” Wackenroder, “Das eigentümliche innere Wesen der Tonkunst, 
und die Seelenlehre der heutigen Instrumentalmusik,” In Werke: Herzensergießungen eines 
kunstliebenden Klosterbruders und Phantasien über die Kunst, ed. Markus Schwering (Wilhelmshaven: 
Florian Noetzel Verlag, 2007), 209. 
283
 “Gleichartige Regungen, wie jeder die Musik begleitende unwillkührliche Ausdruck under Affekten 
zeigt. Das Leidenschaftliche in uns hebet sich und sinkt, es hüpft oder schleicht und schreitet langsam. 
Jetzt wird es andringend- jetzt zurückweichend, jetzt schwächer, jetzt stärker gerührt; seine eigne 
Bewegung, sein Tritt verändert sich mit jeder Modulation, mit jed em treffende Accent, geschweige mit 
einer veränderten Tonart. Die Musik spielt in uns ein Clavichord, das unsre eigne innigste Natur ist.“ 
Johann Gottfried Herder, Kalligone, ed. Heinz Begenau (Weimar: H. Böhlaus, 1955), 40. Translation 
mine. 
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responsiveness of instruments such as the clavichord, and the scientific theory of 
sympathetic resonance.
284
 
As the larger context of this quotation makes clear, Herder chooses the clavichord 
as the soul’s instrument  ecause of its great sensitivity and flexi ility. When he descri es 
our inner passion as rising and sinking, leaping or striding slowly, now surging ‒ now 
drawing  ack, now weaker ‒ now moved more forcefully, he does so with the assurance 
that the clavichord’s potential for dynamic sensitivity and the  uaking of its Bebung will 
mirror the movements of the soul. Indeed, his description of our inner passion mirrors Carl 
Ludwig Junker’s description of the special capa ilities of the clavichord from the 
Musikalisches Almanach auf das Jahr 1782: “with enough heart and reason one can vary 
the sonority [of the clavichord] with all sorts of nuances, allowing it to vibrate, tremble, 
fall, die, and there y express all the sentiments of one’s heart, and  ring out the  eauty of 
all details.”285  
In addition to the confusion between soul and instrument, the passage also  
confounds the nature of that which the soul transmits and receives. Here again, Herder 
reveals his debt to eighteenth-century thought. Although knowledge of sympathetic 
resonance as a scientific principle dates back to antiquity,
286
 in the mid-eighteenth century 
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 Both Emily Dolan and John Hamilton seem to invoke the theory of sympathetic resonance, though 
not explicitly, when discussing this passage, with Dolan suggesting that Herder  elieved “musical 
sensations resonated with the fi res of our souls” and Hamilton that “our  very nerve fibers constitute a 
clavichord of sorts, which vi rate in ‘involuntary reaction’.” Emily Dolan, “E.T.A. Hoffmann and the 
Ethereal Technologies of ‘Nature Music’,” Eighteenth-Century Music 5 (2008), 22. John T. Hamilton, 
Music, Madness, and the Unworking of Language  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 84. 
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 Carl Ludwig Junker, in Bernard Brauchli, The Clavichord (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 173. 
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 The term sympathetic resonance or vibration describes the transmission of energy in the form of 
sound waves from one sonorous resonator to another, where the receptive resonator possesses the same 
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this theory developed metaphorical implications. As Downing Thomas explains in his 
aptly-titled “Heart Strings” chapter, “over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, as musical effects were naturalized, the notion of the resonant human body, both 
in medical writings and in other areas of inquiry, became the predominant way to account 
for the effects of music.”287 Although eighteenth-century thinkers treat the human body as 
physical material responding in sympathy to the frequencies produced by music, the human 
response is presumed to be more than simple vibration. While the influence exerted by 
music on an individual may be transmitted physically, it rapidly becomes confused with 
poetic or moral concerns.
288
 
Returning to the Kalligone, Herder’s identification of the clavichord with the human 
soul, fuelled by his extrapolation of eighteenth-century musical ideas, demonstrates his 
understanding of how external music acts on the listener. In addition to figuring the 
                                                                                                                                                             
natural frequency (or a multiple of that natural frequency) as the originating resonator. Burdette Green 
and David Butler, “From Acoustics to Tonpsychologie,” in The Cambridge History of Western Music 
Theory, ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 248-49. 
 
287
 Downing A. Thomas, “Heart Strings,” in Aesthetics of Opera in the Ancien Régime, 1647-1785 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 200. As an example, Thomas cites a study by the 
doctor Joseph-Louis Roger, entitled Tentamen di vi soni et musices in corpore humano  [sic] (1758). 
Thomas relates that “after discussing the phenomenon of sympathetic  resonance in strings, [Roger] 
suggested that the human  ody may  e said to function in a similar way: ‘the organ of hearing, and 
even the entire human body, can be considered as instruments of this kind; for the influence that music 
exerts on us depends in part on the greater or lesser ease with which the viscera, the bones, the nerves, 
and the humors of the human  ody resonate and  uiver’.” Thomas, 193. 
288
 Catherine J. Minter explains that the rejection of the mind -body dichotomy which occurred during 
this period is reflected in the rise of the scientific discipline of “anthropology,” with which the “whole 
man” can  e studied. Minter then demonstrates that the intermingling of mind and body was not limited 
to scientific thought, but also influenced literature. For instance, characters suffering from nervous 
disorders often begin to take on the qualities of the overly empfindsam, such as poetic leanings and an 
excessive appetite for love. Conversely, a character’s over-abundance of Empfindsamkeit could lead to 
nervous problems, particularly in critical or satirical texts.  As Minter points out, “The association 
between the physical and moral spheres is very common in the critiques of Empfindsamkeit, not least 
because one of the main criticisms leveled at Empfindsamkeit was that it sublimated everything bodily 
to the level of mind.” Catherine J. Minter, “Literary ‘Empfindsamkeit’ and Nervous Sensi ility in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany,” The Modern Language Review 96, no. 4 (2001): 1016-19. 
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instrument as our internal receptor of music, though, Herder also understands sound as that 
which reveals an inner being: 
A. When things want to not suggest, but reveal their inner being 
[Inneres] to us, how does this come to pass? Through what 
means alone can it happen? 
 
C. Through an empty/meaningless sound? 
 
A. Through a not empty sound: for each sound is expressive, 
thus more than suggestive. It expresses an inner being; it stirs 
an inner being.
289
 
 
Herder summarises this by asking: “What else is sound,  ut the voice of all moving bodies, 
emerging from their inner beings ”290 For Herder, then, sound implies life: it is the 
expression of an inner being. This is the other side of his image of the clavichord as inmost 
being: if sound is what emerges from our interiors, then the soul must  be a musical 
instrument, and the most sensitive conceivable. Furthermore, his statement reads all 
resounding things as possessing inner movement, and the more refined the sound, the 
greater the inner life. In Herder’s thought, then, when instruments gain a superbly 
heightened sensitivity, as is the case with the clavichord, they approach or even equal the 
human soul in their ability to generate and express a profound essence. Music, emerging 
from the instrument, is proof of an inner being in motion. 
                                                 
289
 “A. Wenn Dinge um uns her ihr Inneres nicht andeuten, sondern ankündigen wollen, wodurch 
geschieht es? wodurch kann es allein geschehen?  
C. Durch einen leeren Schall?  
A. Durch einen nicht leeren Schall: denn jeder Schall ist ausdrückend, also mehr als andeutend. Er 
drückt ein Inneres aus; er bewegt ein Inneres.” Herder, Kalligone, 35. 
 
290
 “Was ist also der Schall anders, als die Stimme aller bewegten Körper, aus ihrem Innern hervor? ihr 
Leiden, ihren Widerstand, ihre erregten Kräfte andern harmonischen Wesen laut oder leise 
verkündend.” Herder, Kalligone, 35.  
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In his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, Hegel is far more equivocal than Herder as to 
the unity of the fabricated musical instrument and the expression of human interiority. 
Instead, Hegel distinguishes between the human voice and the sounds produced by foreign 
objects, conceiving of the former as the only direct conduit of the soul:  
The human voice can apprehend itself as the sounding of the 
soul itself, as the sound which the inner life has in its own 
nature for the expression of itself, an expression which it 
regulates directly. On the other hand, in the case of the other 
instruments a vibration is set up in a body indifferent to the soul 
and its expression and, in virtue of its own character, more 
remote from these; but in song the soul rings out from its own 
body.
291
 
 
In this passage, Hegel emphasises the underlying limitation of the instrument in 
comparison to the voice: the disconnection of the body and the soul. He describes the 
material of the instrument as a body that only indifferently hosts the soul, suggesting, 
perhaps, that it is less sympathetic to the finer vibrations of our inner being.  
 For Hegel, musical instruments, as opposed to the human voice, “are more remote 
from the expression of the soul and remain, in general, an external matter, a dead thing, 
while music is inner movement and activity.”292 However, he makes an exception to this 
statement, acknowledging that a merger of the human soul and the indifferent body of the 
instrument may occur under circumstances of exceptional virtuosity. Through virtuosity, 
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 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 922. “Zugleich last die menschliche Stimme sich als das Tönen 
der Seele selbst vernehmen, als der Klang, den das Innere seiner Natur nach zum Ausdruck des Inneren 
hat und diese Äuβerung unmittelbar regiert. Bei den übrigen Instrumenten wird dagegen ein der Seele 
und ihrer Empfindung gleichgültiger und seiner Beschaffenheit nach fernabliegender Körper in 
Schwingung versetzt, im Gesang aber ist es ihr eigener Leib, aus welchem die Seele herausklingt.” 
Hegel, Ästhetik, volume II (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1965), 291. 
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 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 957. “Diese nämlich liegen mit ihrem Klang dem Ausdruck der 
Seele ferner und  lei en ü erhaupt eine äuβerliche Sache, ein tote s Ding, während die Musik innerliche 
Bewegung und Tätigkeit ist.” Hegel, Ästhetik, volume II, 325. 
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the externality of the instrument disappears altogether, that is, if 
inner music penetrates this external reality through and through, 
then in this virtuosity the foreign instrument appears as a 
perfectly developed organ of the artistic soul and its very own 
property.
293
 
 
In other words, an instrument ceases to  e a “dead thing,” and instead  ecomes a living 
extension    an “organ” of the performer’s  ody – when it is infused with the performer’s 
soul through the medium of music. Taking this idea even further, Hegel suggests that the 
instrument, through virtuosic performance, can go beyond its development as a seamless 
physical extension of the artistic soul, and indeed, can even  ecome “a perfectly animated 
instrument.” However, he descri es this state, where “inner conception and [...] execution” 
fuse, as no less fleeting than the sublime flash of lightening. While the instrument may 
 ecome animate, for Hegel this is a “most  uickly passing life.”294 
Though Hegel retains his preference of the voice over the instrument, he 
uncharacteristically gives the impression of being the least conservative of the three 
thinkers in his discussion of instruments, for his language entertains the fancy of their 
fleeting animation, while Herder and Wackenroder display their ties to ideas of 
sympathetic resonance and the metaphorical expansion of this idea to account for the 
mental and emotional effects of music. All three demonstrate, however, that the cause of an 
instrument’s uncanny living-dead status reverses the source of Ludwig’s repulsion for the 
automatons. Rather than providing an exterior imitation of life in want of inner activity, the 
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 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 957; “Verschwindet nun die Äuβerlichkeit des Instrumentes 
durchaus, dringt die innere Musik ganz durch die äuβere Rea lität hindurch, so erscheint in dieser 
Virtuosität das fremde Instrument als ein vollendet durchgebildetes eigenstes Organ der künstlerischen 
Seele.” Hegel, Ästhetik II, 325. 
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 Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, 958; “verschwindendstem Le en” Hegel, Ästhetik II, 326. 
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instrument brings about the disjunctive emergence of a vibrant soul (whether it is attributed 
to the performer, the instrument, or an amalgamation of the two) from insensitive 
materials. 
 
The Instrument Sings 
While Hegel imagines the virtuosically-played, yet “foreign” instrument as “a perfectly 
developed organ of the artistic soul,” in folk tales and literary works, the instrument is 
portrayed as far less foreign to the human body, and is even sometimes quite literally a 
human organ. In literature, the living-dead instrument owes a debt to an older folk tradition 
in which physical connections between individual and instrument were more explicitly 
drawn. Though the literary thematisation of the living-dead instrument shares concerns 
with the philosophical exploration of this idea, albeit developed in a more fantastic manner, 
it also exhibits other, more gruesome, roots in folklore. According to the Aarne-Thompson 
folktale catalogue, type 780 tales  elong to the “truth comes to light” folktale family. More 
specifically, they are murder ballads featuring a chilling twist: after the murder, the body is 
found and fashioned into a musical instrument, which proceeds to expose the identity of the 
murderer.
295
 
 The Märchen “The Singing Bone” (“Der singende Knochen”), collected in the first 
edition of Jaco  and Wilhelm Grimm’s Kinder- und Hausmärchen (1812),296 is one such 
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 Alternately, a tree growing over the burial site is fashioned into the instrument. Antti Aarne and 
Stith Thompson, The Types of the Folktale: A Classification and Bibliography , trans. Stith Thompson 
(Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1961) 269-70. 
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 Jaco  and Wilhelm Grimm, “Der singende Knochen” Kinder- und Hausmärchen, 1st ed., vol. 1 
(Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 1812), no. 28, 119-22. 
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tale in the German folk tradition. The story recounts the quest of three brothers to kill a 
wild boar that is plaguing the kingdom. Since the king has decreed that whoever can fulfill 
this task will win the hand of his daughter, the two older brothers go wild with murderous 
jealousy when they discover that the younger brother has succeeded. After weakening the 
younger with a celebratory draught of wine, the older brothers attack him on a bridge and 
bury his corpse below it. Some years later, a shepherd crossing the bridge happens upon 
one of his bones and retrieves it, thinking that it is the perfect material for a new 
mouthpiece for his horn. However, as he attaches it to his horn and brings it to his lips, the 
little bone begins to sing: 
Oh, you dear shepherd, 
You blow on my little bone: 
My brothers struck me dead 
Buried me beneath the bridge, 
To get the wild boar 
For the king’s daughter.297 
 
The tale concludes with the astounded shepherd bringing the instrument to the king and the 
murderous brothers, now revealed, finally facing their punishment.  
“The Singing Bone” is related to the much earlier Scottish  allad, “The Twa 
Sisters,” which dates  ack to at least 1656,  ut still produced new variants centuries 
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 „Darnach machte er sichs zum Mundstück für sein Horn, und wie er ansetzen und blasen wollte, da 
fing das Knöchlein an, von selbst zu singen:  
»Ach! du liebes Hirtelein,  
du bläßt auf meinem Knöchelein:  
meine Brüder mich erschlugen 
unter die Brücke begruben,  
um das wilde Schwein 
für des Königs Töchterlein.«“ 
Grimm and Grimm, “Der singende Knochen,” 119 -120. Translation mine. 
 
  
187 
 
 
later.
298
 In this tale, motivated by jealousy over the affections of a suitor, the older, dark 
sister drowns the younger, fair sister. In most forms of the ballad, according to Francis J. 
Child, “either some part of the  ody of the drowned girl is taken to furnish a musical 
instrument, a harp or a viol, or the instrument is wholly made from the  ody.” 299 For 
instance, in version B a harper finds the drowned sister and strings his harp with her hair:  
He’s taen three locks o her yallow hair, 
An wi’ them strung his harp sae fair.300 
 
As in “The Singing Bone,” the instrument assumes a strange power of speech, and extracts 
its revenge  y revealing the circumstances of the murder. Version C of the  allad, “O 
Binnorie” (1802), recounts the harper’s construction of the instrument for her  ody and the 
resulting music:  
He made a harp of her breast-bone, 
Whose sounds would melt a heart of stone. 
 
The strings he framed of her yellow hair, 
Whose notes made sad the listening ear. 
 
He  rought it to her father’s hall, 
And there was the court assembled all. 
 
He laid this harp upon a stone, 
And straight it began to play alone. 
 
‘O yonder sits my father, the king, 
And yonder sits my mother, the queen. 
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 Francis James Child and George Lyman Kittredge, The English and Scottish Popular Ballads , 
Volume One (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1884) 119. According to Child and 
Kittredge, the ballad is found throughout British Isles and also exists in Danish, Icelandic, Norwegian, 
Swedish, Finnish versions. Child and Kittredge, 119-120. 
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 Child and Kittredge, The English and Scottish Popular Ballads, 120. 
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 Child and Kittredge, The English and Scottish Popular Ballads, 127. 
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‘And yonder stands my  rother Hugh, 
And  y him my William, sweet and true.’ 
 
But the last tune that the harp played then, 
Was ‘Woe to my sister, false Helen!’301 
 
In these earlier tales, the physical connection between an individual and the instrument is 
explicit. The instruments are fashioned, fully or partially, from elements of their corpses. 
Furthermore, though the bodies form various types of musical instruments – viols, harps, 
horns – these instruments do not sound in their characteristic fashions. Instead, they give 
rise to human voices and are even capable of speech, a phenomenon that seems particularly 
strange in the cases of the string instruments, where breath and the mouth do not factor into 
creating sound. 
 Elements of these folk tales are evident in nineteenth-century literary thematisations 
of the living-dead instrument: the death of a central character is usually involved, the 
sounds of the instrument are interpreted as the communication or expression of that 
character (who, dead or alive, is unable to communicate more directly), and the instrument 
is also understood as assuming a physical connection to the same individual. In Theodor 
Körner’s short story “The Harp,” the instrument acts as the earthly embodiment of Josephe 
Sellner. The brief story introduces us to the Sellner couple, who after a deep , longstanding 
affection for one another, finally marry. They enjoy their state of quiet domesticity and 
pass the evening hours by playing music together: Josephe on the harp, and her husband 
Eduard on the flute. Tragedy soon strikes, however, when the young Josephe passes away 
unexpectedly after a long day of music-making leaves her stricken with an intense 
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headache and fever. Although she had suffered from weak nerves throughout her life (a 
possible allusion to her susceptibility to the powers of music and the theory of sympathetic 
resonance), there had  een no indication that her disorder might turn lethal. In Josephe’s 
sitting room one evening at the hour that marked her death days earlier, the grief -stricken 
Eduard discovers that her harp begins to sound when he plays his flute, joining him in their 
regular cham er music practice. Thereafter, every day at nine o’clock, he enters Josephe’s 
room and senses her presence through the harp’s music. He finally addresses Josephe 
through the harp and begs her to let him rejoin her. Days later he, too, falls ill and dies. As 
he passes from the world, the harp tones begin to fade into silence, and when Eduard dies, 
the strings of the harp snap as Josephe’s only remaining  onds with the world and the 
instrument are broken.
302
 
“The Harp” maintains the elements of the folk tradition identified a ove, exclusive 
of their gruesome treatment, but in some other literary works these elements seem to 
converge with another motif that has its roots in folklore: the fundamental romantic theme 
of the double, or Doppelgänger. The conception of the living-dead instrument relates to the 
figure of the Doppelgänger in its emphasis on mutually-dependant physicalities and 
spiritualities. A discrete entity that exists in a dependent relationship to a primary 
individual, the double is perceptible to at least some of the senses. Though the double is 
usually physically identical to its primary, it is possible for the doubling to be solely 
spiritual, and for the two beings in the relationship to differ materially.
303
 It is thus 
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 Theodor Körner, “Die Harfe,” in  Theodor Körners Sämtliche Werke, ed. Karl Streckfuβ (Berlin: 
Nicolai’schen Buchhandlung, 1834), 340-342. 
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 “By ‘dependent’ we do not mean ‘su ordinate’ , for often the double comes to dominate, control, and 
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reasonable, though not typical, to conceive of a solely audible double, and under these 
conditions the Doppelgänger theme operates in tandem with the theme of the living-dead 
instrument. 
Furthermore, as Ralph Tymms and John Herdman explain, the double bears a strong 
association with mortality. An encounter with one’s Doppelgänger is a portent of 
immanent death  ecause of the dou le’s association with the folkloric  elief in the “wraith” 
– the visible, but not substantial, counterpart of a person that appears around the time of 
their death.
304
 The association of the double with imminent death recollects Hegel’s 
statement that virtuosic performance can result in “a perfectly animated instrument,”  ut 
that this generates only a “most  uickly passing life.”305 The instrument acts as a spiritual 
double that comes into being through intense performance and whose ephemeral existence 
is dependent on the performer. Hegel’s theory does not give further details a out the result 
of this brief union on the human being interacting with the instrument, but this concern is 
elaborated in literature. When an individual sees his or her double externally in an 
                                                                                                                                                             
the original.” John Herdman, The Double in Nineteenth Century Fiction  (London: MacMillan, 1990), 
14. Ralph Tymms, Doubles in Literary Psychology  (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1949) 16-17. 
Herdman adds that “Divided, split, or schizophrenic characters are, again, not in themselves dou les or 
Doppelgänger, though these terms may become appropriate i f and when their division gives rise to a 
second, sensibly apprehensible personality (even if apprehensible only to the subject), which can occur 
for instance in the case of a hallucination fictionally presented as a distinct personage. ” This point will 
become relevant for our discussion of Schu ert’s “Der Leiermann.” Herdman, The Double in Nineteenth 
Century Fiction, 15. 
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 Tymms, Doubles in Literary Psychology, 17. Herdman, The Double in Nineteenth Century Fiction, 2. 
One comic instance of the literary afterlife of this belief can be found in a scene from Wilhelm 
Meister’s Lehrjahr, wherein the Count stumbles upon Wilhelm in his chambers and dressed in his 
clothing. Believing that he encountered his wraith – and not suspecting the prank that Wilhelm and the  
Baroness had actually been trying to play on the Countess – the Count spends several days preparing 
for his untimely death. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre  (Frankfurt am Main: 
Insel Verlag, 1980), 360. 
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instrument, the end of this mutually-dependant life looms not only for the instrument, but 
also for the performer. 
While we might see only the faintest traces of the Doppelgänger motif in “The 
Harp,” in Hoffmann’s “Councillor Krespel” it intertwines more fully with our  y-now 
familiar theme of the living-dead instrument. In “Councillor Krespel,” as mentioned in the 
beginning of this chapter, the title character regards the violin he resists dismantling as a 
“dead thing, which depends upon [him] for its life and its voice,” yet he confides to his 
friend that the violin seems to speak to him. Furthermore, its physical and spiritual bonds 
with his daughter, Antonie, belie his words.
306
 Antonie must refrain from singing, despite 
her passion and otherworldly voice, for the act is lethal to her. However, she becomes quite 
attached to a particular violin and protests when her father intends to dismember it. He 
accedes to her wishes, and when he begins playing the violin instead, a curious 
phenomenon takes place: “Hardly had he struck the first tone, when Antonie loudly and 
joyfully cried: ‘Ah, it is me - I sing again.’”307 Antonie is astounded to discover a voice 
that she recognises as her own emerging from the violin. Eventually, she becomes 
accustomed to thinking of the violin as an extension of herself, as the instrument that sings 
for her. At her urging, and to assuage her pain at not being able to produce her own music, 
Krespel regularly plays for her. When Krespel plays virtuosically, she applauds herself as 
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 Lichtenhahn, “‘Le endigtote Dinger’: Zur romantischen Auffassung von Musikin strumente und 
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 “Kaum hatte er die ersten Töne angestrichen, als Antonie laut und freudig rief: »Ach, das bin ich ja - 
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though she had executed the difficult passage: “Ah, I did that well! I did that well!” 308 Her 
cheeks flush in sympathy, just as they had when she sang.
309
 The violin helps her to resist 
singing, but eventually, she cannot suffer a life without song, and this temptation proves 
deathly. When Antonia dies, the sound post of the violin cracks and the soundboard 
shatters. The violin is buried with her.
310
 
In this narrative, the bond formed between musical instruments and musicians – 
even those not directly performing on the instrument - enacts the mystery that Hegel 
descri es. Hoffmann’s story treats the violin as the mechanism that externalises Antonie’s 
utterances, reinterpreting the instrument as an ambiguously animate extension of her body. 
As Jürg Theilacker notes, Hoffmann’s narrative also plays into widespread associations of 
the female body with the form of the violin.
311
 Both the spiritual connection through music 
and the physical affinity between the woman and the form of a violin underscore the theme 
of the instrument as double. The twin mortality of Antonie and the violin, the impossibility 
of their lasting union, looms from the moment that she hears the violin and cries out “it is 
me.” 
The identification of the foreign instrument with the human body and of its music as 
the song of the soul brings about this enrichment of an established theme. The 
transformation of the living-dead instrument from folktale motif to literary theme is 
fundamentally a different emphasis on music and instruments. In the folk tradition, the 
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macabre situation is only peripherally musical; in the literary works, the focal point of the 
uncanniness is placed squarely on the strange properties of music and instruments. This 
shift requires a greater conviction in the uncanny and mystical properties of music, such 
that the improbable and extremely literal situations of the folktales cede to the subtle and 
metaphorical insinuations of Hoffmann’s and Körner’s stories. If we recall Jentsch’s theory 
of latent animation, for instance, we might note that, in the folktales, the uncanniness of the 
musical instruments is largely founded on their composition from human remains. When 
these instruments stir to life, they are not commenting on the mysterious bond between 
performer and instrument; rather, they are more akin to a ghoulish rattling of bones. This 
grisly source material indirectly counters Wackenroder’s marvelling that musical 
instruments, composed of the humble and inert materials of metal and wood, are able to 
ring forth and create an impression of life. In “The Harp,” as in the folktales, death is a 
necessary precursor to the uncanny situation. But while Josephe is dead, the latent 
animation of the harp is more musical than grotesque. The harp sounds, not because i t is 
fashioned from her body, but because her deep bond with the instrument suspends a residue 
of her essence with the harp. 
 While the physical human-instrument relationship shifts from blatant to insinuating 
between the folktales and the literary work, speech with specifiable meaning is similarly 
traded for the ineffable depth of music. In the tales, though the body of the character is 
fashioned into another sounding vehicle, speech prevails over music. The human voice, 
complete with the precision of words, effaces the natural sounds of the wholly unnatural 
instrument. Conversely, although Antonie exclaims “I sing again” when she hears the 
brilliant tones of the violin, that which she identifies as her own is a wordless singing, 
  
194 
 
 
indefinite in its meaning. Sounding as a violin rather than as a voice, the instrument’s 
music is unidentifia le as song to anyone  ut Antonie. In Hegel’s terms,  y hearing the 
violin as voice, Antonie hears the most immediate manifestation of her soul issuing from 
the instrument. 
In  oth “The Harp” and “Councillor Krespel,” the more normalised  ehaviour of the 
instrument (ghostly performances on the harp notwithstanding), rather than diffusing the 
uncanniness of the situation, redirects it to the wholly familiar mysteries of musical  
performance. Stripped of the outlandishness of the folktales, these stories cut closer to 
nineteenth-century convictions about music and the performer-instrument relationship, 
even if they are elaborated with a strong dose of fantasy. The blurring of the distinction 
between instrument and musician becomes evident when instrumental music stands in for 
the human voice, thus implying its closer affinity to the soul, and in the physical bonds 
between musician and instrument. 
 
The Instrument Sings II: Voice and Strata 
If the inanimate instrument seems to awaken when sound is imagined as proof of life, how 
does an encounter with that sound shape our understanding of the state of the instrument? 
This chapter has thus far explored the notion of the living-dead instrument in aesthetic 
writings and literature; however, my central interest is to interrogate how musical works, 
specifically Lieder, respond to this theme. When the theme of the living-dead instrument 
enters the world of the Lied, sonic representations of instrumental sound (whether or not 
performed by the instrument supposedly being depicted) interact with human responses to 
those sounds. That is, the textual elements of the song comment on a persona’s interaction 
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with an instrument, which is represented ‒ or  rought to life, one might say ‒  y the 
accompaniment. While human characters dominate in literary thematisations of the living-
dead instrument, in Lieder of this type, the instrument steps into the foreground alongside 
them. In the short stories encountered earlier, a central character and the instrument are 
engaged in a symbiotic relationship; however, in the songs I consider, the precise 
connection between instrument and individual becomes increasingly opaque, a 
phenomenon that can only partially  e attri uted to the songs’ texts. In turning from the 
printed word to songs that thematise musical instruments sounding with or without their 
performers, I will consider how the presence of instrumental sound in the world of the so ng 
alters the representation of the instrument as living-dead thing. 
 In his influential book The Composer’s Voice, Edward Cone asks the following 
 uestion: “If music is a language, then who is speaking ”312 Although the question is 
complex and handled in an extraordinarily nuanced manner, in the case of Lieder, at least, 
Cone’s answer seems firm on the matter of who  isn’t speaking: the instrument. Cone 
believes that “we cannot accept the accompaniment as a character in the drama: [...] it is 
voiceless, communicating only  y musical gesture.”313 Although Cone’s statement rings 
true for many songs, its validity diminishes when the accompaniment moves beyond simple 
harmonic support for the vocal line, and even further, beyond the atmospheric mimetic 
music of Schubert’s “Erlkönig” or the diegetic accompaniment of a serenade. When an 
instrument is made the su ject ‒ or even the protagonist ‒ of a song and is represented 
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musically in what we must rather inade uately call “the accompaniment,” Cone’s 
designation of the instrument as “voiceless” must  e reconsidered. This is especially 
apparent when we take into account the treatment of the living-dead instrument in the 
literary works considered above, where the instrument is explicitly regarded as the voice of 
the individual with which it is associated. As this theme moves from the folk tradition to 
nineteenth century literature, the bond becomes less literal: instruments fashioned from 
corpses and verbal confessions are traded for vaguely sensed, yet powerful, physical 
affinities and deeply personal musical expressions. The loss of literality is exchanged for 
an increasingly intense emotional response. And although, in literature, the instrument no 
longer makes explicit verbal statements, it nonetheless speaks: only the deeper language of 
music has usurped the supremacy of words. In shifting from one genre to another, from 
literature to Lied, it would seem paradoxical that the instrument would lose its voice just as 
it gained the more realised manifestation of its sound afforded by musical expression. 
 In addition to the literary substantiation for conceiving of instrumental sound as 
voice, Cone perhaps overlooks a song tradition that specifically figures the instrument as 
speaking or singing alongside the human vocalist, and that, furthermore, resonates with 
Herder’s conceptions of the soul as instrument: the An das Clavier song. A style of private 
solo song from the second half of the eighteenth-century, wherein the singer is understood 
as confiding in or conversing with his or her instrument,
314
 this genre is fuelled by an 
understanding of the clavichord as responsive to the movements of the soul, and therefore 
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as being as agile and direct as the expressions of the human voice.
315
 A verse from 
Philippine von Gatterer Engelhardt’s “An das Klavier,” for example, dispenses with su tle 
comparisons and simply characterises the clavichord as “speaking”:  
Dank sey dem Mann, der dich erfand, Thanks be to the man who invented you 
Du sprechendes Klavier!   You speaking clavichord!  
Dir, längst verschwundne liebe Hand, You, dear, long-since vanished hand, 
Wie feurig dank ich dir!   How fervently I thank you!
316
 
 
The contradiction of these songs is that, while their texts anthropomorphise the 
clavichord, their musical content is less convincing, as Annette Richards and Sally Fortino 
have argued.
 317
 Fortino points out that most settings are simple and strophic, with the 
clavichord and voice sharing the melody.
318
 In these songs, we hear a textual conviction 
that the instrument speaks or sings, but little to convince us of it musically, while 
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instrumental works such as C.P.E. Bach’s Abschied von meinem Silbermannischen Claviere 
display evocations of voice to such an extent that Richards describes them as 
“ventrilo uistic.”319 Moreover, in some nineteenth-century songs that thematise 
instruments, the emphasis on the music intensifies: the listener hears the instrument 
speaking for itself, voicing its existence, its autonomy. While there is a great deal of 
continuity  etween the ideas supporting “An das Clavier” songs and the nineteenth-century 
songs of the living-dead instrument that I will discuss, the two differ primarily in their 
instrumental focus and dimensions. In the early nineteenth century, the status of the 
clavichord as peer to the voice is extended as a general instrumental property, though under 
exceptional circumstances, as established in the philosophical and literary texts 
encountered earlier. Furthermore, and most crucially, the performance situation and 
construction of the An das Clavier-style Lied create a single, unified song-sphere where 
singer and clavichord interact, while songs thematising the living-dead instrument revel in 
the ambiguities created by the interplay between their phenomenal strata.  
 Cone’s stratification of the various elements of art songs, evident in his statement 
that the accompaniment “o viously [...] does not inha it the same world as the vocal 
persona,”320 is useful for my consideration of how the ambiguous human-instrument 
relationship is created in song. He further clarifies his stratification  y stating that “[e]ven 
when the accompaniment produces programmatically appropriate sounds, it is rarely to be 
considered as directly heard  y the vocal persona.”321 Although the accompaniment is not 
                                                 
319
 Richards, The Free Fantasia and the Musical Picturesque, 155. 
320
 Cone, The Composer’s Voice, 12. 
321
 Cone, The Composer’s Voice, 30. 
  
199 
 
 
identical to the sounds that the vocal persona hears, Cone does believe that the vocal 
persona leaves a trace of his or her perception in the accompaniment. Thus, in such songs 
as Schu ert’s “Erlkönig” or “Der Leiermann” 
we hear, not the actual sounds of hooves and hurdy-gurdy, but 
a transformation of those sounds – their resonance in the 
subconscious of the protagonist as interpreted by the 
consciousness of the instrumental persona. Thus, even when the 
accompaniment appears to be dealing with external 
circumstances, it is usually revealing their effect on the 
protagonist.
322
 
 
It is worth noting that Cone’s ideas are chiefly concerned with the real performance 
situation of art song, rather than some ethereal imagining of the world of the song and its 
characters. In performance, the protagonist or vocal persona is immediately present in the 
form of the singer who embodies him or her. The accompaniment, however, even when it 
represents the sounds of a physical body or process, does not have an immediate physical 
representative in a performance situation. Nor is the protagonist aware of the 
accompaniment as an accompaniment.
323
 That is to say, he or she is aware only of any 
possi le source material that is represented mimetically in an accompaniment ‒ including 
representations of instrumental sound ‒  ut not of any other musical content. In a later 
publication, Cone adds an exception to this line of reasoning: when the protagonist is 
assumed to  e a musician, it is “easy to think of the accompaniment we actually hear as a 
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representation of what is going on in the inner ear of the composer-protagonist.”324 
 Except in very limited circumstances, then, the accompaniment, even when it is 
mimetic, neither  rings the listener fully into the world of the protagonist’s perception, nor 
 rings a distant physical world into our presence. Thus, when Cone writes that “[t]he 
protagonist of ‘Der Leiermann’ hears a hurdy-gurdy, but he does not hear what the actual 
singer and the audience hear: a pianist playing a stylized version of what a hurdy-gurdy 
might sound like,”325 he points out that we are neither listening fully from the perspective 
of the protagonist, nor alongside him. This strange positioning, along with the remove of 
the performance situation, is perhaps what Cone is identifying when he describes the vocal 
persona as the only element of the song that is “incarnate”:  
Of the three [vocal, instrumental, complete musical], only the 
vocal persona [...] can  e thought of as ‘incarnate,’ since it is the 
only one that expresses itself fully through the human voice. By 
comparison with its forthright existence, the instrumental persona 
may seem a creature of analogy, an imaginary construct.
326
 
 
I agree with Cone that the different strata of the song create the impression of their 
varying degrees of realisation. Certain phenomena in the song will seem more immediate to 
the listener, while others seem more shrouded in fantasy or as though they are filtered 
through the less-than-objective awareness of a particular character. However, I believe that 
it is a misapprehension to assign these different levels of reality to what Cone labels the 
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vocal and instrumental personae; and even more importantly, to treat the instrumental 
persona as one-dimensional. Especially in instances where instrumental sound is 
represented within the world of the Lied, the same instrument may be responsible for the 
accompaniment, for diegetic music (that is, music that acts as music within the world of the 
song), and for giving voice to a character. Furthermore, and crucially, these different 
functions may not always be readily distinguished, and, in addition, the listener may not be  
able to identify with certainty whether some or all of the song’s instrumental components 
are reporting an objective reality or relaying the perceptions of one or more characters. The 
status of these sounds is even further obscured when the accompanying instrument in 
question, as is most often the case, is the piano, and is meant to be representing the sounds 
of another instrument.  
 Cone’s remark that “the instrumental persona may seem [...] an imaginary 
construct”327 means that what the listener hears instrumentally may seem to have no basis 
in reality, but is only the misheard echo of a distant phenomenon or a reflection of 
unspoken emotion. I would argue for these same words in another sense. In the songs I will 
discuss, the crux of the uncanniness occurs when instrumental sound is understood as the 
voice of a character; that is, when an instrument is briefly understood as animate and its 
sound, like the human voice, is understood as the revelation of an inner being. However, 
due to the uncertainty created by the various strata of the song, this instrumental character 
may seem only an imaginary construct. The songs entertain the simultaneous possibility of 
the instrument as living being and dead mechanism. 
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To conclude this chapter and further examine the idea of instrumental sound as 
voice, I look at three songs that engage with the theme of the living-dead instrument: 
Conradin Kreutzer’s “Das tote Fagott” (“The Dead Bassoon”), Ro ert Schumann’s “Die 
wandelnde Glocke” (“The Walking/Transforming Bell”), and Franz Schu ert’s “Der 
Leiermann” (“The Hurdy-Gurdy Man”). In these songs, the unrelia le perceptions of the 
protagonists – a murderous father, a terrified and guilty child, and a wanderer likely 
stricken with madness - leave the listener in doubt as to what, exactly, they are interacting 
with. While the literary works present the living-dead condition of instruments as an 
accepted, though fantastical, reality, the Lieder hesitate to define what we hear. My 
consideration of these Lieder concentrates on two central questions. Firstly, when can we 
understand the instrument as voice? That is, when might it be understood as a character 
speaking of its own volition, as a sign of independent life? Secondly, how is the instrument 
represented among the strata of the song; and, thirdly, how does the interaction of these 
layers of variously represented phenomena contri ute to the o fuscation of the instrument’s 
precise state? 
 
Reanimation 
Conradin Kreutzer’s  allad “The Dead Bassoon ,” is primarily a comic ‒ and even ri ald ‒ 
romp with a bouncing, jovial musical character, but it nonetheless features the uncanny 
twist that the title leads us to expect.
328
 By an anonymous author, the narrative recounts the 
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death of the Knight Otto and his squire Gunteram at the hands of the Knight von 
Beutelschnapp, father of the beloved Adelgunde: 
 
Das tote Fagott    The Dead Bassoon 
Die Nacht ist so mild und so heiter, The night is so mild and so serene,  
Die Sternelein blinken so hell;  The little stars twinkle so bright; 
Da kommen zwei dunkle Reiter  There come two dark riders 
daher im Galopp gar schnell;  thence at such a swift gallop; 
Und unter der ragenden Feste  And under the towering fortress 
Des Ritters von Beutelschnapp,  Of the Knight von Beutelschnapp, 
Da springen die nächtlichen Gäste  There spring the nighttime guests 
Von den Gäulen herab.   Down from their nags. 
 
Das ist der Ritter Otto,   This is the Knight Otto, 
Sein Knappe der Gunteram,   And his squire named Gunteram, 
Der hat ein grossen Fagotto,  who has a large bassoon, 
Den bläst er gar wundersam.  which he blows so wonderfully. 
 
Der Ritter liebt Adelgunde,   The knight loves Adelgunde, 
Das Fräulein von Beutelschnapp.  The maiden von Beutelschnapp. 
Drum schlägt er die Zither zur Stunde, So he now strikes the zither, 
Drum blast den Fagotto der Knapp; So the squire blasts the bassoon; 
Sie spielen ein süsses Larghetto  They play a sweet Larghetto 
Voll brennender Liebesglut.  Full of burning ardour. 
Das Fräulein ward bei dem Larghetto The maiden was compelled by the Larghetto 
Gar wundersam zu Mut.   to such a strange state of emotion. 
Es lockt sie ein holdes Sehnen  A sweet longing entices her 
Hinaus auf den Söller bald;   Soon out onto the balcony;  
Sie lauschet den lieblichen Tönen  She listens to the lovely tones  
Die klingen durch Flur und Wald.  That sound through meadow and wood. 
 
“Adelgunde, lie liche Minne,  “Adelgunge, sweet love, 
Adelgunde, der Frauen Zier!  Adelgunde, jewel among women! 
O du Eine, du Feine, du Reine,  Oh you the only one, you fine one, you pure one, 
Komm, o komm und entflieh mit mir!” Come, oh come and fly away with me!” 
Doch ach, Adelgundes Vater  But alas, Adelgunde’s father 
Vernahm die Musik zur Stund';  Now heard the music; 
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Sein Schwert genommen hat er,  He took his sword, 
Ermordet sein Kind Adelgund!  And murdered his child Adelgunde! 
Hat auch dann den Ritter erschlagen, He then also slew the knight,  
Den Knappen auch stach er zu Todt. The squire, too, he stabbed to death. 
Da nahm er mit grimmen Behagen  Then he took, with grim pleasure 
Als Beute den edlen Fagott!   The noble bassoon as his spoils! 
 
Den hängt er im Ahnensaale  He hangs it in the ancestral hall 
Hoch auf über seinem Sitz,   High above his chair, 
Und lacht beim vollem Pokale  And laughs over a full goblet 
Und spottet mit frevelndem Witz:  And mocks with wicked wit: 
 
„Du schnarrender Bassgeselle!  “You rasping  ass-fellow! 
Nun bist du auf ewig verstummt.  Now you are eternally silent 
Ich sandte den Bläser zur Hölle -  I sent the wind player to hell -  
Dein Liedel hat ausge rummt!”  Your song has droned out!” 
  
Da ziehet ein Hauch durch die Halle, Then a breath blew through the halls, 
Dem Ritter wird Angst und Bang;  The knight became anxious and scared 
Mit schrecklichem Geisterschalle  With horrible ghostly sounds  
Das Tote Fagott erklang!   The dead bassoon rang forth! 
 
Den Ritter fasst tödliches Wehe  Deadly woe seizes the knight  
Es fasst ihn grimm grausiger Graus. Grim ghastly horror grasps him. 
Er stürzt sich von schwindelnder Höhe, He throws himself from the dizzying heights, 
Verzweifelt zum Fenster hinaus.  Desperately out through the window. 
Da fällt das Fagott vom Nagel  Then the bassoon falls from the nail 
Und bricht sich das Genick.   And breaks its neck. 
Die Burg zerstört der Hagel ‒  Hail destroys the castle ‒ 
O grausames Geschick.   Oh horrifying fate. 
  
Um Mitternacht da stöhnet dort  At midnight there moans 
Ein grausamer Klang;   A gruesome sound; 
In dunklem Schauer tönet   In the dark shadows sounds 
Der Geister Zwiegesang:   The ghosts’ duet:  
Adelgunde, ja wir sind vereint!  Adelgunde, we are indeed united!
329
 
 
 
Composed for piano, bassoon, and tenor voice, the song is unique in that it features the 
bassoon representing itself, rather than the piano imitating the characteristic gestures of the 
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instrument. The bassoon is an instrumental component of the song; however, only a portion 
of its function is accompanimental. Though it sometimes provides interludes between 
stanzas and flourishes at line ends that do not call attention to its role in the text of the 
song, the majority of Kreutzer’s use of the  assoon elevates it to the status of a character, 
sounding for itself. The Knight Otto’s zither, on the other hand, is imitated  y the piano in 
the serenade passage of the song that follows Adelgunde’s admiration of the “lovely tones / 
That sound through meadow and wood,”  ut, unlike the  assoon, it does not possess any 
remarkable qualities. The piano-zither falls, unprotesting, into the background in the 
function of the mimicked accompaniment to the song of Knight Otto and the bassoon. In 
addition to the piano-as-zither, the piano also acts simply as piano, providing a variety of 
supporting accompanimental textures and dramatic atmospheres. The instrumental forces 
are thus divided, with the piano functioning as the accompaniment, according to Cone’s 
theory, largely unheard in the world of the song, while the bassoon is more present than the 
voices of any of the human characters, save for the narrator. 
The mystery at the centre of the song is Knight von Beutelschnapp’s curiously 
misdirected wrath at the bassoon. It is the instrument, and not the bassoonist, that bears the 
 runt of his outrage, even though his daughter’s suitor, Knight Otto, actually plays the 
zither to entice her. In this way, the song reads more as a large-scale mockery of the 
 assoon and its characteristic tone  uality than as a tale concerned with a father’s 
protectiveness of his daughter’s virtue. Indeed, the  assoon reanimates in reply to von 
Beutelschnapp’s taunt that,  y killing the wind player, he has eternally silenced the 
instrument’s rasping and droning, reminding the instrument of its incapacity and insulting 
its tone quality in one cruel jab. On the other hand, the innuendo with which the line of text 
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stating that S uire Gunteram “has a large  assoon” is intoned suggests that his daughter’s 
virtue may  e, after all, at the forefront of Knight von Beutelschnapp’s concerns. The 
symbolic substitution of the bassoon for an object offensive to a protective father would 
explain the peculiar direction of his anger towards the instrument and offers an outrageous 
twist on the idea that an instrument can be interpreted as an ambiguously animate organ of 
the performer’s  ody. (Whether this suggests that the squire Gunteram, whose bassoon 
music is decidedly less lofty than Knight Otto’s tender strains on the zither, had  een 
pursuing Adelgunde right under his master’s nose, I will leave to the listener to determine). 
The instrument also acts as a parallel to the human body when, immediately following 
Knight von Beutelschnapp’s final leap from the heights of the castle, the bassoon falls from 
its place on the wall and “ reaks its neck.”330 Following its brief life, the instrument 
presents itself as corpse. 
Though the Lied is predominantly comical, with only moments of eeriness, it 
nevertheless relies on a web of confusions common to thematisations of the living-dead 
instrument. We have already visited the obscured distinction between instrument and the 
human body, but the song also blurs the lines between instrument and voice, thus 
implicating it in human desires and concerns, and entertains the notion of the instrument as 
an ambiguously animate entity in its own right. The former occurs most overtly at the  
conclusion of the serenade to Adelgunde, when the Knight Otto entreats her to “Come, oh 
come and fly away with me!” Part way through the repetition of this line of text, he cedes 
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to the bassoon, leaving it to voice a drawn out, pleading tone where the word “come” 
would have been sung. The bassoon also doubles, echoes and anticipates, or interacts with 
the voice. Naturally, these techniques are common to accompaniments, but take on a 
different quality when performed by an instrument inhabiting the curious role of a central 
character in a drama. 
The only full-fledged moment of uncanniness in the song, acting on both the listener 
and the Knight von Beutelschnapp, coincides with the reanimation of the bassoon without 
its player, after it has been so viciously mocked: 
Then a breath blew through the halls, 
The knight became anxious and scared 
With horrible ghostly sounds 
The dead bassoon rang forth! 
 
Pronounced dead, the bassoon is also alive here for the first time. Here, the bassoon sounds 
neither as accompaniment to the Lied, nor as serenading music in the context of the song, 
but as a sign of independent life. Alongside Knight von Beutelschnapp, we are asked to 
hear the bassoon as resounding of its own accord, coming to life to extract vengeance for 
the victims of the Knight’s triple murder. The context of the sound, however, leaves room 
for doubt: does the sound necessarily signify the reanimation of the bassoon, or is it 
possibly only the wind that Knight von Beutelschnapp hears, distraught in the aftermath of  
his murderous frenzy? Presenting, at first, a bassoon line that could be heard as mimetic of 
the wind, Kreutzer develops the bassoon part into a sound that is unmistakably 
instrumental, first a ringing announcement of presence, then an eerie high-pitched 
sustained trill, and finally a call-and-response passage shifting from the upper to the lower 
register of the bassoon. The confusion remains, however, as to whether the listener is 
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encountering these sounds of the bassoon from the detached perspective of the narrator or 
the erratic perceptions of Knight von Beutelschnapp. 
Throughout the song, Kreutzer plays with the perspective through which the 
accompaniment is filtered, making a joke of the tones and gestures of the bassoon while 
Adelgunde von Beutelschnapp hears them as no less than sweet and enrapturing. In 
addition, Kreutzer continually shifts the function and significance of instrumental sounds. 
Thus, while it offers a delightful musical drama in miniature, “The Dead Bassoon” can also 
be read as a commentary on the strange mutability and multiple incarnations of the 
instrument and instrumental sound. The music of the bassoon functions as accompaniment 
to a song ( oth in “The Dead Bassoon” and in the diegetic music of the serenade), as voice, 
as an undetermined sound read as a sign of life or howling of the wind, and as the ghostly 
residue of the lovers’ passion. The  assoon itself, in addition to  eing a mere instrument, 
acts as a proxy for male anatomy and as corpse. 
 
Transformation 
The title of Robert Schumann’s “Die wandelnde Glocke,” from Lieder für die Jugend, 
translates to the dou le meaning of “The Transforming Bell” or “The Walking Bell,”  oth 
of which accurately descri e the events of the narrative. Goethe’s versified cautionary tale 
recounts the story of a little boy who avoids church in favour of playing in the fields. His 
mother warns him that if he does not go to church, the bell will come after him, but he 
takes no heed. Out playing, he notices that the bell has stopped ringing. Then, to his horror, 
he sees the bell coming after him, threatening to cover him up. He immediately runs to the 
church and never misses services again. 
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Die wandelnde Glocke The Wandering/Transforming Bell 
Es war ein Kind, das wollte nie  There was a child who never would 
Zur Kirche sich bequemen, agree to go to church, 
Und sonntags fand es stets ein Wie,  and every Sunday he found some reason 
Den Weg ins Feld zu nehmen.  to make his way into the fields. 
 
Die Mutter sprach: die Glocke tönt,  His mother said: “The  ell is ringing, 
Und so ist dir's befohlen,  and so you’re commanded to go; 
Und hast du dich nicht hingewöhnt,  and if you haven’t made it a ha it, 
Sie kommt und wird dich holen.  it will come and get you.” 
 
Das Kind, es denkt: die Glocke hängt  The child thinks: “The  ell is hanging 
Da droben auf dem Stuhle.   up there among the roof girders.” 
Schon hat's den Weg ins Feld gelenkt, He has already turned his steps toward the fields, 
Als lief' es aus der Schule.   as if he were running out of school. 
 
Die Glocke, Glocke tönt nicht mehr, “The  ell,  ell is no longer ringing; 
Die Mutter hat gefackelt.   Mother was talking nonsense.” 
Doch welch ein Schrecken hinterher! But what a fright behind the child! 
Die Glocke kommt gewackelt.  The bell comes toddling along. 
 
Sie wackelt schnell, man glaubt es kaum; It toddles  uickly, you’d scarcely  elieve it; 
Das arme Kind im Schrecken,  the poor child is terrified, 
Es läuft, es rennt, als wie im Traum; he runs, he dashes, as if in a dream; 
Die Glocke wird es decken.   the bell is going to cover him up. 
 
Doch nimmt es richtig seinen Husch But now the child starts to put on speed, 
Und mit gewandter Schnelle,  and with skillful swiftness 
Eilt es durch Anger, Feld und Busch he hastens through common, field, and bush 
Zur Kirche, zur Kapelle.   to the church, to the chapel. 
 
Und jeden Sonn- und Feiertag  And every Sunday and holiday 
Gedenkt es an den Schaden,   he remembers that transgression offense, 
Läßt durch den ersten Glockenschlag and lets himself be summoned by the first bell-toll 
Nicht in Person sich laden.   not to be sent for in person.
 331
 
 
The poem opens with a classic Märchen formulation “Es war ein Kind,” and 
Schumann instructs the performers to present the Lied “Im erzählenden Ton,” emphasising 
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that the song is presented from the distanced position of a narrator. The central figure of 
the song, the boy, does not have a voice, in the sense that his representation does not 
feature song or dialogue, but only reported internal thought presented by the narrator. And 
yet, despite the emphasis placed on narration in the vocal part, the song as a whole seems 
to take place in a grey area between the fairy-tale realm and the real world of the child. In 
the case of this song, the singer/narrator, with his contained and detached perspective, feels 
more removed from the scene than the accompaniment, which gives indirect expression to 
the perceptions and emotions of the boy and, thus, an excess of life to the bell that he so 
fears.  
Schumann immediately weaves the reality of the instrument into the fabric of the 
Lied by opening with the dark, oppressive sound of a tolling bell in g-minor. By depicting 
the bell musically, Schumann renders it a living presence within the world of the song, and 
begins to establish a basis upon which the listener can later suspend his or her disbelief in 
the impossibility of a bell coming to life (Example 18). 
 
Example 18: Schumann, “Die wandelnde Glocke,” Op. 79, no. 18, measures 1-4.332 
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 Ro ert Schumann, “Die wandelnde Glocke.” In Sämtliche Lieder für eine Singstimme mit 
Klavierbegleitung, Volume 2, ed. Alfred Dörffel and Max Friedländer (New York: C.F. Peters, n.d.) 
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As the song progresses, and the mother warns the boy that the bell is calling him, the 
transformation of the bell into an animate character is first suggested (Example 19). The 
bell-toll motive is com ined with the shouting of the mother to suggest the child’s 
identification of the bell with her authority. That the mother and church-bell can exist in a 
sort of grotesque parallel with one another seems less odd when their similarities are 
considered from the point of view of the child - both tower above him, organise his sense 
of time, and dictate his behaviour. 
 
 
Example 19: Schumann, “Die wandelnde Glocke,” Op. 79, no. 18, measures 11-15. 
 
The point of transition in the Lied, where the  ell’s latent animation is transformed into 
 uite literal animation, occurs when the  oy scoffs at his mother’s warning (“Die Glocke, 
Glocke tönt nicht mehr”; Example 20, measures 26-29). The bell, indeed, is no longer 
ringing, and it is not long before the boy discovers the cause - the bell has descended from 
the tower and is coming after him! In measures 30-34 (Example 20), Schumann transforms 
the aural depiction of the swinging bell, associated with the tolling motive, into a heavy, 
trudging motion and the sound related to it, transforming the natural swinging of the bell 
into an unmistakable depiction of motion. In the accented F-major and E-diminished 
seventh chords of these measures, Schumann is able to convey both the ghastly animation 
of the  ell and the terror of the  oy. The  oy’s horror comes to the fore and reaches fever 
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pitch when he realises that the bell is going to envelop him. Having presented the bell as an 
animate authority figure, Schumann focuses on the  oy’s fear in order to cement the child’s 
perspective and thereby ground the transformation of the bell (Example 21). The  oy’s 
mixture of credulity and horror-struck disbelief is conveyed  y Goethe’s allusion to dream-
states (“als wie im Traum”) and Schumann’s use of shifting tonalities, emphasised  y 
creeping semi-tone motion and applied diminished seventh chords. 
 
 
Example 20: Schumann - “Die wandelnde Glocke,” Op.79, no. 18, measures 26-34. 
 
Example 21: Schumann - “Die wandelnde Glocke,” Op.79, no. 18, measures 39-42. 
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 “Die wandelnde Glocke” presents the  ell as an independent  eing that gains the 
free animation suggested by its sound: the swinging of the tolling bell transforms  into a 
rolling gait. In this instance, motion and sound are necessarily linked, but it is only once 
the bell has transformed and begins to chase after the boy that the opening tolling motive is 
fully understood as the voice of an animated instrument on the verge of turning sound into 
movement. And yet, a less fantastic possibility also seems imbedded in the song: the 
suggestion that the bell is strangely connected to the mother. As I pointed out, Schumann 
dou les the mother’s speech with the  ell motive. Perhaps the guilty boy, swayed by his 
mother’s threats, imagines her skirts as the swaying  ell and collapses maternal and 
religious authority into one horrifying figure. 
The presentation of the  ell’s sound through the intermediary of the piano allows it 
to exist suspended between the sensible explanation of the mother-as-bell and the 
märchenhaft possibility of the bell coming to life. In some regards, the listener is presented 
with the psychological realism of portions of the accompaniment, which present the  oy’s 
very lifelike emotional reactions to the situation and seem to place the events in reality. 
This realism is at odds with the sing-song character of much of the narration and the pat 
cartoonishness of the text, which conversely point to the imaginary world of fairy tales. 
 
Extrapolation 
This chapter  egan with E. T. A. Hoffmann’s sketch of string  ass player Antonio Dall’ 
Occa and an invitation to imagine one of the superfluously sketched heads of the 
instrumentalist sitting atop the neck of the string bass, usurping the position of the peg-box 
and rendering the human-instrument figure, already substantially intermingled, altogether 
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grotesque. Though the proposition was somewhat facetious, if we did play along and 
envision Dall’ Occa’s head supplanting the pegbox, what we would see would not be too 
dissimilar from the quite common design of the hurdy-gurdy. On these instruments, from 
the mid-eighteenth century onward, carved finials featuring a human head regularly served 
as a design flourish, even on otherwise rather plain models.
333
 By the nineteenth century, as 
the instrument fell somewhat out of favour, these ornate examples of the instrument could 
even be seen in the hands of street musicians.
334
 
I draw attention to the design of this instrument, not to argue that luthiers conceived 
of their hurdy-gurdies as somewhat alive or human, but rather to ground my reading of 
Schu ert’s setting of Wilhelm Müller’s poem “Der Leierman,” or “The Hurdy-Gurdy 
Man,” in which the notion of the living-dead instrument is brought to its most 
psychological and enigmatic realisation. The final song of Winterreise sees the wanderer 
engaging in rare human contact with an old hurdy-gurdy player: 
Der Leiermann    The Hurdy-Gurdy Man 
 
Drüben hinterm Dorfe   Over there beyond the village 
Steht ein Leiermann,   Stands a hurdy-gurdy man, 
Und mit starren Fingern   And with frozen fingers 
Dreht er was er kann.   He plays what he can. 
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 Susann Palmer with Samuel Palmer, The Hurdy Gurdy (London, David & Charles, 1980), 27, 145-
47. 
334
 The carved-head finial was hardly an unusual choice for string instruments with embellishments, as 
Leppert notes. Richard D. Leppert, Arcadia at Versailles: Noble Amateur Musicians and Their Musettes 
and Hurdy-gurdies at the French Court (c. 1660-1789) (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1978), 105-6; 
Palmer, The Hurdy Gurdy, 169. For instance, an al umen image  y one of Fox Tal ot’s associates (c. 
1850) presents a youth with a hurdy-gurdy; and though he is clearly poor, with bare feet and torn pants, 
the hurdy-gurdy he plays is ornamented with  ar er’s pole  lack -and-white purfling and a carved head 
finial. Palmer, The Hurdy Gurdy, 184. 
  
215 
 
 
Barfuss auf dem Eise   Barefoot on the ice 
Wankt er hin und her,   He staggers to and fro, 
Und sein kleiner Teller   And his little plate 
Bleibt ihm immer leer,   Remains ever empty, 
 
Keiner mag ihn hören,   No one cares to hear him,  
Keiner sieht ihn an,    No one looks his way, 
Und die Hunde knurren   And the dogs snarl 
Um den alten Mann.   At the old man. 
 
Und er lässt es gehen   And he lets it 
Alles wie es will,    All go on as it will, 
Dreht, und seine Leier   Cranks, and his hurdy-gurdy 
Steht ihm nimmer still.   Never stands still. 
 
Wunderlicher Alter,   Strange old man, 
Soll ich mit dir geh’n    should I go with you? 
Willst zu meinen Liedern   Will you grind your hurdy-gurdy 
Deine Leier dreh’n    Along to my songs? 
 
 
While Wilhelm Müller’s poem presents the encounter in a more-or-less 
straightforward, though eerie, manner, Schu ert’s song amplifies  our doubts, present 
throughout the cycle, a out the central character’s sanity. By fashioning the 
accompaniment of the song as a pianistic representation of a hurdy-gurdy’s drones and 
simple melody, and alternating this instrumental representation with the voice of the 
wanderer, Schubert frames the song as an interaction, even a conversation, between two 
characters, as opposed to the impression of distance and immobility produced by the poem 
in isolation. The dialogue that Schubert creates, however, takes place between the wanderer 
and the instrument: the hurdy-gurdy stands in for the old man, speaking for him. In the 
context of this “conversation,” and the close presence of the hurdy-gurdy man that it 
implies, the absence of speech on his part    his absolute immateriality in the world of the 
song, save for the sounds of the hurdy-gurdy    creates an unsettling suspicion in the 
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listener that perhaps he is not there at all. Only the verbal address of the wanderer, 
certainly an unreliable narrator, attests to his existence. At this point, the listener might 
notice the su tle mention in the text that “no one cares to hear him, no one looks his way,” 
an ambiguous remark that could suggest the old man’s social invisi ility or actual non-
being. 
As Schumann does with his  ell in “Das wandelnde Glocke,” Schu ert represents 
the hurdy-gurdy through the piano, only here it dominates the accompaniment, rising to the 
status of duet partner. As Cone points out, the status of this sound is usually understood as 
being influenced by how the wanderer hears the music.
335
 But, in my view, the question is 
not what the wanderer hears, but what he understands the music as revealing. For Herder, 
each sound is expressive of an inner being. Sounds reveal and stir inner beings.
336
 But what 
is revealed, what is expressed by the music of the hurdy-gurdy? In the song, as in the 
poem, the instrument is hardly a consideration: merely a dead thing to be played quasi-
mechanically. Schubert treats the hurdy-gurdy in kind, abstracting from it all signs of life 
by repeating a limited number of short musical fragments with very little variation and 
emphasising the instrument’s immova le drone. In this way, it is also the inverse of 
Hegel’s statement, visited earlier: we cannot imagine the mechanical sound as an infusion 
of a musician’s inner life, as the voice of the old man. The music of the hurdy-gurdy, 
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denied virtuosity, does not achieve the animating spark that would transmit the artistic 
soul.
337
 
The music, rote and soulless, seems to deny the presence that the wanderer speaks 
into being. And yet, we know that our impressions conflict with those of the wanderer, who 
imagines that an individual spiritually akin to himself is responsible for the music, who 
fabricates the company of a soul from those barren sounds. I suggest a more extreme 
interpretation than Susan Youens’ reading, though  oth are in the same vein. Rather than 
figuring the old hurdy-gurdy man as the wanderer’s dou le, as Youens suggests,338 I 
understand the instrument itself as a Doppelgänger, like Antonie’s violin. The wanderer’s 
fractured mind, hearing sounds he himself produces on a simple instrument and staring into 
its carved face, conjures a short-lived persona from a hurdy-gurdy’s tones. The hurdy-
gurdy is the perfect instrument for bringing into being this state of confusion. It is an 
instrument at once mechanical and manual, and its design, as discussed above, lends itself 
to a fantastic reading that reflects the anxieties and enthusiasms about the merger of human 
and instrument in performance. 
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“Der Leiermann,” unlike the other song and narratives I have considered, does not 
feature what we might think of as the animation of an instrument. The hurdy-gurdy does 
not sound itself or perform motions, and indeed has the effect  of voiding even the 
possibility of animacy, dispersing the illusory performer who gives it life. The presentation 
of the world of the song, through the distancing intermediary of the piano and the 
undependable account of the wanderer, can do no more than evoke the ambiguity of the old 
man’s existence. Yet, if Schu ert’s song suggests to us that the wanderer himself is playing 
the instrument and hearing these barren sounds as kinship, then the song reads as all the 
more devastating. 
This song demands of the listener an impossible double hearing, where the sparse 
music of the hurdy-gurdy is at once the voice of the wanderer’s imagined companion and 
the stumbling tune of his own instrument. It asks us to see the living-dead instrument as 
concurrently alive and lifeless, rather than as the flourishing of spirit in latency. As such, it 
collides all of these collected hopes, fantasies, and delusions about the transformative 
powers of music with stark nihilism. The living-dead instrument, then, achieves its state of 
utmost ambiguity in the world of song, where layers of perception create an irresolvable 
juxtaposition of the instrument as conscious being and lifeless matter.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
In his exploration of the romantic symbol, Umberto Eco poses an unanswered  uestion: “is 
the Romantic symbol the instance of an immanence or of a transcendence ”339 The answer, 
for this dissertation, falls firmly to the former. The theory of the synecdochal romantic 
symbol that I read into early nineteenth-century aesthetics and that plays out in several 
musical uncanny themes throughout this study is dependent on this simultaneity of symbol 
and symbolised. I would not go so far as to claim that music, as  Romantic symbol, is 
always an immanence. The “ ipolar two-world model,” which places the ordinary world of 
common reality and the sublime art-realm in opposition, is a well-established and richly 
supported paradigm that thrives on the idea of transcendence.
340
 When one reads 
Hoffmann’s “Ritter Gluck,” for instance, or the greater part of Wackenroder’s musical 
writings, this is the vision of music that is presented. However, while this idea of music 
meshes well with Hegel’s aesthetics and provides a sense of continuity with eighteenth -
century musical thought, its position as the dominant early nineteenth-century musical 
model needs to be reexamined. 
 In manifestations of the musical uncanny, music reveals the absolute as immanent 
within itself; paralleling this relationship on a lower plane, and one tied more closely to 
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musical practice, the musical instrument reveals the human soul as immanent within itself. 
Neither, music nor the musical instrument are exceeded in this manifestation: rather, they 
are necessary components. Throughout this dissertation, I make recourse to the notion of  
metamusical activity, music that self-consciously refers to music (the dated signals of 
ombra music, the transformed significance of the waldhorn, the representation of 
instruments through the piano accompaniment of a Lied are all examples of this process). 
In order to demonstrate immanence, music must draw attention to itself. It must insist on 
its co-presence with the Absolute, however unlikely a shell it may seem. 
 Over the course of this study I identify, with the aid of nineteenth-century music 
criticism and literary works, an assortment of musical techniques that are perceived as 
uncanny. To the redirected ombra and horn topics and the confusion of instrument and 
voice mentioned above, I add the juxtaposition of the sonorities of two instrument groups  
in alternation,
341
 music that halts and recommences as though calling attention to an inner 
force, irregular or obsessive repetition (especially when rejecting resolution), an unusual 
emphasis on pulse, music that seems to strip away its materiality, making itself transparent, 
and strange combinations of sonorities. As acknowledged throughout the dissertation, many 
of these musical techniques have been called uncanny by previous scholars. However, t hese 
local moments of uncanniness, in my reading, are activated by the philosophical, critical, 
and literary basis that I present. To my thinking, without this context they simply sound 
strange and disorienting – uncanny in the weak sense of the word, as only one arm of the 
constellation without the full complexity of its aesthetic meaning that lies at the center. 
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 As I specified at the outset, this study has been interested in why music becomes 
uncanny in the early nineteenth-century and what uncanniness, as a historically specific 
idea, means for music. In the course of this investigation, I find that musical 
uncanniness, according to its nineteenth-century definition, is a fundamental element of 
German musical Romanticism: an essential counterpart to the dominant concept of 
musical transcendence. However, while the conception of the musical art becomes 
marked with uncanniness, musical works that calls this uncanniness into manifestation 
are uncommon. Musical uncanniness lies in secrecy, in latency, in silence – waiting to 
emerge.  
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